Boulder County's discredited HART/Intercivic voting equipment has failed again. It is unable to read votes on ballots that are folded.
Since the ballots were folded by HART, there is nothing that voters can do to protect their vote.
In "County voting faces more woes", the Daily Times-Call reports that seven of 429 ballots were misread during a test run. This is a huge error. It is more than three times the number required for a mandatory recount.
How did this system pass federal and state certification tests? Are the testing procedures real, or are they a hoax intended to give the public false confidence in voting equipment?
Why is this system being used in Boulder County, since it failed during both the 2004 Primary and General elections?
The “ballot fold” problem demonstrates yet again that the HART system is totally unreliable and must be immediately discarded – BEFORE it is used to count votes for the November election.
The county’s planned solution is unacceptable. There is no guarantee that all ballots with creases will somehow be detected by the ineffective and untrustworthy equipment and resolved as intended.
And the county’s solution exposes the voter’s vote to accidental or intentional change by workers. It exposes "good" votes to cancellation by "bad" votes.
On this ballot, county officials are attempting to extend their own terms of office and increase their own budgets. Simple concern for the appearance of impropriety dictates that the untrustworthy Hart/Intercivic system must not be used to decide this election. Surely the results would be challenged in court.
The Boulder County Clerk should file an immediate request with the Colorado Secretary of State to authorize removal of the HART/Intercivic equipment from this election.
Saturday, October 08, 2005
Tuesday, October 04, 2005
Colorado releases secret RFP for voting systems.
Colorado's Secretary of State has secretly developed and published (October 3, 2005) a massive Request for Proposal -- http://www.elections.colorado.gov/WWW/default/Voting%20Systems/Colorado_Voting_Systems_RFP_2005_10_03.pdf
This is an arrogant display of insensitivity to the public and an arrogant presumption of technical infallibility.
This RFP will influence/control the purchase of all voting equipment in the State of Colorado. The stated goals of this RFP are:
This is an arrogant display of insensitivity to the public and an arrogant presumption of technical infallibility.
This RFP will influence/control the purchase of all voting equipment in the State of Colorado. The stated goals of this RFP are:
- To select a Preferred Vendor for which the CDOS Elections Division will provide election setup and tabulation software support to counties that choose to purchase the Preferred Vendor’s system;
- To purchase and maintain training, support, upgrades, hardware and software from the Preferred Vendor for use by he CDOS Elections Division to achieve goal 1.
- To establish documented pricing for voting system vendor products and services that may be utilized by Colorado election officials during their voting system procurement efforts from the Preferred Vendor; and
- To allow for existing methods of procuring voting systems by County election officials to exist independent of the Preferred Vendor models.
For many months, CAMBER has asked to work with the Secretary of State to ensure that the RFP would represent the needs of the public. State has stalled and stalled. Just today, the Election Division’s website shows that the RFP has been completed and released. Obviously State was stalling us while secretly developing the RFP. See the correspondence below for the background.
A quick reading of the RFP is enough to discover that all we feared has now happened. While voluminous, the work is pitifully incomplete and does not establish a basis for the evolution of a secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent election system in Colorado.
The people in the Secretary of States’ office have, through their actions, announced their total disregard for the public. They have also made the arrogant statement that they are infallible and the only ones who matter.
If I could, I would make the Secretary of State withdraw this RFP and establish the public process that we have requested.
If you can, please do something to make the Secretary of State withdraw this RFP and establish the public process that we have requested.
-------------------
From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Tuesday, October 04, 2005 8:33 AM
To: Dana Williams (Dana.Williams@SOS.STATE.CO.US)
Subject: FW: Request for Information
Ms. Williams,
It was my understanding that I was to submit SOS correspondence to you. Is this correct?
----------------------
From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Sunday, October 02, 2005 2:43 PM
To: Dana Williams (Dana.Williams@SOS.STATE.CO.US)
Subject: FW: Request for Information
Ms. Williams:
Did you receive the following request?
-----------------------
From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Wednesday, September 28, 2005 2:16 PM
To: 'Dana Williams'
Cc: 'Bill Hobbs'; 'Bill Compton'; 'Patti Fredrick'; 'Len Vest'; 'Wayne Munster'; Dr. Charles Corry; Joe Pezzillo; Pete Klammer; Ralph Shnelvar
Subject: RE: Request for Information
Ms. Williams:
Thank you for the partial response to our queries.
Later today we will be sending you an appeal of the Secretary of State’s decision to authorize Boulder County’s use of illegal non-anonymous ballots. What is the independent forum for public debate and resolution of this appeal?
It appears, from your partial response, that the comments and recommendations raised in the September 21st CAMBER to Liss Analysis and Recommendations of the Boulder County Mail Ballot Election Plan were not considered by the Secretary of State. We have received no response from Boulder County. If it is true that the Secretary of State did not consider our comments and recommendations, we will make an appeal. What is the independent forum for public debate and resolution of this appeal?
We have not received a response to our comments and recommendations regarding the Boulder County Security Plan. We have received no response from Boulder County. Has the Secretary of State approved it? If so, we will make an appeal. What is the independent forum for public debate and resolution of this appeal?
We have not received a response to our request for an extensive public presentation of the SCORE system before it is deployed. Is it the intention of the Secretary of State to grant our request?
Please consider this e-mail a formal request for a comprehensive, and public, regulatory analysis of the October 31st Rules draft. Also, we have not received a response to our request for an independent and competent technical review of the proposed rules – before the draft is circulated. Is it the intention of the Secretary of State to grant our request?
We have not received a response to our request for publicly developed requirements for the voting system. We have not received a response to our request for public participation in the development of the RFP.
We have not received a response to our request to review the State’s plan for the development of a comprehensive election systems, to include functional and performance specifications. What is the plan to develop this?
Please confirm that you have received this e-mail and our request for a regulatory analysis.
-------------------
From: Dana Williams [mailto:Dana.Williams@SOS.STATE.CO.US]
Sent: Wednesday, September 28, 2005 9:54 AM
To: AlKolwicz
Cc: Bill Hobbs; Bill Compton; Patti Fredrick; Len Vest; Wayne Munster
Subject: RE: Request for Information
Mr. Kolwicz:
The Secretary of State's office did receive your fax dated September 21, 2005 concerning Boulder County's mail ballot plan and we responded to you in writing. As you know, we approved Boulder County's mail ballot plan on September 21. As always, we appreciate the issues raised in your letter, but we saw no legal basis for disapproving the plan submitted to this office. We looked carefully at the issues raised in your letter, however, the plan and timetable are in compliance with Title 1, Article 7.5 of the Colorado Revised Statutes and the Colorado Secretary of State Election Rules.
The Secretary of State has announced a rulemaking hearing schedule for October 31, 2005 at 1:30 p.m. to take public testimony for our rules concerning certification of voting equipment. The hearing is located in the Blue Spruce Room at 1700 Broadway, Denver, Colorado 80290. Written and oral data, comments and arguments, will be received form all interested parties. Written submissions must be filed at or before the commencement of the hearing on October 31, 2005 at 1:30 p.m. in order to be considered. The Secretary of State staff is in the process of completing draft rules and will post them on our website shortly. We hope you can submit your comments or attend the hearing to give us your feedback concerning the rules.
I hope this information is helpful.
Thank you,
Dana Jaclyn Williams
Public Information Officer
Secretary of State's Office
1700 Broadway, Suite 250
Denver, CO 80290
(303) 894-2200 ext. 6108
(303) 869-4860 Fax
dana.williams@sos.state.co.us
www.sos.state.co.us
-----Original Message-----
From: AlKolwicz
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2005 11:26 AM
To: Dana Williams
Cc: Bill Hobbs; Bill Compton; Patti Fredrick; Wayne Munster; Dr. Charles Corry; Joe Pezzillo; Sheila Horton; Pete Klammer
Subject: Request for Information
Ms. Williams,
We have been attempting, since July 25th, to gain access to certain information regarding Colorado Elections projects.
Today we learned that we are to direct our queries to you.
Has the Secretary of State responded to our FAX sent September 21?
Has the Secretary of State considered our analysis and recommendations of the Boulder County Mail Ballot Election Plan?
Has the Secretary of State considered our criticism of Boulder County’s Security Plan?
We have requested an extensive public presentation of the SCORE system before it is deployed. A simple demonstration will not suffice. There are several technologists who are concerned that the system will not be secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent. The non-transparent methods used to develop the system have left a lot of bad feelings. It is the last chance to engage the public. After all, the recent failing of the benefits system should alert you to the risks of pushing something out before it has public support.
We have requested procedures for requesting a regulatory analysis. The response was a “catch-22” whereby we would be required to make a request before we can possibly know that a proposed rules change is to be heard. The procedure used for the August 2nd rules hearing was totally unsatisfactory. It is not enough for SOS to “allow” the public to write comments. Written, “I feel your pain”, acknowledgements would not be an adequate response to the public input. The public is the CUSTOMER. Will you commit to an open and timely regulatory analysis including an independent and competent technical review of all future proposed standards and rules? See C.R.S. 24-4-103(4.5).
Regarding the RFP – we are concerned about the lack of agreed to ELECTION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS. We want the public to have a chance to participate in the development of the draft requirements. Currently the SOS plans to perform this work in secret. It is our experience that requirements, once documented, tend to be defended by the staff that develops them, and the public needs are essentially excluded. Will you commit to an open process before it is too late?
Regarding the voting system architecture, performance and functional specifications, etc. – there are a number of books that describe the path to excellence here. Also, we have written some illustrative lists, not intended to be comprehensive, of functions to be included and performance factors to be achieved. We’re happy to discuss them with you. Colorado needs a comprehensive systems plan. What is the plan to develop this?
Election officials and the public appear to be approaching the election system from incompatible directions. We believe that the customer of the election system is the public – which includes the voters, political parties, contestants, etc. Responsiveness to public suggestions and queries suggests that SOS believes that the customer is the election official. It is our experience that the customer decides the requirements, accepts (or rejects) the finished system, evaluates its performance and pays the bills. If we do in fact differ in our understanding of who is the customer, we should resolve this issue first.
Time is a-ticking. I hope that you will use your good office to respond to our requests, and bring the public into the process before battle lines are inadvertently drawn.
-----------------
From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Tuesday, September 20, 2005 4:38 PM
To: Len Vest (len.vest@sos.state.co.us)
Subject: Follow up and some new data
Hi Len,
We are still waiting for responses to our five requests. Don’t you agree that it has been an excessive wait?
As you consider the RFP, I’ve attached a “testimonial” for AutoMark.
----------------------------------------
From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Wednesday, September 07, 2005 10:51 AM
To: 'Len Vest'
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP
Hello Len,
Just in case our outstanding requests have been misplaced, please accept this as a reminder message.
“As you know, our requests include (1) SCORE, (2) voting system standards, rules and regulatory analysis, (3) RFP requirements, (4) voting system architecture, performance and functional specification, and (5) transparency.”
Thanks
---------------------
From: Len Vest [mailto:Len.Vest@SOS.STATE.CO.US]
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 3:49 PM
To: AlKolwicz
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP
Will do. By the way, most of the items in your list don’t impact this November’s election. They will all impact 2006 elections.
Len Vest
Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
Colorado Department of State
-----Original Message-----
From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 11:12 AM
To: Len Vest
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP
Thanks Len,
Please let me know how we can help expedite action.
As you know, our requests include (1) SCORE, (2) voting system standards, rules and regulatory analysis, (3) RFP requirements, (4) voting system architecture, performance and functional specification, and (5) transparency.
We are concerned that time to protect the November election is running out.
--------------------------
From: Len Vest [mailto:Len.Vest@SOS.STATE.CO.US]
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 11:01 AM
To: AlKolwicz
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP
Good Morning Al,
I was out of town last week for clerk training. I did take your request with me in hopes of talking to Bill Compton (Elections Director) and Patti Fredrick (HAVA Director) about it. They are much more familiar with the procedures related to such a request, so I wanted them to give me direction. I will try to speak with them today, so I can give you feedback. I apologize for the delay. We are still working on the drafting of the RFP, so lots of work remaining to get it ready for release.
I’ll get back to you. Thanks, Len
Len Vest
Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
Colorado Department of State
-----Original Message-----
From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Wednesday, August 31, 2005 10:01 AM
To: Len Vest
Cc: John Gardner; Dr. Charles Corry; Joe Pezzillo; Ralph Shnelvar; Pete Klammer; Ivan C. Meek; Sheila Horton
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP
Hi Len,
I am sure that you are very busy, but we are very concerned that our requests (below) are not being satisfied in a timely manner.
Are you the correct person to whom these communications should be addressed?
-----------------------------------
From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2005 9:39 AM
To: 'Len Vest'
Cc: 'John Gardner'; Dr. Charles Corry; Joe Pezzillo; Ralph Shnelvar; Pete Klammer; Ivan C. Meek; Sheila Horton
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP
Hi Len,
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss Colorado’s planned election system. Assuming that you will not object, I am adding some people to this conversation. These are people who are interested in, and could contribute to the success of Colorado’s election system.
1. Regarding SCORE – we hope that you are planning an extensive public presentation of the system before you deploy it. A simple demonstration will not suffice. There are several technologists who are concerned that the system will not be secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent. The non-transparent methods used to develop the system have left a lot of bad feelings. It is the last chance to engage the public. After all, the recent failing of the benefits system should alert you to the risks of pushing something out before it has public support.
2. Regarding new voting system standards and rules change – we have requested procedures for requesting a regulatory analysis. We want to use this mechanism to get answers to our questions. The procedure used for the August 2nd rules hearing was totally unsatisfactory. It is not enough for SOS to “allow” the public to write comments. Written, “I feel your pain”, acknowledgements would not be an adequate response to the public input. The public is the CUSTOMER. We need our concerns addressed, so we hope that the regulatory analysis will initiate an independent and competent technical review of the proposed standards and rules. We are referring to the analysis defined in C.R.S. 24-4-103(4.5);
(4.5) (a) Upon request of any person, at least fifteen days prior to the hearing, the agency shall issue a regulatory analysis of a proposed rule. The regulatory analysis shall contain:
(I) A description of the classes of persons who will be affected by the proposed rule, including classes that will bear the costs of the proposed rule and classes that will benefit from the proposed rule;
(II) To the extent practicable, a description of the probable quantitative and qualitative impact of the proposed rule, economic or otherwise, upon affected classes of persons;
(III) The probable costs to the agency and to any other agency of the implementation and enforcement of the proposed rule and any anticipated effect on state revenues;
(IV) A comparison of the probable costs and benefits of the proposed rule to the probable costs and benefits of inaction;
(V) A determination of whether there are less costly methods or less intrusive methods for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule; and
(VI) A description of any alternative methods for achieving the purpose of the proposed rule that were seriously considered by the agency and the reasons why they were rejected in favor of the proposed rule.
(b) Each regulatory analysis shall include quantification of the data to the extent practicable and shall take account of both short-term and long-term consequences.
(c) The regulatory analysis shall be available to the public at least five days prior to the rule-making hearing.
(d) If the agency has made a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of paragraphs (a) to (c) of this subsection (4.5), the rule shall not be invalidated on the ground that the contents of the regulatory analysis are insufficient or inaccurate.
(e) Nothing in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this subsection (4.5) shall limit an agency's discretionary authority to adopt or amend rules.
(f) The provisions of this subsection (4.5) shall not apply to rules and regulations promulgated by the department of revenue regarding the administration of any tax which is within the authority of said department.
3. Regarding the RFP – it is the “requirements” that you refer to that have us most concerned. It would be an opportunity missed if you were to complete a requirements statement in secret. Once requirements have been documented, staff will have much sweat invested in the document and will naturally tend to defend their own work rather than openly interacting the public. We encourage yo to open the process before it is too late.
4. Regarding the voting system architecture, performance and functional specifications, etc. – there are a number of books that describe the path to excellence here. Also, we have written some illustrative lists, not intended to be comprehensive, of functions to be included and performance factors to be achieved. We’re happy to discuss them with you.
We appear to be approaching the election system from incompatible directions. We believe that the customer of the election system is the public – which includes the voters, political parties, contestants, etc. It appears that SOS believes that the customer is the election official. The customer decides the requirements, accepts (or rejects) the finished system, evaluates its performance and pays the bills. If we do in fact differ in our understanding of who is the customer, we should resolve this issue first.
Time is a-ticking. I hope that you will use this opportunity to reconsider the direction you have chosen and bring the public into the process before you inadvertently draw battle lines.
----------------------------------
From: Len Vest [mailto:Len.Vest@SOS.STATE.CO.US]
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 4:43 PM
To: AlKolwicz
Cc: John Gardner
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP
Al,
I apologize for not getting back to you sooner. We have been busy with SCORE system testing over the past month. I’ll try to catch you up on where we are.
John has been working diligently on constructing new voting system certification standards for Colorado. During the process, it was recently determined that these standards need to be incorporated into the Election Rules. Therefore, within the next few days (I’ll alert you to when) we will be posting the new certification standards on our website for public review and feedback. They will be posted for comments for at least two weeks. These standards will be a key component of the forthcoming Voting System RFP.
You stated in your memo that Section 2 of our RFI indicated a very different set of requirements than what you understood from our last meeting. The purpose of the RFP is to establish pricing and contract terms with vendors who meet the requirements specified in the RFP and to select one vendor to be considered a “Colorado Preferred Vendor”. The SOS will support counties that select the preferred vendor by assisting with election software setup. This allows an option to the small counties that don’t have the expertise or staff to perform the software functions in-house. Counties that do not want or need to use the preferred vendors will have other vendors to work with as a result of the RFP and the Colorado certification process. They will also have agreed upon pricing and contract terms to utilize if they don’t want to negotiate on their own.
Vendors will be required to operate (once SCORE is operational) with a standard election setup import and election tabulation export with SCORE. You mentioned canvass board support and we see that, as it relates to the RFP, as voting system report features that facilitates the canvass board activities.
Our RFP will have diagrams of more than one scenario of how voting systems might function in Colorado counties. Of course, every polling place will need an accessible voting machine (DRE or electronic ballot marker). Some polling places may have precinct scanners and others may not. All counties will need a central scanner for absentee and mail ballot processing.
Regarding performance specifications and functionality specifications, does CAMBER have what they consider best practice examples from other jurisdictions or internally generated by CAMBER? If so, I would be glad to review and consider such input. We do want to serve the best interest of the voter through all phases of the voting process, including backend office transaction processing.
Thanks for your concern.
Len Vest
Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
Colorado Department of State
-----Original Message-----
From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2005 3:46 PM
To: Len Vest
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP
Len,
It is coming up on a month since we met. Have you had a chance to review our July 25th letter? (attached)
-------------------------------
From: Len Vest [mailto:Len.Vest@SOS.STATE.CO.US]
Sent: Monday, July 25, 2005 4:06 PM
To: AlKolwicz
Subject: RE: Reaction to potential RFP
Yes, I was able to open the attachment. Will read tonight. We have been working on rules all day to get posted tonight. Tx, Len
Len Vest
Help America Vote Act (HAVA)
Colorado Department of State
-----Original Message-----
From: AlKolwicz [mailto:alkolwicz@qwest.net]
Sent: Monday, July 25, 2005 8:08 AM
To: Len Vest
Subject: Reaction to potential RFP
Len
Attached is a word document. Please let me know that you can open and read it.
Thanks
ATTACHMENT:
CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://www.coloradovoter.blogspot.com/
July 25, 2005
Len Vest
HAVA Deputy Director
Department of State
1700 Broadway, Suite 270
Denver, CO 80290
Dear Len:
Following our meeting Friday, I read the RFI. Section 2.0 describes a very different set of requirements than what I understood from our Friday meeting. Consequently, my initial reaction to your RFP is revised.
I see now that the project is not limited to (1) election definition, (2) Internet publication of interim vote totals, and (3) canvass board support. In fact, the RFP envisions a wide set of requirements.
Because of the apparent scope of the project, we are very interested in this RFP. Contrary to my Friday conclusion, my remarks Friday do in fact apply to this RFP.
Based on what we can extrapolate from the attached General and Specific Requirements, we strongly encourage you to suspend issuance of this RFP until you have:
Voting system diagram that includes the entire set of voting functions and how they interact.
Systems functional specifications that specify the required security, accuracy, verifiability and transparency requirements, the method for measuring each, and the acceptable range of performance values for each.
Explicit public endorsement of the systems diagram and functional specifications.
Without this documentation and public support, I believe that the public will fight the RFP. Such a fight is not necessary. I have the impression that you and your team want to serve the best interests of the public. A prolonged fight will subvert voter confidence and extend the distrust of the administration and the election system.
I strongly recommend that you suspend issuance of this RFP until you have proper documentation and public support.
Al Kolwicz
Al Kolwicz
Executive Director
2.0 Project Scope
2.1 General Requirements
The principal scope of the Colorado voting system acquisition project is to deliver, within the optimal project budget and time constraints, a modernized voting system, which equals or exceeds the functionality, reliability, and overall requirements of HAVA and the criteria of the CDOS. For the purpose of this RFI, a voting system will consist of accessible voting units for disabled voters, direct recording electronic (DRE) units, voter-verifiable paper audit trail (V-VPAT), optical scan ballot counters, a software package (including election definition, ballot preparation and tabulation), supplies, system documentation, training, equipment maintenance and support services. Voting systems used in Colorado must be capable of providing accurate and timely election results.
2.2 Specific Requirements
Basic requirements for voting system hardware and software to be acceptable for use in Colorado elections include:
• System Certification under 2002 Federal Voting System standards.
• Colorado Secretary of State Certification.
• Agreement by vendor to abide by Federal statutes, rules and regulations.
• Agreement by vendor to abide by Colorado statutes and Election rules.
Friday, September 30, 2005
CAMBER comments re: Voluntary Voting System Guidelines
Mr. Eustis:
This is the CAMBER comment on the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines.
Included in our comment is a copy of our August 24th letter to Ms. Hillman which is included below. Also included in our comment is a sketch of a brochure that outlines the level of documentation that we expect, see below.
The final technical guidelines should fit in a small pamphlet.
Please ensure that our comment is not rejected, is available to reviewers online, and will receive proper consideration and a response. If you wish, follow this instruction: (a) DELETE VOLUME I, (b) DELETE VOLUME II, and INSERT this document including its attachments.
Audience
It is clear to me that the TGDC has not spent enough time considering the audience for the guidelines. We believe that the audience includes: judges, attorneys, district attorneys, attorneys general, secretary of state, county clerks, election officials, legislators, political parties, political campaigns, Election workers, poll watchers, vendors, application developers, application and system testers, independent testing authorities, the public and the press.
A summary of the document is not a solution. For example, the Court, in order to decide a case being litigated before it, must comprehend and make its determination on the official document itself. The current work product does not meet the needs of its audience.
What is needed
A trivial example of what is needed might be helpful. Consider what the individual members of the TGDC would write if they were asked to document their personal requirements for a car. I would anticipate that their individual requirements could be grouped into fairly regular categories such as: comfort, safety, performance, price, operating cost, service, and warrantee. I anticipate that few, if any, members would differentiate between the type of ignition system used to start the engine.
The current guidelines are aimed at the wrong things, because they are not aimed at the right audience.
National expense
The direction that the work is heading would be prohibitively expensive to maintain and impossible to litigate.
CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com/
August 24, 2005
Ms. Hillman,
Again I compliment you for your wonderfully insightful questions of panelists at yesterday’s EAC hearing in Denver. I deduce from your questions that you truly want to represent the interests of the public.
You don’t know me, so you won’t know how much weight to attribute to the following comments. I hope that you will take them seriously.
1. The problem that you and the other commissioners appear to sense with the VVSG is that the VVSG is both voluminous and complex. I concur with this appraisal. In fact, I would go a step further and say that the VVSG is unusable because of its volume and complexity. Writing a superficial overview will not suddenly make the VVSG useable. Editing the VVSG will not make it useable. The problem with the guide is fundamental -- it is aiming at the wrong target, and it is using the wrong ammunition.
a. The guide is incomplete (wrong target). The election system involves many components – the VVSP addresses very few of them. For example, the guide does not address public oversight, yet public oversight is a fundamental component of a trustworthy election process. The guide does not address procedures, such as authentication that a voter is the person who they claim to be. All of the components of the election system must be identified, and must be documented in a high-level systems diagram supplemented with a high level systems description. The diagram and description must be void of specific implementation details, and must not require change for different implementations. The current guide violates these precepts.
b. The guide addresses implementation-level details (wrong ammo). The VVSG should specify only: required results, measurement specifications for each result, acceptable performance for each result, and consequences when the required result is not achieved. HOW the result is achieved must be invisible in the VVSG. Instead, this guide is burdened with detailed descriptions of how things are to be done for specific implementations. For example, there is no general requirement that people and procedures be tested and measured. One of the problems with the approach taken in the VVSG is that it will require revision every time a new technology is introduced. Remember, it will take years before any VVSG change will be reflected in a majority of the nation’s voting systems. Unless changed to reflect principles rather than implementations, the VVSG will fail in its goal of returning public trust to the election system.
2. The proposal for accreditation of Testing Laboratories and the testing process itself is headed in the wrong direction.
a. Missing, for example, is a way to pay for the testing. The vendors should not pay, because that would compromise the integrity of the Testing Labs. The people should not pay for overly expensive or frivolous tests, and should be compensated through penalty fees, for poor vendor performance.
b. There is nothing proposed that will motivate vendors to withhold certification requests until they have a very high degree of confidence that the certification process will not discover a deviation between requirements and the implementation.
c. The role of the public, and in particular the interested professional computer scientists, is missing.
d. There is no penalty when a Testing Lab fails to detect problems that make it into production. How is a lab de-certified?
e. Who is accountable for the quality of the election process?
f. Also, because of the fundamental problems with the VVSG, described above, the Testing Labs are going to be testing the wrong stuff. There is a difference between systems testing that is aimed at requirements and architecture (what), and implementation testing that is aimed at implementation specifications (how).
Few people have the skills needed to draw the elegant line between requirements/architecture and the implementation specifications. The VVSG desperately needs these skills. Unless the VVSG is revamped, I anticipate that it will become a burden on the public. It will generate enormous costs, fail to deliver quality, and be rejected by the public as a solution to their concerns.
Finally, yesterday it was suggested by staff that only public comments that are specific to a page and line number will be considered. In my opinion, the VVSG problems are so severe that it is way premature to inspect spelling errors. Until focused on the correct target, and using the correct ammunition, it is too way early to do any fine tuning.
Is there anything you would like me to do to amplify these points?
Thank you for conducting your hearing in Denver. I look forward to working with you.
Al
Al Kolwicz
CAMBER - Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
Election System
Requirements
===============================
Election Objects
Property
Person
Jurisdiction
Contest
Contestant
Unused Ballot
Cast Ballot
Election Results
Control Data & Audit Report
================================
Election Requirements
Requirement _____ Metric ______ Standard
Security
Accuracy
Verifiability
Transparency
Performance
Ease of use
Price
Cost
Cycle time
Support
======================================
System Standards
=====================================
Election System Design Rules
This is the CAMBER comment on the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines.
Included in our comment is a copy of our August 24th letter to Ms. Hillman which is included below. Also included in our comment is a sketch of a brochure that outlines the level of documentation that we expect, see below.
The final technical guidelines should fit in a small pamphlet.
Please ensure that our comment is not rejected, is available to reviewers online, and will receive proper consideration and a response. If you wish, follow this instruction: (a) DELETE VOLUME I, (b) DELETE VOLUME II, and INSERT this document including its attachments.
Audience
It is clear to me that the TGDC has not spent enough time considering the audience for the guidelines. We believe that the audience includes: judges, attorneys, district attorneys, attorneys general, secretary of state, county clerks, election officials, legislators, political parties, political campaigns, Election workers, poll watchers, vendors, application developers, application and system testers, independent testing authorities, the public and the press.
A summary of the document is not a solution. For example, the Court, in order to decide a case being litigated before it, must comprehend and make its determination on the official document itself. The current work product does not meet the needs of its audience.
What is needed
A trivial example of what is needed might be helpful. Consider what the individual members of the TGDC would write if they were asked to document their personal requirements for a car. I would anticipate that their individual requirements could be grouped into fairly regular categories such as: comfort, safety, performance, price, operating cost, service, and warrantee. I anticipate that few, if any, members would differentiate between the type of ignition system used to start the engine.
The current guidelines are aimed at the wrong things, because they are not aimed at the right audience.
National expense
The direction that the work is heading would be prohibitively expensive to maintain and impossible to litigate.
CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com/
----------------------------------------------------------
August 24, 2005
Ms. Hillman,
Again I compliment you for your wonderfully insightful questions of panelists at yesterday’s EAC hearing in Denver. I deduce from your questions that you truly want to represent the interests of the public.
You don’t know me, so you won’t know how much weight to attribute to the following comments. I hope that you will take them seriously.
1. The problem that you and the other commissioners appear to sense with the VVSG is that the VVSG is both voluminous and complex. I concur with this appraisal. In fact, I would go a step further and say that the VVSG is unusable because of its volume and complexity. Writing a superficial overview will not suddenly make the VVSG useable. Editing the VVSG will not make it useable. The problem with the guide is fundamental -- it is aiming at the wrong target, and it is using the wrong ammunition.
a. The guide is incomplete (wrong target). The election system involves many components – the VVSP addresses very few of them. For example, the guide does not address public oversight, yet public oversight is a fundamental component of a trustworthy election process. The guide does not address procedures, such as authentication that a voter is the person who they claim to be. All of the components of the election system must be identified, and must be documented in a high-level systems diagram supplemented with a high level systems description. The diagram and description must be void of specific implementation details, and must not require change for different implementations. The current guide violates these precepts.
b. The guide addresses implementation-level details (wrong ammo). The VVSG should specify only: required results, measurement specifications for each result, acceptable performance for each result, and consequences when the required result is not achieved. HOW the result is achieved must be invisible in the VVSG. Instead, this guide is burdened with detailed descriptions of how things are to be done for specific implementations. For example, there is no general requirement that people and procedures be tested and measured. One of the problems with the approach taken in the VVSG is that it will require revision every time a new technology is introduced. Remember, it will take years before any VVSG change will be reflected in a majority of the nation’s voting systems. Unless changed to reflect principles rather than implementations, the VVSG will fail in its goal of returning public trust to the election system.
2. The proposal for accreditation of Testing Laboratories and the testing process itself is headed in the wrong direction.
a. Missing, for example, is a way to pay for the testing. The vendors should not pay, because that would compromise the integrity of the Testing Labs. The people should not pay for overly expensive or frivolous tests, and should be compensated through penalty fees, for poor vendor performance.
b. There is nothing proposed that will motivate vendors to withhold certification requests until they have a very high degree of confidence that the certification process will not discover a deviation between requirements and the implementation.
c. The role of the public, and in particular the interested professional computer scientists, is missing.
d. There is no penalty when a Testing Lab fails to detect problems that make it into production. How is a lab de-certified?
e. Who is accountable for the quality of the election process?
f. Also, because of the fundamental problems with the VVSG, described above, the Testing Labs are going to be testing the wrong stuff. There is a difference between systems testing that is aimed at requirements and architecture (what), and implementation testing that is aimed at implementation specifications (how).
Few people have the skills needed to draw the elegant line between requirements/architecture and the implementation specifications. The VVSG desperately needs these skills. Unless the VVSG is revamped, I anticipate that it will become a burden on the public. It will generate enormous costs, fail to deliver quality, and be rejected by the public as a solution to their concerns.
Finally, yesterday it was suggested by staff that only public comments that are specific to a page and line number will be considered. In my opinion, the VVSG problems are so severe that it is way premature to inspect spelling errors. Until focused on the correct target, and using the correct ammunition, it is too way early to do any fine tuning.
Is there anything you would like me to do to amplify these points?
Thank you for conducting your hearing in Denver. I look forward to working with you.
Al
Al Kolwicz
CAMBER - Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
==========================================
Election System
Requirements
===============================
Election Objects
Property
Person
Jurisdiction
Contest
Contestant
Unused Ballot
Cast Ballot
Election Results
Control Data & Audit Report
================================
Election Requirements
Requirement _____ Metric ______ Standard
Security
Accuracy
Verifiability
Transparency
Performance
Ease of use
Price
Cost
Cycle time
Support
======================================
System Standards
=====================================
Election System Design Rules
- “Using the computer industry as an example, Carliss Y. Baldwin and Kim B. Clark develop a powerful theory of design and industrial evolution. They argue that the industry has experienced previously unimaginable levels of innovation and growth because it embraced the concept of modularity, building complex products from smaller subsystems that can be designed independently yet function together as a whole. Modularity freed designers to experiment with different approaches, as long as they obeyed the established design rules.” from Amazon.com
- "Process Synthesis, also known as Structured Conceptual Process Design, is a technique suitable not only for making a step-change in the existing process but also for synthesizing a process flowsheet from scratch.” From Process Design Center, The Netherlands
============================
WARNING
"We are fast approaching the stage of the ultimate inversion: the stage where the government is free to do anything it pleases, while the citizens may act only by permission; which is the stage of the darkest periods of human history, the stage of rule by brute force." - Ayn Rand, The Nature of Government
==========================
CAMBER is a dedicated group of volunteers who are working to ensure that every voter gets to vote once, every vote is counted once, and that every ballot is secure and anonymous.
CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate
Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
Phone: 303-494-1540
E-mail: AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.ColoradoVoter.blogspot.com
Friday, September 23, 2005
Election Assessment Hearing Report
Thursday, September 22 marks the release of a Preliminary Report of Findings by the Election Assessment project. The 54-page report documents the wide-ranging concerns expressed by voters in testimony and submissions received at the public Election Assessment Hearing convened on June 29, 2005 in Houston, Texas.
Testimony and analysis presented at the Houston hearing represented voters of at least five major and minor political parties, and described numerous problems and irregularities in the conduct of the American electoral processes.
The Election Assessment project seeks to foster the use of established professional methods for the effective improvement of election processes by administrators, policymakers, standards bodies, advisors and other voting stewards and participants. Ongoing goals of the project include capture of the voice of the customers of the electoral process (the voters) and addressing the measurement of the process, the analysis of root causes for defects, and the controlled implementation of improvements.
The Election Assessment Hearing Preliminary Report is available online at
http://www.electionassessment.org/downloads/EAH_Customer_Voice_9-22-05.pdf
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
September 22, 2005
Contact: Seth Johnson
Phone: 212-543-4266
E-mail: seth@electionassessment.org
###
Testimony and analysis presented at the Houston hearing represented voters of at least five major and minor political parties, and described numerous problems and irregularities in the conduct of the American electoral processes.
The Election Assessment project seeks to foster the use of established professional methods for the effective improvement of election processes by administrators, policymakers, standards bodies, advisors and other voting stewards and participants. Ongoing goals of the project include capture of the voice of the customers of the electoral process (the voters) and addressing the measurement of the process, the analysis of root causes for defects, and the controlled implementation of improvements.
The Election Assessment Hearing Preliminary Report is available online at
http://www.electionassessment.org/downloads/EAH_Customer_Voice_9-22-05.pdf
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
September 22, 2005
Contact: Seth Johnson
Phone: 212-543-4266
E-mail: seth@electionassessment.org
###
Thursday, September 22, 2005
Colorado Security plan deemed worthless
Colorado HAVA director.
We hope that by now you have dismissed Boulder County’s draft security plan as a joke. The four page “plan” with accompanying attachments is worthless. We hope that the Boulder County effort is not representative of the other county plans.
We suggest that you refer Boulder County to professionally developed security standards and papers including:
- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA - http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/rainbow/5200.28-STD.html
- CERT Coordination Center – http://www.cert.org/octave/
- HIPPA Security Standards - http://www.hipaadvisory.com/regs/finalsecurity/
Security is a professional subject area, like brain surgery, and should not be attempted by amateurs.
Wednesday, September 21, 2005
Boulder County Election Plan Fundamentally Flawed
DATE: September 21, 2005
TO: Josh Liss
FROM: Al Kolwicz, CAMBER
CC: Linda Salas, Bill Compton, Hillary Hall, Marty Neilson,
Dean Schooler, Joe Pezzillo
RE: Draft Mail Ballot Election Plan, September 7, 2005
We have reviewed your September 7th draft Mail Ballot Election Plan, and confess to being terribly disappointed. Most if not all of the problems identified during the 2001-2004 elections have not been addressed.
There are fundamental problems with the plan. The plan is so incomplete that it is not meaningful for us to prepare a comprehensive analysis. The results from an election conducted under this plan should not be trusted.
It may seem odd to say this, but county employees have a huge vested interest in the outcome of this election -- future income and term-limits. Voters should not be asked to trust that those with the most to gain will conduct a trustworthy election. To the extent humanly possible, this plan should be sufficiently robust that error, fraud, or incompetence cannot escape detection and public disclosure.
1. The plan discloses that Boulder County intends to violate Article VII, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution. This is a fundamental defect which will not come as a surprise to you. We have made many requests, beginning at least as early as August 2nd, for disclosure of the county’s plan to provide anonymous voting. You have chosen to hide your plans by not responding to these many requests.As you know, the county has a proven alternative to non-secret ballots – ballots with ballot stubs – that is compatible with the HART/Intercivic vote interpretation and counting system. We have requested that the Secretary of State disapprove your plan unless it is revised to provide anonymous voting. We ask that you do so.
2. Boulder County elections have suffered a pattern of major problems with Logic & Accuracy Testing, Canvass Board membership and operation, watcher’s access to election data contained in computer files, and even the interpretation of the meaning of words such as “cast”. None of these problems have been addressed in the plan.
3. An election conducted under this plan will not be transparent. The county has been presented with many examples whereby watchers have been blocked by election officials from performing watcher duties. Provisions for Boulder County Political Party participation is missing. There is no mechanism for publicly reporting and resolving election issues.
4. An election conducted under this plan will not be verifiable. The county has been presented with many examples whereby watchers have been blocked from verifying processes and records, including computer files, and from verifying the security, eligibility, interpretation and counting of votes.
5. An election conducted under this plan will not be secure. The county has been presented with many examples of security exposures including privacy issues, intimidation and vote selling issues, forgery issues, ballot control issues, and verification of computer systems, files and soft-switches.
6. An election conducted under this plan will not be accurate. The county has been presented with many examples of inaccuracy problems including the counting of ineligible votes, rejection of eligible votes, lack of batch integrity, and HART/Intercivic vote interpretation and vote counting reliability problems.
The county has chosen to conduct its planning in the dark, protected from the sunshine of transparency. It has ignored all offers of help and suggestions for improvement. The county has chosen to behave as “ruling elite” rather than “public servants”.
Despite its vested interest in the outcome, the county is proposing to conduct a non-trustworthy election. This is exceedingly bad public policy.
Delaying this election would provide time to correct the major problems. If you do not delay the election, there is something that can be done to improve the situation -- implement the August 2nd recommendations made to the Boulder County Commissioners:
Citizens ask Boulder County Commissioners to "act to restore public trust" –
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com/2005/08/citizens-ask-boulder-county.html
If the problems summarized above are not fixed, or the plan to restore public trust is not implemented, we fear that the results of this election will be contested. This will not improve the public’s confidence in our election system.
TO: Josh Liss
FROM: Al Kolwicz, CAMBER
CC: Linda Salas, Bill Compton, Hillary Hall, Marty Neilson,
Dean Schooler, Joe Pezzillo
RE: Draft Mail Ballot Election Plan, September 7, 2005
We have reviewed your September 7th draft Mail Ballot Election Plan, and confess to being terribly disappointed. Most if not all of the problems identified during the 2001-2004 elections have not been addressed.
There are fundamental problems with the plan. The plan is so incomplete that it is not meaningful for us to prepare a comprehensive analysis. The results from an election conducted under this plan should not be trusted.
It may seem odd to say this, but county employees have a huge vested interest in the outcome of this election -- future income and term-limits. Voters should not be asked to trust that those with the most to gain will conduct a trustworthy election. To the extent humanly possible, this plan should be sufficiently robust that error, fraud, or incompetence cannot escape detection and public disclosure.
1. The plan discloses that Boulder County intends to violate Article VII, Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution. This is a fundamental defect which will not come as a surprise to you. We have made many requests, beginning at least as early as August 2nd, for disclosure of the county’s plan to provide anonymous voting. You have chosen to hide your plans by not responding to these many requests.As you know, the county has a proven alternative to non-secret ballots – ballots with ballot stubs – that is compatible with the HART/Intercivic vote interpretation and counting system. We have requested that the Secretary of State disapprove your plan unless it is revised to provide anonymous voting. We ask that you do so.
2. Boulder County elections have suffered a pattern of major problems with Logic & Accuracy Testing, Canvass Board membership and operation, watcher’s access to election data contained in computer files, and even the interpretation of the meaning of words such as “cast”. None of these problems have been addressed in the plan.
3. An election conducted under this plan will not be transparent. The county has been presented with many examples whereby watchers have been blocked by election officials from performing watcher duties. Provisions for Boulder County Political Party participation is missing. There is no mechanism for publicly reporting and resolving election issues.
4. An election conducted under this plan will not be verifiable. The county has been presented with many examples whereby watchers have been blocked from verifying processes and records, including computer files, and from verifying the security, eligibility, interpretation and counting of votes.
5. An election conducted under this plan will not be secure. The county has been presented with many examples of security exposures including privacy issues, intimidation and vote selling issues, forgery issues, ballot control issues, and verification of computer systems, files and soft-switches.
6. An election conducted under this plan will not be accurate. The county has been presented with many examples of inaccuracy problems including the counting of ineligible votes, rejection of eligible votes, lack of batch integrity, and HART/Intercivic vote interpretation and vote counting reliability problems.
The county has chosen to conduct its planning in the dark, protected from the sunshine of transparency. It has ignored all offers of help and suggestions for improvement. The county has chosen to behave as “ruling elite” rather than “public servants”.
Despite its vested interest in the outcome, the county is proposing to conduct a non-trustworthy election. This is exceedingly bad public policy.
Delaying this election would provide time to correct the major problems. If you do not delay the election, there is something that can be done to improve the situation -- implement the August 2nd recommendations made to the Boulder County Commissioners:
Citizens ask Boulder County Commissioners to "act to restore public trust" –
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com/2005/08/citizens-ask-boulder-county.html
If the problems summarized above are not fixed, or the plan to restore public trust is not implemented, we fear that the results of this election will be contested. This will not improve the public’s confidence in our election system.
Tuesday, September 20, 2005
Violation of Colorado Constitution -- voter privacy
CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com
September 20, 2005
Gigi Dennis BY FAX 303 869 4860
Colorado Secretary of State
1700 Broadway
Denver, CO 80290
URGENT: Violation of Colorado Constitution – Article VII, Section 8.
Dear Ms. Dennis:
Welcome to your new position as Colorado Secretary of State. We wish you the very best, and we look forward to working with you in behalf of the voters of Colorado. Understanding that you are very busy, we’ll get right to the point.
Boulder County is planning to violate the Colorado Constitution during the November 2005 election. You have the authority and duty to prevent this. We ask you to enforce Article VII, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution.
You have been asked to approve Boulder County’s draft Mail Ballot Election Plan, dated September, 7, 2005, which discloses that paper ballots will be required to be used, and that each ballot is to be permanently marked in a way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it – page 9, paragraph-O.
This is a violation Article VII, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution which says, “All elections by the people shall be by ballot, and in case paper ballots are required to be used, no ballots shall be marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it.”
We ask that you disapprove Boulder County’s plan to so violate the Colorado Constitution.
We support the use of paper ballots. We object to the use of ballots containing non-removable unique identifiers such as printed serial numbers or identifiers encoded as bar-codes. Non-removable serial numbers/bar-codes are not legal. They can be used to facilitate vote selling, voter intimidation, and privacy invasion. The serial number/bar-code enables the government, an insider, an outsider, or the voter to identify a ballot as the ballot of a particular voter.
Boulder County’s expressed intention is to use the serial number/bar-code for ballot control, and not to associate voters and ballots. They do not express bad intentions. However, once the data exists, others may make the association between ballots and voters.
Boulder County has several options available to it that do not require use of a non-removable serial number/bar-code. One of these options would be to use removable serial numbers/bar-codes. Unique identifiers would be recorded on removable ballot stubs. The stub containing the serial number/bar-code would be removed before the ballot is cast by the voter. The stubs would be retained for use in ballot auditing in conjunction with a poll book that lists which ballot(s) were issued to each voter. This option would comply with the Colorado Constitution and with Colorado’s Election Laws and Rules.
Boulder County is on record as opposing ballot stubs because of the possibility that a procedural error might result in a ballot being cast with the ballot stub still attached – thereby associating the voter and their ballot. This is a fallacious argument for at least two reasons: (1) the November election is a mail ballot election and all stubs would be removed by election workers, and (2) the computer file containing the scanned ballot images would not contain the image of the original serial number/bar-code.
The Colorado Constitution is clear. “… no ballots shall be marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it.” Once cast, the ballot must be absolutely anonymous and indistinguishable from any other ballot of the same style from the same precinct.
A unique serial number printed or bar-coded on a ballot and not removed before the ballot is cast is a mark that can be used to “identify the ballot as the ballot of a person casting it” and consequently violates Article VII section 8.
We ask that you fulfill your duty and exercise your authority to prevent Boulder County from violating the Colorado Constitution.
Al Kolwicz
Executive Director
cc: John W. Suthers, Colorado Attorney General
Linda Salas, Boulder County Clerk & Recorder
Dean Schooler, Lead Plaintiff, Schooler v. Salas, Case# 2004CV1281
Hillary Hall, Chair, Boulder County Democrats
Marty Neilson, Chair, Boulder County Republicans
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com
September 20, 2005
Gigi Dennis BY FAX 303 869 4860
Colorado Secretary of State
1700 Broadway
Denver, CO 80290
URGENT: Violation of Colorado Constitution – Article VII, Section 8.
Dear Ms. Dennis:
Welcome to your new position as Colorado Secretary of State. We wish you the very best, and we look forward to working with you in behalf of the voters of Colorado. Understanding that you are very busy, we’ll get right to the point.
Boulder County is planning to violate the Colorado Constitution during the November 2005 election. You have the authority and duty to prevent this. We ask you to enforce Article VII, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution.
You have been asked to approve Boulder County’s draft Mail Ballot Election Plan, dated September, 7, 2005, which discloses that paper ballots will be required to be used, and that each ballot is to be permanently marked in a way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it – page 9, paragraph-O.
This is a violation Article VII, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution which says, “All elections by the people shall be by ballot, and in case paper ballots are required to be used, no ballots shall be marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it.”
We ask that you disapprove Boulder County’s plan to so violate the Colorado Constitution.
We support the use of paper ballots. We object to the use of ballots containing non-removable unique identifiers such as printed serial numbers or identifiers encoded as bar-codes. Non-removable serial numbers/bar-codes are not legal. They can be used to facilitate vote selling, voter intimidation, and privacy invasion. The serial number/bar-code enables the government, an insider, an outsider, or the voter to identify a ballot as the ballot of a particular voter.
Boulder County’s expressed intention is to use the serial number/bar-code for ballot control, and not to associate voters and ballots. They do not express bad intentions. However, once the data exists, others may make the association between ballots and voters.
Boulder County has several options available to it that do not require use of a non-removable serial number/bar-code. One of these options would be to use removable serial numbers/bar-codes. Unique identifiers would be recorded on removable ballot stubs. The stub containing the serial number/bar-code would be removed before the ballot is cast by the voter. The stubs would be retained for use in ballot auditing in conjunction with a poll book that lists which ballot(s) were issued to each voter. This option would comply with the Colorado Constitution and with Colorado’s Election Laws and Rules.
Boulder County is on record as opposing ballot stubs because of the possibility that a procedural error might result in a ballot being cast with the ballot stub still attached – thereby associating the voter and their ballot. This is a fallacious argument for at least two reasons: (1) the November election is a mail ballot election and all stubs would be removed by election workers, and (2) the computer file containing the scanned ballot images would not contain the image of the original serial number/bar-code.
The Colorado Constitution is clear. “… no ballots shall be marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it.” Once cast, the ballot must be absolutely anonymous and indistinguishable from any other ballot of the same style from the same precinct.
A unique serial number printed or bar-coded on a ballot and not removed before the ballot is cast is a mark that can be used to “identify the ballot as the ballot of a person casting it” and consequently violates Article VII section 8.
We ask that you fulfill your duty and exercise your authority to prevent Boulder County from violating the Colorado Constitution.
Al Kolwicz
Executive Director
cc: John W. Suthers, Colorado Attorney General
Linda Salas, Boulder County Clerk & Recorder
Dean Schooler, Lead Plaintiff, Schooler v. Salas, Case# 2004CV1281
Hillary Hall, Chair, Boulder County Democrats
Marty Neilson, Chair, Boulder County Republicans
Sunday, August 21, 2005
REBUTTAL to Paul Tiger's Opinion by Al Kolwicz
An incredibly poor comprehension of Boulder County’s 2004 election problems is revealed in Paul Tiger’s Opinion, “Less emotion, more science”, Colorado Daily, August 14th. Below, each of Mr. Tiger’s major errors is refuted, paragraph by paragraph.
1. Tiger appears to believe that the public policy issue is focused on “control of the [elections] division.” This is not true. Voter activists are demanding a restoration of public trust in elections -- see August 2nd posting by Joe Pezzillo at http://www.coloradovoter.blogspot.com/ “Citizens ask Boulder County Commissioners to act to restore public trust".
Colorado law defines election administration to be a joint authority. The law defines roles for independent oversight and for political party and contestant involvement. It is not true, as asserted by Tiger, that “only the clerk can and should have oversight and control”.
2. The root cause of the widespread 2004 election failures was the lack of competent planning and execution. This fundamental failure is what caused “the parts of the process that failed”.
Salas fails to acknowledge the problems and consequently fails to address them, preferring instead to cover up the problems by blaming others.
An elected official need not be a subject-matter expert, but does need to set standards of acceptable performance. Salas does not.
3. The statement that "only the clerk and her staff can control the methods" is contrary to the law, the rules, and good sense. The law defines political party and Secretary of State responsibilities.
Salas works hard to prevent independent oversight. Only by maximizing transparency, while protecting security, accuracy and verifiability, can the clerk earn voter confidence.
4. Her continued denial of the facts and refusal to directly engage the public is proof that Salas has failed to learn from her failures. Further, Salas has launched the 2005 election using her same false assumptions.
Salas continues to cling to her dangerously euphoric and erroneous beliefs, despite facts to the contrary. In addition to many other denials of fact, Salas refuses to acknowledge that:
Tiger’s use of the pejorative "doom purveyor" is an attempt to “kill the messenger.” It is an attempt to discredit those who dedicate time and effort to reform the flawed election process. It is a debating trick intended to avoid dealing with the issues.
It is totally untrue that critics spent no time working with the systems. Collectively, hundreds of hours and thousands of dollars were invested by people like Kolwicz, Thigpen, Eckert, McBurnett, Shnelvar, Horton, Schooler, and many others.
Tiger implies that a comprehensive agreed-to set of elections procedures existed. They most definitely did not.
It is absolutely untrue that the critics were “citizens choosing to stand outside”. In fact, Salas and her gang abused their office by using their special positions to steadfastly prevent citizens from getting inside. She directly refused to permit legally prescribed public participation in the election process and threatened and attempted to discredit and silence those who did. She even used sheriff’s deputies to intimidate and prevent at least one legally appointed election official (me) from performing his duty.
6. Salas’ hand-picked Election Review Committee is not independent and made no attempt to perform comprehensive election oversight. The ERC results are tragically incomplete, and grossly inaccurate. Further, the ERC makes numerous statements “of fact” that are totally unsupported and most likely untrue.
The ERC should have addressed quantities – how many, exactly when, how fast, etc. But, such numbers were not published in their report, and apparently not even examined.
Tiger attempts to make it appear OK that the system failed, using as a rationale “the complexity of the issues.” In fact, if the job is too complex for her, Salas should demonstrate good character by stepping aside and letting a more qualified person represent the interests of the people. As long as Salas retains control, the unresolved problems of 2004 will never be resolved.
7. Tiger attacks “uneducated and ill-informed suggestions“ made by people who “refused to be involved in the operations of elections”. This inflammatory attack calls for specific names and specific allegations.
Well in advance of the 2004 elections, Salas was presented numerous written lists of problems and recommended solutions – one of these, “Requirements for Trustworthy Elections – 2004 Primary and General,” was published April 10, 2004 at www.coloradovoter.blogspot.com.
Salas has not dealt with any of the fundamental issues. Instead, the Clerks of Colorado ganged up with the Secretary of State to block future independent oversight. Perhaps their theory is that if nobody can detect and report the problems, then the problems will be gone. In fact, the 2005 elections will be exposed to the same unresolved problems.
8. Despite Tiger’s assertion to the contrary, it was never true that the activists were overjoyed at the purchase of the HART system. In fact, the opposite is true – activists were distraught at the purchase of the HART system. Activists were pleased at the commissioner’s recommendations to use paper ballots and reject DRE voting equipment. Tiger should identify the so-called “activists” who were “overjoyed” by the purchase.
It is not true that activists were quiet from December 11, 2003 to April 27, 2004. Among many others there was the Orange County issue. It involved a clandestine, useless field trip by election officials with no written report, followed by an attempted cover-up of HART system malfunctions that happened during the Orange County election.
Both leasing and hand counting were prophetic recommendations by the activists. If the HART system were to have been leased in 2003, it would likely not have been purchased after the 2004 election problems were discovered. If votes on the paper ballots were hand counted, the 2004 election might have been successful.
9. Hand counted paper ballots are a part of Colorado law and were recommended by some members of the public. See November, 2003, www.coloradovoter.net/DeclarationforQualityElectionsNov212003.pdf . The Swiss Method suggestion was advanced later.
Contrary to Salas' assertions, it was then and is now permissible to verify vote counts. In 2003, for example, Salas conducted a so-called “administrative recount”. This same authority could have been used to attempt to satisfy the public’s demand for verification of vote counts.
The so-called hand audits included in the recently revised statutes are not based on scientific methods, and will likely fail to achieve the hoped for increase in voter confidence.
10. It is our understanding that the HART system cannot be revised and certified in time for the 2005 election; therefore the HART system should not be used for the 2005 election.
To our knowledge, it is not true that comprehensive election procedures exist. Where are these procedures? What public reviews have they sustained? What technical reviews have determined that the procedures are secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent?
Boulder County was wrong to spend more than a million dollars on a dysfunctional, partially complete system that requires R&D funding and excessive operational resources to make it meet minimum requirements.
Boulder County is failing in its obligation to protect the taxpayer’s money. It is wasting this money in order to cover up government’s failings. The County should immediately demand a full refund plus high penalty fees from HART.
Salas and crew have demonstrated that they lack the skills needed to recognize and define the problems. They most certainly lack the skills needed to solve them. In my opinion, they do not even have the skills needed to identify, select and supervise professional help.
11. Before Mr. Tiger again reveals his poor comprehension of events, he should practice his own call for “Less emotion, more science”.
Al Kolwicz
CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com/
1. Tiger appears to believe that the public policy issue is focused on “control of the [elections] division.” This is not true. Voter activists are demanding a restoration of public trust in elections -- see August 2nd posting by Joe Pezzillo at http://www.coloradovoter.blogspot.com/ “Citizens ask Boulder County Commissioners to act to restore public trust".
Colorado law defines election administration to be a joint authority. The law defines roles for independent oversight and for political party and contestant involvement. It is not true, as asserted by Tiger, that “only the clerk can and should have oversight and control”.
2. The root cause of the widespread 2004 election failures was the lack of competent planning and execution. This fundamental failure is what caused “the parts of the process that failed”.
Salas fails to acknowledge the problems and consequently fails to address them, preferring instead to cover up the problems by blaming others.
An elected official need not be a subject-matter expert, but does need to set standards of acceptable performance. Salas does not.
3. The statement that "only the clerk and her staff can control the methods" is contrary to the law, the rules, and good sense. The law defines political party and Secretary of State responsibilities.
Salas works hard to prevent independent oversight. Only by maximizing transparency, while protecting security, accuracy and verifiability, can the clerk earn voter confidence.
4. Her continued denial of the facts and refusal to directly engage the public is proof that Salas has failed to learn from her failures. Further, Salas has launched the 2005 election using her same false assumptions.
Salas continues to cling to her dangerously euphoric and erroneous beliefs, despite facts to the contrary. In addition to many other denials of fact, Salas refuses to acknowledge that:
- The 2004 election was not accurate – the clerk’s own recount, and the defects discovered during the canvass of results, proved this.
- Permanently serialized ballots violate the Colorado Constitution – Article VII section 8 requires secret ballots.
- Mail ballot elections do not increase voter turnout – data from past elections prove this.
- Mail ballot elections are not secure, accurate, verifiable – published CAMBER studies prove this, see www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz/ .
- Control of elections is a shared authority -- Colorado statutes clearly state this.
Tiger’s use of the pejorative "doom purveyor" is an attempt to “kill the messenger.” It is an attempt to discredit those who dedicate time and effort to reform the flawed election process. It is a debating trick intended to avoid dealing with the issues.
It is totally untrue that critics spent no time working with the systems. Collectively, hundreds of hours and thousands of dollars were invested by people like Kolwicz, Thigpen, Eckert, McBurnett, Shnelvar, Horton, Schooler, and many others.
Tiger implies that a comprehensive agreed-to set of elections procedures existed. They most definitely did not.
It is absolutely untrue that the critics were “citizens choosing to stand outside”. In fact, Salas and her gang abused their office by using their special positions to steadfastly prevent citizens from getting inside. She directly refused to permit legally prescribed public participation in the election process and threatened and attempted to discredit and silence those who did. She even used sheriff’s deputies to intimidate and prevent at least one legally appointed election official (me) from performing his duty.
6. Salas’ hand-picked Election Review Committee is not independent and made no attempt to perform comprehensive election oversight. The ERC results are tragically incomplete, and grossly inaccurate. Further, the ERC makes numerous statements “of fact” that are totally unsupported and most likely untrue.
The ERC should have addressed quantities – how many, exactly when, how fast, etc. But, such numbers were not published in their report, and apparently not even examined.
Tiger attempts to make it appear OK that the system failed, using as a rationale “the complexity of the issues.” In fact, if the job is too complex for her, Salas should demonstrate good character by stepping aside and letting a more qualified person represent the interests of the people. As long as Salas retains control, the unresolved problems of 2004 will never be resolved.
7. Tiger attacks “uneducated and ill-informed suggestions“ made by people who “refused to be involved in the operations of elections”. This inflammatory attack calls for specific names and specific allegations.
Well in advance of the 2004 elections, Salas was presented numerous written lists of problems and recommended solutions – one of these, “Requirements for Trustworthy Elections – 2004 Primary and General,” was published April 10, 2004 at www.coloradovoter.blogspot.com.
Salas has not dealt with any of the fundamental issues. Instead, the Clerks of Colorado ganged up with the Secretary of State to block future independent oversight. Perhaps their theory is that if nobody can detect and report the problems, then the problems will be gone. In fact, the 2005 elections will be exposed to the same unresolved problems.
8. Despite Tiger’s assertion to the contrary, it was never true that the activists were overjoyed at the purchase of the HART system. In fact, the opposite is true – activists were distraught at the purchase of the HART system. Activists were pleased at the commissioner’s recommendations to use paper ballots and reject DRE voting equipment. Tiger should identify the so-called “activists” who were “overjoyed” by the purchase.
It is not true that activists were quiet from December 11, 2003 to April 27, 2004. Among many others there was the Orange County issue. It involved a clandestine, useless field trip by election officials with no written report, followed by an attempted cover-up of HART system malfunctions that happened during the Orange County election.
Both leasing and hand counting were prophetic recommendations by the activists. If the HART system were to have been leased in 2003, it would likely not have been purchased after the 2004 election problems were discovered. If votes on the paper ballots were hand counted, the 2004 election might have been successful.
9. Hand counted paper ballots are a part of Colorado law and were recommended by some members of the public. See November, 2003, www.coloradovoter.net/DeclarationforQualityElectionsNov212003.pdf . The Swiss Method suggestion was advanced later.
Contrary to Salas' assertions, it was then and is now permissible to verify vote counts. In 2003, for example, Salas conducted a so-called “administrative recount”. This same authority could have been used to attempt to satisfy the public’s demand for verification of vote counts.
The so-called hand audits included in the recently revised statutes are not based on scientific methods, and will likely fail to achieve the hoped for increase in voter confidence.
10. It is our understanding that the HART system cannot be revised and certified in time for the 2005 election; therefore the HART system should not be used for the 2005 election.
To our knowledge, it is not true that comprehensive election procedures exist. Where are these procedures? What public reviews have they sustained? What technical reviews have determined that the procedures are secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent?
Boulder County was wrong to spend more than a million dollars on a dysfunctional, partially complete system that requires R&D funding and excessive operational resources to make it meet minimum requirements.
Boulder County is failing in its obligation to protect the taxpayer’s money. It is wasting this money in order to cover up government’s failings. The County should immediately demand a full refund plus high penalty fees from HART.
Salas and crew have demonstrated that they lack the skills needed to recognize and define the problems. They most certainly lack the skills needed to solve them. In my opinion, they do not even have the skills needed to identify, select and supervise professional help.
11. Before Mr. Tiger again reveals his poor comprehension of events, he should practice his own call for “Less emotion, more science”.
Al Kolwicz
CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.users.qwest.net/~alkolwicz
http://coloradovoter.blogspot.com/
Tuesday, August 02, 2005
Citizens ask Boulder County Commissioners to "act to restore public trust"
August 2, 2005 - Boulder County, CO -- To restore public trust in elections County Commissioners were asked to promptly enact the following measures:
Joe Pezzillo
Boulder, Colorado
- We request that you fund an independent citizens group to provide continuous oversight of Boulder County’s elections procedures. We request an amount no less than that provided to the ERC, five thousand dollars per annum, and insist that this group be completely independent of the County Clerk’s office, something that cannot be said of the ERC.
- Second, we reiterate our request that Boulder County provide the citizens an accurate and trustworthy elections system. Only by blatantly ignoring the facts can the Clerk claim that the current system is accurate, and it is clearly not reliable enough to be considered trustworthy.
- We ask you to resurrect the secret, anonymous ballot cast in our local neighborhood precincts. The last two elections in Boulder County were in violation of the Colorado State Constitution because the ballots were not secret, and there is no indication that the coming election in November will meet this fundamental requirement. We reject the notion that the method of conducting our elections should have the convenience of the clerk and her staff as the primary goal.
- Further, we insist that the County make NO additional purchases of proprietary elections equipment. In particular, we expect that not another penny of Boulder County taxpayer money will be spent on equipment from Hart Intercivic. We remain shocked and appalled that the County has not asked for nor received a complete refund for the money that has been wasted already.
- In addition to rejecting proprietary equipment, we also insist that all elections records that can be made public are released as open records in a timely and cost-free manner. It is absolutely unacceptable to be told that our elections records are trade secrets of a private company.
- We expect that every election held in Boulder County will be thoroughly manually audited by persons not connected with the Clerk’s office who are given complete access to all records needed to verify the counts.
- Finally, we ask you to embody our requests into law by passing language that would guarantee that Boulder County’s citizens are provided this basic level of accountability over our taxpayer-funded elections.
Joe Pezzillo
Boulder, Colorado
Monday, August 01, 2005
Colorado proposed rules fail to address known issues
CAMBER comments - Election Rules 8 CCR 1515-1 – August 1, 2005
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed rules – 8-CCR 1505-1. In our opinion, any election conducted under these rules will not be secure, accurate, verifiable or transparent.
The proposed rules, in conjunction with the revised statutes, fail to address many of the past problems and complaints that have been reported to the Secretary and to individual county clerks including, by way of example:
As per C.R.S. 24-4-103 (4)(c), please forward copies of the scientific or technological rationale justifying those rules which involve scientific or technological issues. We are interested in all studies. We expect to see an analysis of error rates for processes such as signature verification. We expect to see the statistical basis for the audit procedure. We expect to see an analysis of the difference in security, accuracy, verifiability and transparency between the different methods of voting and the different voting equipment.
As per C.R.S. 24-4-103 (8)(b), please forward copies of the Attorney General’s opinion as to the constitutionality of these rules. We expect to see his opinion on whether the rules will protect each eligible elector’s right to vote using an anonymous ballot according to Article VII Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution.
To summarize, in our opinion, any election conducted under these rules will not be secure, accurate, verifiable or transparent.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the proposed rules – 8-CCR 1505-1. In our opinion, any election conducted under these rules will not be secure, accurate, verifiable or transparent.
The proposed rules, in conjunction with the revised statutes, fail to address many of the past problems and complaints that have been reported to the Secretary and to individual county clerks including, by way of example:
- Watchers have been denied access to records, charged fees for election records, prevented from reading and analyzing non-private records, and excluded from some phases of elections. There is no independent mechanism to resolve differences of opinion between watchers and election officials.
- Non-anonymous ballots are permitted under these rules. This is a violation of Article VII, section 8 of the Colorado Constitution.
- Voting equipment/software functional specifications, performance, and versions are not public under these rules. Certification-test requirements are not specified. Testing and test materials are not open to the public. There is no remedy prescribed when, during an election, voting equipment is discovered to be incorrectly programmed.
- Mail ballot elections have disenfranchised electors by permitting ineligible voters to vote and subjecting ballots to loss and theft. Voters have been denied their right to vote using a secret ballot. Officials have recklessly tempted people to vote ballots that are not their own, to sell their signed ballot for money or favor, or to intimidate eligible voters to vote for or against contestants.
- Identification and eligibility rules have not reliably verified that an individual voter is the unique real person they claim to be and have not verified that the individual is eligible to vote in a particular jurisdiction at the time that they vote. Amateur signature verification described by the rules is not a reliable means to verify identity and there is no specification of an acceptable error rate for individual signature verification personnel.
- Canvass procedures have not discovered fraud and error in past elections, although fraud and error were present. Election records and computer files needed to conduct a meaningful canvass have been denied to canvass boards. The Secretary of State and the County Clerks have a conflict of interest. They are under great pressure from campaigns and the press to complete an election in a timely manner. This conflicts with the public’s interest for secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent elections. There has been no independent way to resolve disagreements.
- Security of ballots and equipment has been lax. Ballots wind up in public trash dumps before the election. Ballot boxes have been “misplaced”. There has been no way to verify that the voter’s votes are actually recorded on a digital ballot, and whether digital ballots are “lost”, “replaced” or “created” between the time that they are presumably created by the voter and the time at which they are counted.
- Logic and accuracy test procedures have failed to detect errors in voting equipment and software. Procedures have been highly criticized and resulted in legal action. Computer professionals have no confidence in these tests.
As per C.R.S. 24-4-103 (4)(c), please forward copies of the scientific or technological rationale justifying those rules which involve scientific or technological issues. We are interested in all studies. We expect to see an analysis of error rates for processes such as signature verification. We expect to see the statistical basis for the audit procedure. We expect to see an analysis of the difference in security, accuracy, verifiability and transparency between the different methods of voting and the different voting equipment.
As per C.R.S. 24-4-103 (8)(b), please forward copies of the Attorney General’s opinion as to the constitutionality of these rules. We expect to see his opinion on whether the rules will protect each eligible elector’s right to vote using an anonymous ballot according to Article VII Section 8 of the Colorado Constitution.
To summarize, in our opinion, any election conducted under these rules will not be secure, accurate, verifiable or transparent.
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