Illustrations - why professionals oppose imprecise requirements

Two articles published in today's Rocky Mountain News deserve special attention:

1. Computer deal gags criticism

2. Refund due on late vote software

In mid-2003, Colorado’s Secretary of State held a hearing to allow people to make a brief statement about the database project.

The Secretary of State did not listen, and the public’s concerns were not addressed. See notes from the meeting at: Requirements for Colorado Statewide Voter Database - June 19, 2003 .

When unqualified citizens pretend to be doctors, they risk arrest and incarceration.

Unqualified government employees are pretending to be systems designers. Who will stop them, before they do great harm?

Colorado’s failed statewide voter database project clearly illustrates why unqualified people should not be designing systems.

County Clerk Linda Salas should immediately withdraw her draft RFP and follow the CAMBER recommendations.

Boulder County officials infuriate the public.

Linda Salas, Boulder County's Clerk and Recorder, published a draft Request for Vendor Proposals for a new vote tabulating system - RFP.

The RFP is massive in scope and conflicts with most of the requirements expressed by citizens over the past couple of years.

• Read CAMBER's RFP response, including an alternate plan.

• Read CAMBER's Open Records Request intended to reveal information about how the RFP was developed and how public comments will be evaluated and incorporated.

Salas allowed only 2 business days for public comment. Community leaders objected strongly to the Clerk and to the County Commissioners.

In response to the outpouring of public criticism the two day comment period has been extended by an additional 4 business days to January 4th.

CAMBER recommends that the RFP be replaced by a more prudent proposal -- after it has won the people's endorsement.

Choose candidates wisely.

Our December 5th request, for an audience with Gigi Dennis, Colorado Secretary of State, failed. She did receive the request. She did not reply. Click here to read the request.

Our September 1st request and Black Box Voting’s request for Boulder County public records both failed. We believe that these records can be used to prove whether or not Boulder County’s election system is verifiably secure and accurate and whether any ballots are, “marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it.” The State and the County have chosen to protect the vendor, and themselves, rather than the public.

On a much broader scale, the Secretary of State and the Boulder County Clerk continue to refuse to address our long standing concerns about the integrity of the election system.

• Skilled professionals have voiced deep concerns that Colorado’s voting system is not transparent, not independently verifiable, not secure, and not accurate.
  
• The national press is filled with reports of inadequate system requirements and of major failures in electronic voting equipment. They are also filled with reports of the incompetent testing procedures used to certify these systems.
  
• Most elected officials and their staffs are not competent to address these issues, and they refuse to accept help from competent professionals. As stated in the December 5th letter,
  
  “The thinking and procedures of the elections staff has been seriously corrupted. They are not accountable to the people. Their work is not technically competent. They are not being measured against standards for secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent elections.”

It is time to call a halt to the amateurish work-products of Colorado’s Secretary of State and County Clerks. It is time to open the election system design and development process to those among the public who understand security and accuracy, how to design systems that allow for independent verification of each election process, and what is required to make the election system fully transparent while preserving voter privacy.

It seems to me that there is no place in our government for elected officials who refuse to address the concerns of the people.

The Secretary of State and County Clerks are coming up for election.

Choose candidates wisely.

Colorado's election system is out of control

Ginette Dennis December 5, 2005
Colorado Secretary of State
1700 Broadway
Denver, CO 80290

Dear Ms. Dennis:

It is vital that you and I meet privately as soon as possible.

As you might recall, we notified you in our October 9th letter that the voter registration project is untrustworthy and in serious trouble. Your predecessor ignored our many recommendations, beginning June 3, 2003, and our warnings to not enter into the contract (see attached). We offered you our specific suggestions regarding the incompetently conceived system. You should be congratulated for “pulling the plug” on the Accenture contract; knowledgeable people are very upset that it took so long.

Colorado’s entire election system is in urgent need of reform. October 9th we recommended six specific actions for you to take to resurrect Colorado’s failed election system. So far, with the exception of the Accenture contract termination, either nothing or, as with the case of Rule 45, something bad has been permitted to happen. From our perspective:

1. Non-secret ballots. State has taken no action to protect voters from the use of non-secret ballots.
2. Non-existent accountability and transparency. State is collaborating with various counties to block independent oversight of the November 2005 election.
3. Harmful election rules. State, on November 10th, adopted the incompetent and harmful Election Rule 45.
4. Incoherent election system. State has done nothing to bring competent professional talent and the public into its election system development process.
5. Inadequate Voting Equipment RFP. State has not recalled the incompetent and harmful RFP for Election Voting Systems - CDOS-RFP-2005-001.
6. Untrustworthy voter registration system. State has done nothing to bring competent professionals and the public into the registration system development process.

You’re getting your input from the wrong people – elections staff. The thinking and procedures of the elections staff has been seriously corrupted. They are not accountable to the people. Their work is not technically competent. They are not being measured against standards for secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent elections.

Immediate reform is urgently required. When can you and I meet?

Al Kolwicz
CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com/

Colorado faces a serious election problem.

Which is the surest way to win an election? (1) Raise money, recruit volunteers, sell your message, and get out your voters? Or, (2) recruit one person employed by the County to hack the vote?

Colorado faces a serious election problem. Leon County, Florida, has dumped its Diebold voting equipment. According to the reports, insiders can manipulate election results when using Diebold voting equipment. They can do this without leaving any trace of the tampering.

Twenty three of Colorado’s 64 counties use Diebold voting equipment. Boulder County’s HART/InterCivic voting equipment uses a “smart card” similar to the card that was manipulated during the Leon County demonstration. Can it too be hacked?

Many computer professionals question the security and accuracy of Colorado’s voting equipment. Colorado’s Secretary of State has steadfastly refused to permit the public to independently verify whether or not Colorado elections are secure and accurate.

Colorado legislators, led by then Secretary of State Donetta Davidson and State Senator Ken Gordon, enacted massive election reform, SB05-198/206. Colorado Voter said at the time, “These bills limit independent election oversight and legalize unsound and deceptive election procedures.” http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com/2005_06_05_coloradovoter_archive.html

The problem is actually much more serious than it appears. Newly appointed Secretary of State, Gigi Dennis recently enacted Election Rule 45 which makes it even easier for counties to acquire and use faulty voting equipment. Computer expert, Paul Walmsley, carefully described the problems with the rule. His constructive analysis was ignored, http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com/2005/10/paul-walmsleys-comments-on-colorado.html

Also, the Secretary of State is actively seeking proposals for voting equipment. The request for proposal (RFP) has been seriously criticized by computer professionals, including Colorado Voter, http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com/2005/10/colorado-releases-secret-rfp-for.html The combination of rule-45 and this RFP will compromise Colorado elections for years to come.

Colorado voters need to speak to their representatives and to the Secretary of State about this mess. The people in charge of elections are way over their heads when they are asked to make decisions involving high tech. When officials bring in outside experts, they select people who are friends rather than the most competent technologists.

Officials may be “good people” but they are doing a great disservice to our community when they refuse to open election systems to the harsh scrutiny of truly independent oversight.

Colorado elections can no longer be trusted until they are truly transparent and it can be independently verified that each election is secure and accurate.

• Schneier on Security
  Leon County, FL Dumps Diebold Voting Machines http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/12/leon_county_fl.html

• Miami Herald
  New tests fuel doubts about vote machines
  http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/13410061.htm

• Black Box Voting.ORG
  Devastating hack proven - Leon County dumps Diebold
  http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/15595.html

• Leon County, Florida, Elections Supervisor
  Special Report: Black Box Voting Attempts to Penetrate The Leon County Florida Optical Scan Voting System.
  http://www.leonfl.org/elect/SpecialReport.asp
  
  

Colorado Counties that use Diebold Voting Equipment

• Adams
  Douglas
  Mineral
  Weld
  Alamosa
  Eagle
  Montezuma
  Yuma
  Archuleta
  El Paso
  Ouray
  El Paso
  Broomfield
  Hinsdale
  Pitkin
  La Plata
  Costilla
  La Plata
  Saguache
  Weld
  Delta
  Larimer
  Teller
  
  

Colorado Election Rule 45, “Certification of Voting Equipment”, silently adopted

Colorado Election Rule 45, “Certification of Voting Equipment”, was silently adopted on November 10th.

See Rule 45 in Colorado Secretary of State Election Rules.

Our concerns have not been addressed. We anticipate major problems resulting from this adoption.

Paul Walmsley's Comments on Colorado Election Rule 45

A brief reading of Colorado Secretary of State Election Rule 45 regarding Colorado's Voting System Certification Standards reveals several significant problems that should be resolved. The comments below describe some of these problems and proposes solutions in the form of an improved standards drafting process.

Several different versions of Rule 45 exist on the Secretary of State's web site. The following comments refer to what is apparently the most recent version of Rule 45, labeled "RULE 45 - 10-03-05" [1]. Furthermore, the comments below should not be considered a comprehensive review of Rule 45.

1. The State's voting system certification standards must be precisely written, and many sections of Rule 45 are not. This imprecision make it impossible to convert those into verifiable, testable metrics.

1.1. One example of this imprecision is section 45.5.2.1.1, which states that "the voting system shall exhibit an evolution towards new technologies," an abstract requirement which is never concretely elaborated. Another is section 45.5.2.3.8, which states that "the environment in which all databases in the subsystem are maintained shall include all necessary provisions for security and access control," without describing the actual security and access control provisions required. The practical requirements of these and other sections are unclear to the point of being meaningless. While statements of general guiding principles are important, they must be concretely defined with specific, testable criteria in standards documents.

1.2. Rule 45's performance standards also are very imprecisely defined. They make references to operational terms which have no publicly-accepted meaning, and which are not defined in the Rule's glossary, and extend the meanings of other terms, apparently to include other processes. For example, section 45.5.2.2.1 refers to "counting ballots", but does not define whether this process includes the process of casting ballots, as implied by the inclusion of the DRE requirement in subsection (b), or whether it includes the process of ballot scanning, as implied by the optical scan subsections (a) and (c), or whether it includes the process of vote tabulation, which on many systems is separate from the vote casting and ballot scanning processes. Section 45.5.2.2.2 refers to terms like "election media download" and "ballot style assignment" which are not defined - it's not clear whether these terms refer to pre-election preparations, or to the actual ballot casting process. It is also unclear whether these performance requirements refer to individual DRE or vote scanning machines, as implied by section 45.5.2.2.1; or whether these metrics refer to the voting system as a whole, including all of the DRE or vote scanning machines. Testing conformance to the performance requirements in Rule 45 is practically impossible unless the processes under test are rigorously defined.

1.3. The above examples represent only a portion of unclear requirements in Rule 45. These types of imprecision in a certification standards document is undesirable. It creates loopholes by which vendors may certify equipment to the letter of the Rule that does not meet the intention of the Rule. It also fosters confusion as to the Rule's true requirements.

2. The State's voting system certification standards should define performance requirements that specify the maximum amount of time required to perform real-world tasks required in an election, rather than requiring metrics which are not useful for Colorado elections, as are defined in Rule 45. For example, section 45.5.2.2.1 requires a minimum ballot counting rate requirement of 100 ballots per hour for central count optical scan ballots. Such a minimum requirement may be useful for Hinsdale County, Colorado, with only a few hundred voters; but is not useful for Denver County, Colorado, with hundreds of thousands of potential voters. Vendors should instead be required to demonstrate that their system is capable of completing the specified election action in a reasonable election time frame. For example, a more meaningful version of section 45.5.2.2.1 would require voting systems to complete the vote count in a specified maximum number of hours.

3. The parts of the State's voting system certification standards that pertain to computer security and cryptography should be written and reviewed by experts in those fields. This is not the case for at least the information security sections of Rule 45, which were clearly not written or reviewed by experts in the field. For example, section 45.5.2.7.2 refers to "a minimum encryption requirement of 40-bit encryption." Presumably Rule 45's authors are trying to ensure the privacy and integrity of election records that are transmitted over public networks. But section 45.5.2.7.2 does not do this - in fact, it is technically meaningless. For it to be meaningful, the vendor must provide full cryptographic protocol and implementation details, including details on key generation, entropy collection, message authentication, and sender and recipient authentication. These details must be reviewed by experts in cryptography and information security.

4. The State's voting system certification standards should require mandatory compliance with the EAC's Voluntary Voting System Standards [2] - Rule 45 does not require this. These standards are intended to represent the state of the art in voting system standards, and unlike Rule 45, have received nationwide public review. If Colorado's standards are to live up to the Secretary of State's description of them as "one of the most challenging and thorough programs in the country," they should at least require compliance with the latest standards guidance developed by the Federal Government.

5. The State's voting system certification standards should explicitly forbid vendors from submitting "confidential" or "trade secret" information for certification as documentation or application responses to ensure maximum openness and transparency, and Rule 45 does not do this. A vendor could conceivably claim "trade secret" status for significant portions of the documentation required to comply to the rule. This would prevent the public from engaging in any meaningful review of the voting systems, and would conflict with the Secretary of State's commitment to an "open and transparent" voting system certification process [3]. The Colorado voting system standards should forbid the vendor from claiming "trade secret" status for any documentation provided to the State examiners, given the special public trust requirements for voting systems.

6. The State's voting system certification standards should include a glossary which includes all of the terms in the standards which do not have clear public usages, and should build on glossaries already created in the federal voting system standards. But as noted previously, Rule 45's glossary does not contain entries for terms like "election media download," which do not have commonly-accepted unambiguous meanings in elections. Additionally, terms like "Ballot Image" are ambiguously defined. For example, it is unclear whether a "ballot image" refers to cast vote records, or to graphics files depicting the scanned paper ballots from optical scan systems.

7. The State's standards should require vendor systems to support live auditing procedures [4], which Rule 45 does not require. Live auditing is the process of continuously evaluating the accuracy and functionality of election systems during an election using live ballots. Without mandating vendor support for live audit techniques, the accuracy of the election system can only be tested before or after an election, and such testing is inadequate to assure election accuracy.

Many of the principles that motivate Colorado's voting system standards seem well-intentioned. However, the specific manifestation of these standards in the present Rule 45 does not measure up to these principles. It is my belief from a cursory examination of Rule 45 that the problems cited above are not simply endemic to the sections quoted above, but exist throughout the document. This suggests that the public would best be served by committing to a different standards-making process than was used for the Rule under discussion.

A better standards-making process would include the following principles:

• It should be continuously edited by staff experienced with the precise language necessary to define standards.
• It should involve independent subject matter experts outside the Secretary of State's area of expertise.
• All drafts should be released to the public for ongoing comment throughout the drafting process.
• The document should strive to avoid duplicating existing Federal standards, and should draw on existing work, both at the Federal level and standards work by other states. In particular, the State should mandate compliance with the existing EAC Voluntary Voting System Guidelines.
• It should first be articulated in a general set of requirements for voting system performance that are then translated into specific, testable, concrete requirements. For example, a general requirement that "election voting system records and data must be secure from tampering and unauthorized interception" can be translated into specific technical requirements that serve that general principle. Similar general principles and concrete requirements should be articulated for accessibility, reliability, live auditability, speed, and other desirable aspects for Colorado's voting systems.

It is also troubling that Rule 45 was adopted in emergency, before any opportunity for comment or review by independent subject matter experts or the public. Rule 45 seems rushed, and it is a matter of some concern that voting systems may be certified under the emergency rule that would not be certifiable under a more deliberate Rule, either revised from the current rule or rewritten. Therefore, I encourage the Colorado Secretary of State to:

• Revoke the emergency adoption of Rule 45,
• Commit to an open public comment and revision process for a revised voting system standard before it is adopted, and for all future revisions, and
• When revised standards are complete, require immediate re-certification of all equipment certified under the emergency adoption of Rule 45.

Sincerely,

Paul Walmsley paul@pwsan.com
Boulder, Colo.

Footnotes

1. http://www.elections.colorado.gov/DesktopModules/Downloads/download.aspx?tid=501&_iid=193

2. http://guidelines.kennesaw.edu/vvsg/guide_toc.asp

3. http://www.elections.colorado.gov/DDefault.aspx?tid=501

4. http://www.booyaka.com/~paul/ea/eac-20050930/interpretation-live-audit.txt
http://www.booyaka.com/~paul/ea/eac-20050930/tabulation-live-audit.txt
http://www.booyaka.com/~paul/ea/eac-20050930/live-audit-overview.txt

Secretary of State asked to withdraw proposed election rule

Colorado Secretary of State Gigi Dennis has been asked to withdraw a proposed election rule scheduled for hearing on Monday, October 31st. The proposed rule, Rule 45, would establish standards for the certification of voting equipment.

Security and computer professionals who criticize the rule say they have identified illustrative problems and described specific actions that they would like to see taken.

“Voting systems certified under this rule will disenfranchise voters, prevent transparency, and produce untrustworthy elections,” according to Al Kolwicz, executive director of CAMBER, Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results.

Public comment on the rule is solicited at Monday’s 1:30 p.m. hearing. Hearing materials are published on the Secretary of State’s website.

CAMBER’s comment letter to Secretary of Stae Dennis follows.

=======================

Gigi Dennis
Colorado Secretary of State
1700 Broadway
Denver, CO 80290

October 28, 2005

We have reviewed the revised Rule-45, published on the Internet as of October 28, 2005 11:20 AM, and identified as “8 CCR 1515-1 Proposed Election Rules of the Colorado Secretary of State - Redline - 10/24/05”. We have also reviewed the Regulatory Analysis dated October 13, 2005.

We strongly recommend that the Secretary of State (1) withdraw this Rule-45, (2) cancel the October 31st hearing, and (3) withdraw Emergency Rule-45 which was adopted October 3, 2005. All three of these steps are required to stop the implementation of this inadequate certification procedure and the purchase of untrustworthy equipment.

It is not meaningful for us to submit line-by-line recommendations. The rule is grossly inadequate. Known problems are not addressed. The regulatory analysis is superficial. It is vital, to the voters of Colorado, that the proposed rule be scrapped.

We have identified illustrative problems, and described specific actions that we would like to see taken, in letters to the Colorado Secretary of State, October 8 and 9, 2005, correspondence with the Elections Division, July 25 – October 4, 2005, and with the federal Election Assistance Commission, September 29, 2005. We have attached these communications and include them as a part of our official comment.

Illustrative commentary, addressing only some of the more recent concerns, is published at http://www.coloradovoter.blogspot.com/ see:

• Does the Secretary of State Represent the People? - 10/11/2005
• Colorado is up to new mischief – 10/9/2005
• Colorado releases secret RFP for voting systems – 10/4/2005
• CAMBER comments re: Voluntary Voting System Guidelines – 9/30/2005
• Colorado Security plan deemed worthless – 9/22/2005
• Violation of Colorado Constitution -- voter privacy – 9/20/2005
• Colorado proposed rules fail to address known issues – 8/1/2005

Voting systems certified under this rule will disenfranchise voters, prevent transparency, and produce untrustworthy elections. It is vital to the citizens of Colorado that this rule be withdrawn, the hearing cancelled, and Emergency Rule 45 be withdrawn. It is vital that the Secretary of State immediately establish an open and bi-directional process to create a secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent election system to serve the people.

Al Kolwicz

CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com/

CAMBER is a dedicated group of volunteers who are working to ensure that every voter gets to vote once, every vote is counted once, and that every ballot is secure and anonymous.

Boulder County officials hiding from sunshine

TO THE PRESS:

Yesterday we sent you a word document and a note alerting you to the fact that Boulder County is suppressing Sunshine.

Later, we received the following e-mail from the county.

Today, we are informed, in an article published in the Daily Camera that Boulder County voters are being disenfranchised because they are not getting their mail ballots http://www.dailycamera.com/bdc/county_news/article/0,1713,BDC_2423_4187316,00.html

There are at least four BIG stories here:

1. CAMBER anticipated the problems with mail ballots. They published an extensive analysis of the 2001 mail ballot election which documented the problems that are inherent to the voting method. The county and the state know about these problems and continue to force this insecure, inaccurate, and unwanted method of voting upon the voters. Officials have refused to address the problems identified in the 2001 report.

2. Since October 2nd this year, CAMBER has attempted to get copies of the records and files that would enable CAMBER to detect problems with the ballots and mailing. The county has erected a series of concentric fences to block and deny CAMBER's legitimate Open Records Request. The most recent illustration of their blocking and stalling is the response from the county pasted below. The letter to which the county is responding is posted at:
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com/2005/10/boulder-county-refuses-open-records.html As you can see, the county is saying that they will not provide the data in time to use it for the current election. This stinks.

3. The problem with mail ballots is not unique to Boulder County. Arapahoe County has sent two ballots to each voter in at least four precincts. There is increasing chatter about voters who have not received their ballot, and nobody knows how many voted ballots do not make it to the clerk on time -- if ever. One cannot rely on election results that are so compromised.

4. When offered the opportunity to conduct elections by mandatory mail ballot, 60 percent of Boulder County voters said NO. Amendment 28 was soundly defeated in 2001. Boulder county Commissioners voted to conduct the current election as a mail ballot only election BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT A MAIL BALLOT ELECTION WOULD HELP PASS REF C. It isn't right that officials should use the method of voting as a tactic to raise taxes and eliminate term limits.

Election officials have assumed the role of masters rather than the role of public servants. This must be corrected immediately.

Check this out, and please inform your readers what is going on.

Al


Al Kolwicz
CAMBER - Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://ColoradoVoter.blogspot.com


-----Original Message-----
From: Bailey, Shelley [mailto:sbailey@co.boulder.co.us]
Sent: Tuesday, October 25, 2005 2:51 PM
To: alkolwicz@gmail.com
Cc: Liss, Josh
Subject:

Mr. Al Kolwicz
CAMBER
Original via e-mail

I am in receipt of your letter dated October 20 in which you made serious accusations regarding the County's intentions with regard to our response to your October 6, 2005 Open Records Request, and allegations that the response was inadequate.

I am now in the process of reviewing your October 20 letter with respect to your reiteration and clarification of your October 6 Open Records Request. After my review of those items, I will respond as follows:

1) To the extent your October 20 letter provides clarification or information that allows me to release additional documents to you, I will inform you of the situation and schedule a time for you to inspect the documentation; and

2) To the extent my answer to any given item remains the same, I will state that fact.

In addition to discussions about your October 6, Open Records request, you also made new Open Records requests in your October 20 letter. Our office will not be able to respond to the new requests until after the election. The Clerk has adopted a rule that allows her office, under certain circumstances to delay responding to Open Records Requests. (Please let me know if you would like me to fax this document to you, in which case I will need a fax number, or if you would like for me to mail it to you.) The authority for adopting this rule is as follows:

1) C.R.S. § 24-72-203(1)(a) states, "All public records shall be open for inspection by any person at reasonable times, ... but the official custodian of any public records may make such rules with reference to the inspection of such records as are reasonably necessary for the protection of such records and the prevention of unnecessary interference with the regular discharge of the duties of the custodian or the custodian's office."

Due to the fast approaching election day and the fact that the Clerk's office is devoting all of its resources to meet this impending deadline, the Clerk has determined that it is reasonably necessary for the prevention of unnecessary interference with the regular discharge of the duties of the Clerk's office to delay responding to any Open Records requests (which meet the defined criteria) from October 17, 2005, until after the election. See also, Citizens Progressive Alliance v. Southwestern Water Conservation Dist., App.2004, 97 P.3d 308. (Colo. App 2004)

2. Pursuant to C.R.S. 24-72-203(3)(b)(III) a custodian may have additional time to respond to an Open Records Request when " [a] request involves such a large volume of records that the custodian cannot reasonably prepare or gather the records within the three day period without substantially interfering with the custodian's obligations to perform his or her other public service responsibilities" or, if, "[a] broadly stated request is made that encompass all or substantially all of a large category of records and the agency is unable to prepare or gather the records . . . because (A) The agency needs to devote all or substantially all of its resources to meeting an impending deadline or period of peak demand that is either unique or not predicted to recur more frequently than once a month." C.R.S. 24-72-203(3)(b)

3. Finally, Citizens Progressive Alliance v. Southwestern Water Conservation Dist., App.2004, 97 P.3d 308 (Colo. App 2004)t, allows for situations under which an agency may not be able to respond within the additional seven day extension provided by statute. "A records custodian cannot be sanctioned for failure to comply with the time limits in 24-72-203(3)(b) in situations where . . . compliance with a request within those time limits is a physical impossibility." In this case, the Clerk's office is devoting its entire staff to fulfilling its statutory obligations to meet the requirements of the upcoming election. Your additional requests involve voluminous documents and it is not possible for the Clerk's office to fulfill your request and continue to perform its statutorily mandated duties for the upcoming election.

Therefore, as stated above, I will respond to your October 20 letter regarding your previous requests as soon as possible. With regard to your additional requests, pursuant to the Clerk's rule, the Clerk's office will respond to your requests within 20 days after the election. However, I will also make every effort to provide a response to you sooner than the above stated deadlines, if at all possible. In order to respond to your additional requests, as set forth herein, I will need your request on the County's official Open Records Request Form. That document has been sent to you previously on several occasions. If you would like another copy sent to you, please let me know by e-mail response.

Sincerely,
Shelley Stratton Bailey
Assistant County Attorney

Please comment on proposed rule

Friends,

Despite our strong recommendations to do otherwise, the Secretary of State intends to stuff Rule-45 down the throats of the people of Colorado.

Rule-45 will establish an inept certification procedure as the law of the land in Colorado. We have appealed for a procedural change wherein the people would have a voice in this process. To date our appeals have been rejected.

I hope that you will take the time to study the document and submit comments. If this rule is adopted, we are guaranteed poor elections for years to come.

• A rulemaking hearing will be held on October 31, 2005 at 1:30 p.m. in the Secretary of State’s conference room, Suite 270, 1700 Broadway, Denver, Colorado 80290.
  
  All interested persons will be afforded an opportunity to be heard on the subject of additions to the “Rules Concerning Certification of Voting Equipment”.
  
  Subject of the Proposed Rulemaking - Rules establishing procedures for implementation of Title 1, Article 5, Section 616 concerning the minimum standards for electronic and electromechanical voting systems.
  
  A copy of the proposed Rule-45 is available at 8 CCR 1515-1 Proposed Election Rules of the Colorado Secretary of State - Redline - 10/24/05

Dangerous and growing disconnect between the people and the government

An opinion article published in Boulder's Daily Camera today talks about the dangerous and growing disconnect between the people and the government.

It is worth reading, and thinking about.

If we cannot stop this trend we risk losing our way of life.

Dean Schooler is a friend of freedom loving Coloradoans. I hope you will read his opinion at:
Schooler: Standing on principle is not 'mal-intent'

Boulder County refuses open records request

We strongly object to Boulder County’s October 17th response to our October 2nd Colorado Open Records request.

Boulder County’s delays, objections, refusals, and cost barriers are nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to hide records needed to independently determine whether or not Boulder County has faithfully conducted an election which is secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent.

Boulder County does not have the authority to arbitrarily deny our request and hide from public scrutiny, records that might embarrass the County.

In its October 17th reply, Boulder County asserts that it has exerted essentially no control over the preparation and mailing of ballots. If this is actually true, the public has a right and a need to know.

We provide below a detailed response to your objections. We have temporarily moderated our request so that you can produce detailed descriptions of some files rather than the files themselves. This will give both of us time to work thru the legality of your refusal to produce records.

We are aghast to read in your response that there exist massive voids in the procedures used to monitor and control the security, accuracy, verifiability and transparency of this election. These voids threaten the integrity of this election which includes monumentally important statewide and local contests.

If these voids actually exist, Boulder County is failing in its duty to represent the best interests of the voters by assisting the Colorado Legislature and Secretary of State complete their constitutional duty to “secure the purity of elections, and guard against abuses of the elective franchise” – Colorado Constitution, Article VII, section 11.

If these voids exist, the seeds of distrust are planted, and there is no rational basis for trusting the results of this election as conducted by Boulder County.

We must have access to the records we have requested, or there will be no accountability for this election.

1. We do not understand the security risk to which you refer. The ballot images we wish to analyze have not been voted. Un-voted ballot images are not what the Secretary of State ruled on.
A. Ballot printing specification -- We assume that there was a computer file or files which contain information about voters, precincts, and ballot styles. This data, we assume, was needed to produce the PDF files. It is this file(s) we refer to when we speak of “files that were transmitted by Boulder County to HART”.

These files do not contain ballot images. We ask that the county produce a descriptive list of and copies of these computer files immediately.

B. Un-voted ballots – We do not accept your explanation of why you refuse to fulfill our request to produce the PDF files.Until this dispute is resolved, we ask that you at least provide complete descriptive information about the files. This does not require producing copies of the 353 PDF files.

The identification (name) of each file and its date and time of creation.
The identification of the ballot style of the ballot images on each file.
The identification of the specific computer/software upon which each file was created.
The identification of the person or persons who produced each file.
The number of ballot images on each file.
The serial numbers of the ballots on each file.

Because of delayed compliance, we ask that the county immediately produce complete descriptive information for at least a sample of these files.

C. Official return envelopes -- In addition to un-voted ballots, supporting materials were printed including the official return envelope. We assume that there was a computer file or files produced which contains the data printed on the official return envelopes including: voter name, address, precinct, ballot style, and possibly other information. These files do not contain ballot images. We ask that the county produce a descriptive list of and copies of these computer files immediately.

2. Since ballot packets have already been mailed, we now have access to live ballot packets.

A. Some ballots were delivered unsealed. Were not the ballot-packets to be sealed when they were mailed? Please provide a copy of the procedures used to verify that the envelopes were sealed.
B. The sample ballots you refer to are not exact photocopies of real ballots. For example, they do not include illustrative bar code/serial information. Please provide a descriptive list or matrix of all 353 ballot styles that identifies precinct, style, and number of ballots printed for each style.
C. We requested a copy of the Official Ballot Envelope (to include the voter-specific printing). Since we now have our own ballots to examine, we will no longer require a copy of the Official Ballot Envelope from the county.

3. Your response does not satisfy our request.

A. Version verification – If we correctly understand your reply, the county has no idea of which versions of software are loaded into the machines used to prepare the ballots. Does not the county create and maintain a record of exactly what software and hardware is used to create ballots and other election materials? Is it not required to maintain controls over the hardware and software being used to conduct Boulder County elections? Please expand your response.
B. Certification verification - If we understand your reply, the county has made no attempt to verify that the software used was certified. Hopefully this is an error in our interpretation of your response. Please expand your response, and also:
Are you aware that filed with the Secretary of State on September 13, 2004 is an unresolved, “formal complaint against the HART InterCivic electronic vote-tabulating equipment and the HART InterCivic election administration equipment”?
Are you aware that BOSS 3.4.0 and Ballot Now 2.1.0 are not included in the list of certified versions of HART products listed on the Secretary of State website?
C. Unapproved data transmission – We have been unable to locate in the Boulder County Mail Ballot Plan or its Security Plan any reference to data transmission of election materials including ballots and voter lists. Please provide a copy of the authorization to transmit via data communications the ballots and voter lists performed. Please provide a copy of the procedures used to secure and verify the security of these materials.

D. Verification procedure - We cannot tell from your description exactly how it was “verified that the ballot envelopes were labeled and inserted with the correct ballot style corresponding to the voter listed on the label”. Please provide a copy of the procedure and control sheets that show: Who did what and when on which ballots & envelopes. Records of errors detected and error free pieces. Detailed procedure and supporting data used to ensure that each voter got the correct ballot in their ballot packet.

4. We will need to discuss the ethics of paying money to Boulder County for data needed to exercise our right to verify that only eligible electors were provided ballots, that electors were provided the correct ballots, and that all eligible electors were provided a ballot. How much would you charge us to produce the files you suggest?

Because of delayed compliance, we ask that the county immediately produce a complete descriptive list of these computer files. We intend that you include any USPS Address Verification report files.

In closing, oOur concerns are legitimate and justified, and the county’s reply is not responsive.

As you are no doubt aware, Arapahoe County failed to perform its duty to protect the ballot box. They have mailed duplicate ballots to an undefined number of voters in at least four precincts. See Rocky Mountain News, October 19, 2005, “Some Arapahoe voters receive duplicate ballots”.

We insist that Boulder County immediately produce the files and records we have requested, or at least immediately produce the detailed descriptions of the files and copies of the records we have requested.

If these files and records are not timely produced, we will be denied our right to determine if any elements of the election should be challenged. And to file challenges if appropriate.




Al Kolwicz

CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com

CAMBER is a dedicated group of volunteers who are working to ensure that every voter gets to vote once, every vote is counted once, and that every ballot is secure and anonymous.

Does the Secretary of State represent the people?

Ginette Dennis
Colorado Secretary of State
1700 Broadway
Denver, CO 80290
BY FAX: (303) 869-4861

October 9, 2005

Dear Ms. Dennis:

Since you are new to the office of Secretary of State, we assume that you are not aware of the history of improper, strained relations between the Elections Division and members of the public.

Colorado’s Elections Division is squandering a tremendous opportunity to earn confidence in our election system. The division has blocked true public participation in the formulation of election policies and procedures and the protection of elections from fraud, error and incompetence. It rejects the assistance offered by competent professionals, and consistently hides from public purview the election system’s deficiencies and problems.

The division is out of control, and it is failing to deliver trustworthy elections. The division operates without the benefit of accountability and transparency. It insulates itself from public and professional oversight and the law. It has been permitted to operate unilaterally, in secret, and to disregard public inquiry and election complaints. As operated, the division exists to serve the interests of election officials and equipment suppliers, rather than the public interest.

Worse, no independent body reviews election division dictates, and there is no way for the public to assert its rights.

We recognize that you aren’t accountable for the things that have happened in the past. However, we call to your attention some things that are happening now, on your watch.

• Non-secret ballots. The Elections Division has authorized Boulder County to use non-secret ballots. ACTION: Reinforce anonymous ballot protections in election statutes and rules.
• Non-existent accountability and transparency. The elections division is operating without benefit of independent scrutiny. Problems are hidden; formal objections to division dictates are consistently rejected by the division; and there is no accountability. ACTION: Endorse formation of a truly independent Elections Accountability Board to represent the interests of the public rather than the interests of election officials.
• Harmful election rules. Election rules are being developed in a non-professional, hodgepodge manner, and are inadequate to serve the need. ACTION: Immediately rescind the October 3, emergency Rule-45, before it is used. Procure an independent and competent technical review of the statutes and rules. Adopt a new rulemaking model based on true public participation (not “public comment”).
• Incoherent election system. Colorado does not have a professionally developed, publicly endorsed election system. It has no coherent set of requirements and no architectural framework. Election statutes, rules, and local procedures are incomplete, imprecise, ambiguous, and conflicting, resulting in the unequal treatment of voters under the law. ACTION: Create a plan for the comprehensive professional make-over of the entire election system. Gain endorsement by the legislature and the public.
• Inadequate Voting Equipment RFP. The RFP is not precise, not quantified, and does not take reasonable steps to ensure that elections will be secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent. It is not an adequate statement of Colorado’s election system requirements, and does not incorporate the recommendations of experienced, knowledgeable professionals who have offered their expertise. ACTION: Immediately recall the RFP. Re-do the RFP based on the revised requirements and architecture.
• Untrustworthy voter registration system. The statewide voter registration system is being developed in the dark. We do not trust that there are adequate provisions for security, accuracy, verifiability and transparency. The vendor is receiving harsh criticism in other states, and reports indicate that Colorado is now finding problems. ACTION: Avoid the “Colorado benefits management system” nightmare; take a time-out. Before the registration system is deployed, conduct an extensive and detailed public discussion. Listen and respond to the concerns of Colorado professionals. Ensure a two-way discussion that affords adequate opportunity for the public to ask questions, resolve differences, and get commitments for solutions.

You have been given the incredible opportunity to reform the elections division, and restore confidence to those Coloradoans who care about trustworthy elections.

Until it is verified that each election is secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent, there should be no public trust of election results.

We appeal to you to intercede in behalf of the people. If you choose to be the people’s representative, we will do all that we can to help you.

Al Kolwicz

CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com

CAMBER is a dedicated group of volunteers who are working to ensure that every voter gets to vote once, every vote is counted once, and that every ballot is secure and anonymous.

Colorado is up to new mischief

Colorado’s election division is up to new mischief. It has opened the door for election officials to purchase voting equipment that is not secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent. The administrative gimmick being used to authorize this travesty is Emergency Rule 45. ACTION is needed to prevent this travesty.

September 15th, the Secretary of state announced an October 31st rulemaking hearing on the subject of draft Rule 45 -Rules Concerning Voting System Standards for Certification.

October 3rd, the Secretary of State approved and enacted as an Emergency Rule, an identical Rule 45 -Rules Concerning Voting System Standards for Certification. There was no hearing announcement, no draft, and no public hearing on the emergency rule. It was done in the back room.

What does this mean? It means that the Secretary of State may legally use the October 3rd emergency rule to get around public opposition to the September 15th rule. If public opposition were to delay adoption of the September 15th rule, then the identical, October 3rd emergency rule is the law. The public is shut out.

Emergency Rule 45 can be used by election officials to purchase voting equipment that does not meet the standards sought by competent Colorado professionals and does not conform to Federal Guidelines. The emergency rule can be used by the elections division to help equipment vendors sell untrustworthy equipment and lock up the Colorado market for the next decade. Rule 45 is a bad deal for Colorado.

Analogous federal standards are currently under development by the Election Assistance Commission. These standards have been heavily criticized by computer and security professionals for many of the same reasons as is rule 45.

Along with experts in security, privacy, computing, software and quality, CAMBER has recommended a major redirection of the approach being taken by the EAC – see CAMBER recommendations to the EAC.

Interested members of the public should review the draft Rule-45 and make comments to the Secretary of State well before the October 31st hearing. Demand that officials provide complete answers before the hearing is closed.

CAMBER is develping comments for the October 31st hearing. So that we may track what is happening, please send a copy of your comments to AlKolwicz@qwest.net .

Regarding the October 3rd Emergency Rule, CAMBER filed the following objection:

• 
  
  October 8, 2005
  
  Dear Ms. Dennis:
  
  We are in receipt of your October 3, 2005 “Notice of Temporary Adoption” of Emergency Rule-45 – Concerning Voting System Standards for Certification.
  
  We wish to file the strongest possible protest and beg that you withdraw this rule before it adversely affects the people of Colorado.
  
  Aside from the fact that we were not notified of this pending action and aside from the fact that the rule can and surely will be used to disadvantage the people of Colorado, the rule is not competently formed. If implemented, it would deprive the public of equal protection under the law. It would legitimize actions that are not in the best interests of, and would cause irreparable injury to, the public. It would result in excessive cost to the taxpayers.
  
  We ask that you immediately rescind your temporary adoption order until you have had an opportunity to hear and respond to the public’s concerns.
  
  Al Kolwicz, CAMBER
  
  .

Discredited voting system fails again

Boulder County's discredited HART/Intercivic voting equipment has failed again. It is unable to read votes on ballots that are folded.

Since the ballots were folded by HART, there is nothing that voters can do to protect their vote.

In "County voting faces more woes", the Daily Times-Call reports that seven of 429 ballots were misread during a test run. This is a huge error. It is more than three times the number required for a mandatory recount.

How did this system pass federal and state certification tests? Are the testing procedures real, or are they a hoax intended to give the public false confidence in voting equipment?

Why is this system being used in Boulder County, since it failed during both the 2004 Primary and General elections?

The “ballot fold” problem demonstrates yet again that the HART system is totally unreliable and must be immediately discarded – BEFORE it is used to count votes for the November election.

The county’s planned solution is unacceptable. There is no guarantee that all ballots with creases will somehow be detected by the ineffective and untrustworthy equipment and resolved as intended.

And the county’s solution exposes the voter’s vote to accidental or intentional change by workers. It exposes "good" votes to cancellation by "bad" votes.

On this ballot, county officials are attempting to extend their own terms of office and increase their own budgets. Simple concern for the appearance of impropriety dictates that the untrustworthy Hart/Intercivic system must not be used to decide this election. Surely the results would be challenged in court.

The Boulder County Clerk should file an immediate request with the Colorado Secretary of State to authorize removal of the HART/Intercivic equipment from this election.

Colorado releases secret RFP for voting systems.

Colorado's Secretary of State has secretly developed and published (October 3, 2005) a massive Request for Proposal -- http://www.elections.colorado.gov/WWW/default/Voting%20Systems/Colorado_Voting_Systems_RFP_2005_10_03.pdf

This is an arrogant display of insensitivity to the public and an arrogant presumption of technical infallibility.

This RFP will influence/control the purchase of all voting equipment in the State of Colorado. The stated goals of this RFP are:

1. To select a Preferred Vendor for which the CDOS Elections Division will provide election setup and tabulation software support to counties that choose to purchase the Preferred Vendor’s system;
2. To purchase and maintain training, support, upgrades, hardware and software from the Preferred Vendor for use by he CDOS Elections Division to achieve goal 1.
3. To establish documented pricing for voting system vendor products and services that may be utilized by Colorado election officials during their voting system procurement efforts from the Preferred Vendor; and
4. To allow for existing methods of procuring voting systems by County election officials to exist independent of the Preferred Vendor models.

For many months, CAMBER has asked to work with the Secretary of State to ensure that the RFP would represent the needs of the public. State has stalled and stalled. Just today, the Election Division’s website shows that the RFP has been completed and released. Obviously State was stalling us while secretly developing the RFP. See the correspondence below for the background.

A quick reading of the RFP is enough to discover that all we feared has now happened. While voluminous, the work is pitifully incomplete and does not establish a basis for the evolution of a secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent election system in Colorado.

The people in the Secretary of States’ office have, through their actions, announced their total disregard for the public. They have also made the arrogant statement that they are infallible and the only ones who matter.

If I could, I would make the Secretary of State withdraw this RFP and establish the public process that we have requested.

If you can, please do something to make the Secretary of State withdraw this RFP and establish the public process that we have requested.

-------------------

From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2005 8:33 AM
To: Dana Williams (Dana.Williams@SOS.STATE.CO.US)
Subject: FW: Request for Information

Ms. Williams,

It was my understanding that I was to submit SOS correspondence to you. Is this correct?

----------------------

From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Sunday, October 02, 2005 2:43 PM
To: Dana Williams (Dana.Williams@SOS.STATE.CO.US)
Subject: FW: Request for Information

Ms. Williams:

Did you receive the following request?

-----------------------

From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Wednesday, September 28, 2005 2:16 PM
To: 'Dana Williams'
Cc: 'Bill Hobbs'; 'Bill Compton'; 'Patti Fredrick'; 'Len Vest'; 'Wayne Munster'; Dr. Charles Corry; Joe Pezzillo; Pete Klammer; Ralph Shnelvar
Subject: RE: Request for Information

Ms. Williams:

Thank you for the partial response to our queries.

Later today we will be sending you an appeal of the Secretary of State’s decision to authorize Boulder County’s use of illegal non-anonymous ballots. What is the independent forum for public debate and resolution of this appeal?

It appears, from your partial response, that the comments and recommendations raised in the September 21st CAMBER to Liss Analysis and Recommendations of the Boulder County Mail Ballot Election Plan were not considered by the Secretary of State. We have received no response from Boulder County. If it is true that the Secretary of State did not consider our comments and recommendations, we will make an appeal. What is the independent forum for public debate and resolution of this appeal?

We have not received a response to our comments and recommendations regarding the Boulder County Security Plan. We have received no response from Boulder County. Has the Secretary of State approved it? If so, we will make an appeal. What is the independent forum for public debate and resolution of this appeal?

We have not received a response to our request for an extensive public presentation of the SCORE system before it is deployed. Is it the intention of the Secretary of State to grant our request?

Please consider this e-mail a formal request for a comprehensive, and public, regulatory analysis of the October 31st Rules draft. Also, we have not received a response to our request for an independent and competent technical review of the proposed rules – before the draft is circulated. Is it the intention of the Secretary of State to grant our request?

We have not received a response to our request for publicly developed requirements for the voting system. We have not received a response to our request for public participation in the development of the RFP.

We have not received a response to our request to review the State’s plan for the development of a comprehensive election systems, to include functional and performance specifications. What is the plan to develop this?

Please confirm that you have received this e-mail and our request for a regulatory analysis.

-------------------

From: Dana Williams [mailto:Dana.Williams@SOS.STATE.CO.US]
Sent: Wednesday, September 28, 2005 9:54 AM
To: AlKolwicz
Cc: Bill Hobbs; Bill Compton; Patti Fredrick; Len Vest; Wayne Munster
Subject: RE: Request for Information

Mr. Kolwicz:

The Secretary of State's office did receive your fax dated September 21, 2005 concerning Boulder County's mail ballot plan and we responded to you in writing. As you know, we approved Boulder County's mail ballot plan on September 21. As always, we appreciate the issues raised in your letter, but we saw no legal basis for disapproving the plan submitted to this office. We looked carefully at the issues raised in your letter, however, the plan and timetable are in compliance with Title 1, Article 7.5 of the Colorado Revised Statutes and the Colorado Secretary of State Election Rules.

The Secretary of State has announced a rulemaking hearing schedule for October 31, 2005 at 1:30 p.m. to take public testimony for our rules concerning certification of voting equipment. The hearing is located in the Blue Spruce Room at 1700 Broadway, Denver, Colorado 80290. Written and oral data, comments and arguments, will be received form all interested parties. Written submissions must be filed at or before the commencement of the hearing on October 31, 2005 at 1:30 p.m. in order to be considered. The Secretary of State staff is in the process of completing draft rules and will post them on our website shortly. We hope you can submit your comments or attend the hearing to give us your feedback concerning the rules.

I hope this information is helpful.

Thank you,

Dana Jaclyn Williams
Public Information Officer
Secretary of State's Office
1700 Broadway, Suite 250
Denver, CO 80290
(303) 894-2200 ext. 6108
(303) 869-4860 Fax
dana.williams@sos.state.co.us
www.sos.state.co.us

-----Original Message-----

From: AlKolwicz
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2005 11:26 AM
To: Dana Williams
Cc: Bill Hobbs; Bill Compton; Patti Fredrick; Wayne Munster; Dr. Charles Corry; Joe Pezzillo; Sheila Horton; Pete Klammer
Subject: Request for Information

Ms. Williams,

We have been attempting, since July 25th, to gain access to certain information regarding Colorado Elections projects.

Today we learned that we are to direct our queries to you.

Has the Secretary of State responded to our FAX sent September 21?

Has the Secretary of State considered our analysis and recommendations of the Boulder County Mail Ballot Election Plan?

Has the Secretary of State considered our criticism of Boulder County’s Security Plan?

We have requested an extensive public presentation of the SCORE system before it is deployed. A simple demonstration will not suffice. There are several technologists who are concerned that the system will not be secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent. The non-transparent methods used to develop the system have left a lot of bad feelings. It is the last chance to engage the public. After all, the recent failing of the benefits system should alert you to the risks of pushing something out before it has public support.

We have requested procedures for requesting a regulatory analysis. The response was a “catch-22” whereby we would be required to make a request before we can possibly know that a proposed rules change is to be heard. The procedure used for the August 2nd rules hearing was totally unsatisfactory. It is not enough for SOS to “allow” the public to write comments. Written, “I feel your pain”, acknowledgements would not be an adequate response to the public input. The public is the CUSTOMER. Will you commit to an open and timely regulatory analysis including an independent and competent technical review of all future proposed standards and rules? See C.R.S. 24-4-103(4.5).

Regarding the RFP – we are concerned about the lack of agreed to ELECTION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS. We want the public to have a chance to participate in the development of the draft requirements. Currently the SOS plans to perform this work in secret. It is our experience that requirements, once documented, tend to be defended by the staff that develops them, and the public needs are essentially excluded. Will you commit to an open process before it is too late?

Regarding the voting system architecture, performance and functional specifications, etc. – there are a number of books that describe the path to excellence here. Also, we have written some illustrative lists, not intended to be comprehensive, of functions to be included and performance factors to be achieved. We’re happy to discuss them with you. Colorado needs a comprehensive systems plan. What is the plan to develop this?

Election officials and the public appear to be approaching the election system from incompatible directions. We believe that the customer of the election system is the public – which includes the voters, political parties, contestants, etc. Responsiveness to public suggestions and queries suggests that SOS believes that the customer is the election official. It is our experience that the customer decides the requirements, accepts (or rejects) the finished system, evaluates its performance and pays the bills. If we do in fact differ in our understanding of who is the customer, we should resolve this issue first.

Time is a-ticking. I hope that you will use your good office to respond to our requests, and bring the public into the process before battle lines are inadvertently drawn.

-----------------

From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Tuesday, September 20, 2005 4:38 PM
To: Len Vest (len.vest@sos.state.co.us)
Subject: Follow up and some new data

Hi Len,

We are still waiting for responses to our five requests. Don’t you agree that it has been an excessive wait?

As you consider the RFP, I’ve attached a “testimonial” for AutoMark.

----------------------------------------

From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Wednesday, September 07, 2005 10:51 AM
To: 'Len Vest'
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP

Hello Len,

Just in case our outstanding requests have been misplaced, please accept this as a reminder message.

“As you know, our requests include (1) SCORE, (2) voting system standards, rules and regulatory analysis, (3) RFP requirements, (4) voting system architecture, performance and functional specification, and (5) transparency.”

Thanks

---------------------

From: Len Vest [mailto:Len.Vest@SOS.STATE.CO.US]
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 3:49 PM
To: AlKolwicz
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP

Will do. By the way, most of the items in your list don’t impact this November’s election. They will all impact 2006 elections.

Len Vest
Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
Colorado Department of State

-----Original Message-----

From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 11:12 AM
To: Len Vest
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP

Thanks Len,

Please let me know how we can help expedite action.

As you know, our requests include (1) SCORE, (2) voting system standards, rules and regulatory analysis, (3) RFP requirements, (4) voting system architecture, performance and functional specification, and (5) transparency.

We are concerned that time to protect the November election is running out.

--------------------------

From: Len Vest [mailto:Len.Vest@SOS.STATE.CO.US]
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 11:01 AM
To: AlKolwicz
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP

Good Morning Al,

I was out of town last week for clerk training. I did take your request with me in hopes of talking to Bill Compton (Elections Director) and Patti Fredrick (HAVA Director) about it. They are much more familiar with the procedures related to such a request, so I wanted them to give me direction. I will try to speak with them today, so I can give you feedback. I apologize for the delay. We are still working on the drafting of the RFP, so lots of work remaining to get it ready for release.

I’ll get back to you. Thanks, Len

Len Vest
Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
Colorado Department of State

-----Original Message-----

From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 10:01 AM
To: Len Vest
Cc: John Gardner; Dr. Charles Corry; Joe Pezzillo; Ralph Shnelvar; Pete Klammer; Ivan C. Meek; Sheila Horton
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP

Hi Len,

I am sure that you are very busy, but we are very concerned that our requests (below) are not being satisfied in a timely manner.

Are you the correct person to whom these communications should be addressed?

-----------------------------------

From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 9:39 AM
To: 'Len Vest'
Cc: 'John Gardner'; Dr. Charles Corry; Joe Pezzillo; Ralph Shnelvar; Pete Klammer; Ivan C. Meek; Sheila Horton
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP

Hi Len,

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss Colorado’s planned election system. Assuming that you will not object, I am adding some people to this conversation. These are people who are interested in, and could contribute to the success of Colorado’s election system.

1. Regarding SCORE – we hope that you are planning an extensive public presentation of the system before you deploy it. A simple demonstration will not suffice. There are several technologists who are concerned that the system will not be secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent. The non-transparent methods used to develop the system have left a lot of bad feelings. It is the last chance to engage the public. After all, the recent failing of the benefits system should alert you to the risks of pushing something out before it has public support.

2. Regarding new voting system standards and rules change – we have requested procedures for requesting a regulatory analysis. We want to use this mechanism to get answers to our questions. The procedure used for the August 2nd rules hearing was totally unsatisfactory. It is not enough for SOS to “allow” the public to write comments. Written, “I feel your pain”, acknowledgements would not be an adequate response to the public input. The public is the CUSTOMER. We need our concerns addressed, so we hope that the regulatory analysis will initiate an independent and competent technical review of the proposed standards and rules. We are referring to the analysis defined in C.R.S. 24-4-103(4.5);

(4.5) (a) Upon request of any person, at least fifteen days prior to the hearing, the agency shall issue a regulatory analysis of a proposed rule. The regulatory analysis shall contain:

• 
  (I) A description of the classes of persons who will be affected by the proposed rule, including classes that will bear the costs of the proposed rule and classes that will benefit from the proposed rule;
  (II) To the extent practicable, a description of the probable quantitative and qualitative impact of the proposed rule, economic or otherwise, upon affected classes of persons;
  (III) The probable costs to the agency and to any other agency of the implementation and enforcement of the proposed rule and any anticipated effect on state revenues;
  (IV) A comparison of the probable costs and benefits of the proposed rule to the probable costs and benefits of inaction;
  (V) A determination of whether there are less costly methods or less intrusive methods for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule; and
  (VI) A description of any alternative methods for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule that were seriously considered by the agency and the reasons why they were rejected in favor of the proposed rule.
  (b) Each regulatory analysis shall include quantification of the data to the extent practicable and shall take account of both short-term and long-term consequences.
  (c) The regulatory analysis shall be available to the public at least five days prior to the rule-making hearing.
  (d) If the agency has made a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of paragraphs (a) to (c) of this subsection (4.5), the rule shall not be invalidated on the ground that the contents of the regulatory analysis are insufficient or inaccurate.
  (e) Nothing in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this subsection (4.5) shall limit an agency's discretionary authority to adopt or amend rules.
  (f) The provisions of this subsection (4.5) shall not apply to rules and regulations promulgated by the department of revenue regarding the administration of any tax which is within the authority of said department.

3. Regarding the RFP – it is the “requirements” that you refer to that have us most concerned. It would be an opportunity missed if you were to complete a requirements statement in secret. Once requirements have been documented, staff will have much sweat invested in the document and will naturally tend to defend their own work rather than openly interacting the public. We encourage yo to open the process before it is too late.

4. Regarding the voting system architecture, performance and functional specifications, etc. – there are a number of books that describe the path to excellence here. Also, we have written some illustrative lists, not intended to be comprehensive, of functions to be included and performance factors to be achieved. We’re happy to discuss them with you.

We appear to be approaching the election system from incompatible directions. We believe that the customer of the election system is the public – which includes the voters, political parties, contestants, etc. It appears that SOS believes that the customer is the election official. The customer decides the requirements, accepts (or rejects) the finished system, evaluates its performance and pays the bills. If we do in fact differ in our understanding of who is the customer, we should resolve this issue first.

Time is a-ticking. I hope that you will use this opportunity to reconsider the direction you have chosen and bring the public into the process before you inadvertently draw battle lines.

----------------------------------

From: Len Vest [mailto:Len.Vest@SOS.STATE.CO.US]
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 4:43 PM
To: AlKolwicz
Cc: John Gardner
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP

Al,

I apologize for not getting back to you sooner. We have been busy with SCORE system testing over the past month. I’ll try to catch you up on where we are.

John has been working diligently on constructing new voting system certification standards for Colorado. During the process, it was recently determined that these standards need to be incorporated into the Election Rules. Therefore, within the next few days (I’ll alert you to when) we will be posting the new certification standards on our website for public review and feedback. They will be posted for comments for at least two weeks. These standards will be a key component of the forthcoming Voting System RFP.

You stated in your memo that Section 2 of our RFI indicated a very different set of requirements than what you understood from our last meeting. The purpose of the RFP is to establish pricing and contract terms with vendors who meet the requirements specified in the RFP and to select one vendor to be considered a “Colorado Preferred Vendor”. The SOS will support counties that select the preferred vendor by assisting with election software setup. This allows an option to the small counties that don’t have the expertise or staff to perform the software functions in-house. Counties that do not want or need to use the preferred vendors will have other vendors to work with as a result of the RFP and the Colorado certification process. They will also have agreed upon pricing and contract terms to utilize if they don’t want to negotiate on their own.

Vendors will be required to operate (once SCORE is operational) with a standard election setup import and election tabulation export with SCORE. You mentioned canvass board support and we see that, as it relates to the RFP, as voting system report features that facilitates the canvass board activities.

Our RFP will have diagrams of more than one scenario of how voting systems might function in Colorado counties. Of course, every polling place will need an accessible voting machine (DRE or electronic ballot marker). Some polling places may have precinct scanners and others may not. All counties will need a central scanner for absentee and mail ballot processing.

Regarding performance specifications and functionality specifications, does CAMBER have what they consider best practice examples from other jurisdictions or internally generated by CAMBER? If so, I would be glad to review and consider such input. We do want to serve the best interest of the voter through all phases of the voting process, including backend office transaction processing.

Thanks for your concern.

Len Vest
Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
Colorado Department of State


-----Original Message-----

From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 3:46 PM
To: Len Vest
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP

Len,

It is coming up on a month since we met. Have you had a chance to review our July 25th letter? (attached)

-------------------------------

From: Len Vest [mailto:Len.Vest@SOS.STATE.CO.US]
Sent: Monday, July 25, 2005 4:06 PM
To: AlKolwicz
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP

Yes, I was able to open the attachment. Will read tonight. We have been working on rules all day to get posted tonight. Tx, Len

Len Vest
Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
Colorado Department of State

-----Original Message-----

From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Monday, July 25, 2005 8:08 AM
To: Len Vest
Subject: Reaction to potential RFP

Len

Attached is a word document. Please let me know that you can open and read it.

Thanks

ATTACHMENT:

CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://www.coloradovoter.blogspot.com/


July 25, 2005

Len Vest
HAVA Deputy Director
Department of State
1700 Broadway, Suite 270
Denver, CO 80290

Dear Len:

Following our meeting Friday, I read the RFI. Section 2.0 describes a very different set of requirements than what I understood from our Friday meeting. Consequently, my initial reaction to your RFP is revised.

I see now that the project is not limited to (1) election definition, (2) Internet publication of interim vote totals, and (3) canvass board support. In fact, the RFP envisions a wide set of requirements.

Because of the apparent scope of the project, we are very interested in this RFP. Contrary to my Friday conclusion, my remarks Friday do in fact apply to this RFP.

Based on what we can extrapolate from the attached General and Specific Requirements, we strongly encourage you to suspend issuance of this RFP until you have:

Voting system diagram that includes the entire set of voting functions and how they interact.
Systems functional specifications that specify the required security, accuracy, verifiability and transparency requirements, the method for measuring each, and the acceptable range of performance values for each.
Explicit public endorsement of the systems diagram and functional specifications.

Without this documentation and public support, I believe that the public will fight the RFP. Such a fight is not necessary. I have the impression that you and your team want to serve the best interests of the public. A prolonged fight will subvert voter confidence and extend the distrust of the administration and the election system.

I strongly recommend that you suspend issuance of this RFP until you have proper documentation and public support.

Al Kolwicz

Al Kolwicz
Executive Director

2.0 Project Scope
2.1 General Requirements
The principal scope of the Colorado voting system acquisition project is to deliver, within the optimal project budget and time constraints, a modernized voting system, which equals or exceeds the functionality, reliability, and overall requirements of HAVA and the criteria of the CDOS. For the purpose of this RFI, a voting system will consist of accessible voting units for disabled voters, direct recording electronic (DRE) units, voter-verifiable paper audit trail (V-VPAT), optical scan ballot counters, a software package (including election definition, ballot preparation and tabulation), supplies, system documentation, training, equipment maintenance and support services. Voting systems used in Colorado must be capable of providing accurate and timely election results.

2.2 Specific Requirements
Basic requirements for voting system hardware and software to be acceptable for use in Colorado elections include:
• System Certification under 2002 Federal Voting System standards.
• Colorado Secretary of State Certification.
• Agreement by vendor to abide by Federal statutes, rules and regulations.
• Agreement by vendor to abide by Colorado statutes and Election rules.

CAMBER comments re: Voluntary Voting System Guidelines

Mr. Eustis:

This is the CAMBER comment on the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines.

Included in our comment is a copy of our August 24th letter to Ms. Hillman which is included below. Also included in our comment is a sketch of a brochure that outlines the level of documentation that we expect, see below.

The final technical guidelines should fit in a small pamphlet.

Please ensure that our comment is not rejected, is available to reviewers online, and will receive proper consideration and a response. If you wish, follow this instruction: (a) DELETE VOLUME I, (b) DELETE VOLUME II, and INSERT this document including its attachments.

Audience

It is clear to me that the TGDC has not spent enough time considering the audience for the guidelines. We believe that the audience includes: judges, attorneys, district attorneys, attorneys general, secretary of state, county clerks, election officials, legislators, political parties, political campaigns, Election workers, poll watchers, vendors, application developers, application and system testers, independent testing authorities, the public and the press.

A summary of the document is not a solution. For example, the Court, in order to decide a case being litigated before it, must comprehend and make its determination on the official document itself. The current work product does not meet the needs of its audience.

What is needed

A trivial example of what is needed might be helpful. Consider what the individual members of the TGDC would write if they were asked to document their personal requirements for a car. I would anticipate that their individual requirements could be grouped into fairly regular categories such as: comfort, safety, performance, price, operating cost, service, and warrantee. I anticipate that few, if any, members would differentiate between the type of ignition system used to start the engine.

The current guidelines are aimed at the wrong things, because they are not aimed at the right audience.

National expense

The direction that the work is heading would be prohibitively expensive to maintain and impossible to litigate.

CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com/

----------------------------------------------------------

August 24, 2005


Ms. Hillman,


Again I compliment you for your wonderfully insightful questions of panelists at yesterday’s EAC hearing in Denver. I deduce from your questions that you truly want to represent the interests of the public.

You don’t know me, so you won’t know how much weight to attribute to the following comments. I hope that you will take them seriously.

1. The problem that you and the other commissioners appear to sense with the VVSG is that the VVSG is both voluminous and complex. I concur with this appraisal. In fact, I would go a step further and say that the VVSG is unusable because of its volume and complexity. Writing a superficial overview will not suddenly make the VVSG useable. Editing the VVSG will not make it useable. The problem with the guide is fundamental -- it is aiming at the wrong target, and it is using the wrong ammunition.

a. The guide is incomplete (wrong target). The election system involves many components – the VVSP addresses very few of them. For example, the guide does not address public oversight, yet public oversight is a fundamental component of a trustworthy election process. The guide does not address procedures, such as authentication that a voter is the person who they claim to be. All of the components of the election system must be identified, and must be documented in a high-level systems diagram supplemented with a high level systems description. The diagram and description must be void of specific implementation details, and must not require change for different implementations. The current guide violates these precepts.

b. The guide addresses implementation-level details (wrong ammo). The VVSG should specify only: required results, measurement specifications for each result, acceptable performance for each result, and consequences when the required result is not achieved. HOW the result is achieved must be invisible in the VVSG. Instead, this guide is burdened with detailed descriptions of how things are to be done for specific implementations. For example, there is no general requirement that people and procedures be tested and measured. One of the problems with the approach taken in the VVSG is that it will require revision every time a new technology is introduced. Remember, it will take years before any VVSG change will be reflected in a majority of the nation’s voting systems. Unless changed to reflect principles rather than implementations, the VVSG will fail in its goal of returning public trust to the election system.

2. The proposal for accreditation of Testing Laboratories and the testing process itself is headed in the wrong direction.

a. Missing, for example, is a way to pay for the testing. The vendors should not pay, because that would compromise the integrity of the Testing Labs. The people should not pay for overly expensive or frivolous tests, and should be compensated through penalty fees, for poor vendor performance.

b. There is nothing proposed that will motivate vendors to withhold certification requests until they have a very high degree of confidence that the certification process will not discover a deviation between requirements and the implementation.

c. The role of the public, and in particular the interested professional computer scientists, is missing.

d. There is no penalty when a Testing Lab fails to detect problems that make it into production. How is a lab de-certified?

e. Who is accountable for the quality of the election process?

f. Also, because of the fundamental problems with the VVSG, described above, the Testing Labs are going to be testing the wrong stuff. There is a difference between systems testing that is aimed at requirements and architecture (what), and implementation testing that is aimed at implementation specifications (how).

Few people have the skills needed to draw the elegant line between requirements/architecture and the implementation specifications. The VVSG desperately needs these skills. Unless the VVSG is revamped, I anticipate that it will become a burden on the public. It will generate enormous costs, fail to deliver quality, and be rejected by the public as a solution to their concerns.

Finally, yesterday it was suggested by staff that only public comments that are specific to a page and line number will be considered. In my opinion, the VVSG problems are so severe that it is way premature to inspect spelling errors. Until focused on the correct target, and using the correct ammunition, it is too way early to do any fine tuning.

Is there anything you would like me to do to amplify these points?

Thank you for conducting your hearing in Denver. I look forward to working with you.

Al

Al Kolwicz
CAMBER - Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540

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Election System
Requirements

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Election Objects

Property
Person
Jurisdiction
Contest
Contestant
Unused Ballot
Cast Ballot
Election Results
Control Data & Audit Report

================================

Election Requirements

Requirement _____ Metric ______ Standard

Security
Accuracy
Verifiability
Transparency
Performance
Ease of use
Price
Cost
Cycle time
Support

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System Standards




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Election System Design Rules

• “Using the computer industry as an example, Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark develop a powerful theory of design and industrial evolution. They argue that the industry has experienced previously unimaginable levels of innovation and growth because it embraced the concept of modularity, building complex products from smaller subsystems that can be designed independently yet function together as a whole. Modularity freed designers to experiment with different approaches, as long as they obeyed the established design rules.” from Amazon.com

• "Process Synthesis, also known as Structured Conceptual Process Design, is a technique suitable not only for making a step-change in the existing process but also for synthesizing a process flowsheet from scratch.” From Process Design Center, The Netherlands
  
  

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WARNING

"We are fast approaching the stage of the ultimate inversion: the stage where the government is free to do anything it pleases, while the citizens may act only by permission; which is the stage of the darkest periods of human history, the stage of rule by brute force." - Ayn Rand, The Nature of Government

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CAMBER is a dedicated group of volunteers who are working to ensure that every voter gets to vote once, every vote is counted once, and that every ballot is secure and anonymous.


CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate
Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
Phone: 303-494-1540
E-mail: AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.ColoradoVoter.blogspot.com

============================