April 20, 2005
Ms. Janice Ward
Mesa County Clerk and Recorder
P.O. Box 20,000
Grand Junction, CO 81502-5006
Dear Ms. Ward:
We have received your letter dated April 15, 2005, and appreciate your response. To ensure that we understand your replies, we have summarized our understanding below. We would appreciate it if you would confirm that your replies represent the views of the committee, and that we have correctly interpreted your replies.
1. What professional, peer-reviewed studies have been published that prove that regional voting centers are secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent?
REPLY – The Mesa County Voting Center Committee is not using any peer-reviewed studies for its work.
2. Compared to neighborhood voting using hand-counted paper ballots, precisely how are voting centers more secure, accurate, verifiable, and transparent?
REPLY -- The Mesa County Voting Center Committee is not using any comparisons against documented standards for its work.
3. Voting center data are kept in invisible computer files rather than on real-time paper records. How would the computer data be provided to empower poll watchers and contestants to detect and challenge problems in a timely fashion?
REPLY – The Mesa County Voting Center Committee is not aware of any written plan to meet the election data requirements of poll watchers and contestants. The committee has not created a comprehensive list of these requirements.
4. Voting center ballots are issued on-demand - electronically. Traditional paper ballots are pre-printed, contain a serial number which is removed before the ballot is cast, issued to a specific voter, and tracked on paper logs. How are on-demand ballots more secret, secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent?
REPLY – The Mesa County Voting Center Committee is not aware of any reports that analyze the effectiveness of on-demand vs. pre-printed ballots.
5. When voting centers are networked together how is the voting system kept secure? When voting centers are not networked together how are electors prevented from voting more than once?
REPLY – The Mesa County Voting Center Committee is not aware of any reports that analyze the impact of voting centers on voting system security and reliability.
6. In addition the public needs to understand the consequences of eliminating the neighborhood voting place (precinct) as the organizational unit for Colorado’s political parties. What is being proposed to replace the precinct committeeperson? How will political parties be structured?
REPLY -- The Mesa County Voting Center Committee has no plans to address any changes in political party operation which might result from the dissolution of neighborhood polling places.
We hope that we have accurately represented your replies and look forward to your confirmation.
Sincerely,
Al Kolwicz
Executive Director
Wednesday, April 20, 2005
Tuesday, April 12, 2005
How do regional voting centers improve elections?
Colorado election officials are continuing to spend public resources to eliminate traditional neighborhood voting places. When Colorado election officials supported a ballot initiative to require that all voting be done by mail 60 percent of voters soundly defeated the initiative. Officials now want people to vote in regional voting centers. They claim that regional voting centers would reduce the cost of conducting elections and would be easier for officials to manage.
Voters care most about election integrity. Voters expect secure, accurate, verifiable, and transparent elections that they can trust. Cost is not the primary consideration.
Before neighborhood voting places are eliminated the public needs lots of answers. A few of the questions are:
1. What professional, peer-reviewed studies have been published that prove that regional voting centers are secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent?
2. Compared to neighborhood voting using hand-counted paper ballots, precisely how are voting centers more secure, accurate, verifiable, and transparent?
3. Voting center data are kept in invisible computer files rather than on real-time paper records. How would the computer data be provided to empower poll watchers and contestants to detect and challenge problems in a timely fashion?
4. Voting center ballots are issued on-demand - electronically. Traditional paper ballots are pre-printed, contain a serial number which is removed before the ballot is cast, issued to a specific voter, and tracked on paper logs. How are on-demand ballots more secret, secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent?
5. When voting centers are networked together how is the voting system kept secure? When voting centers are not networked together how are electors prevented from voting more than once?
In addition the public needs to understand the consequences of eliminating the neighborhood voting place (precinct) as the organizational unit for Colorado’s political parties. What is being proposed to replace the precinct committeeperson? How will political parties be structured?
Anything that reduces the public’s trust in elections is a threat to representative self-governance. Consequently, before going forward with voting centers the public’s questions must be answered and time given for the public to assimilate the answers.
Elections are for the people, not for election officials. It is not in the public’s interest to replace traditional precinct voting places with centralized voting centers unless it can be proven to critics that voting centers will improve the security, accuracy, verifiability and transparency of elections.
Voters care most about election integrity. Voters expect secure, accurate, verifiable, and transparent elections that they can trust. Cost is not the primary consideration.
Before neighborhood voting places are eliminated the public needs lots of answers. A few of the questions are:
1. What professional, peer-reviewed studies have been published that prove that regional voting centers are secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent?
2. Compared to neighborhood voting using hand-counted paper ballots, precisely how are voting centers more secure, accurate, verifiable, and transparent?
3. Voting center data are kept in invisible computer files rather than on real-time paper records. How would the computer data be provided to empower poll watchers and contestants to detect and challenge problems in a timely fashion?
4. Voting center ballots are issued on-demand - electronically. Traditional paper ballots are pre-printed, contain a serial number which is removed before the ballot is cast, issued to a specific voter, and tracked on paper logs. How are on-demand ballots more secret, secure, accurate, verifiable and transparent?
5. When voting centers are networked together how is the voting system kept secure? When voting centers are not networked together how are electors prevented from voting more than once?
In addition the public needs to understand the consequences of eliminating the neighborhood voting place (precinct) as the organizational unit for Colorado’s political parties. What is being proposed to replace the precinct committeeperson? How will political parties be structured?
Anything that reduces the public’s trust in elections is a threat to representative self-governance. Consequently, before going forward with voting centers the public’s questions must be answered and time given for the public to assimilate the answers.
Elections are for the people, not for election officials. It is not in the public’s interest to replace traditional precinct voting places with centralized voting centers unless it can be proven to critics that voting centers will improve the security, accuracy, verifiability and transparency of elections.
Tuesday, March 08, 2005
Hand count plan - attempt to decieve voters
I have just reviewed the City of Boulder hand count plan http://coloradovoter.net/ercdocs/boulder-hand-count-to-sos.pdf .
The plan is a farce, designed to deceive the public into believing that the City is verifying election results.
1. The plan fails to verify (through sampling) that every vote cast by an eligible voter is accurately counted. Entire segments of the voting process are excluded from the hand count plan. Consequently, eligible votes that are not counted will not be detected by the process. Ineligible votes that get counted will not be detected by the process. The ballots sampled should include all ballots received. The plan ignores eligible ballots that are improperly rejected, and ineligible ballots that are improperly counted. It ignores duplicated ballots that are incorrectly duplicated, and potentially misplaced batches of ballots. It ignores eligible votes that are incorrecly interpreted.
2. The sampling procedure described in the plan is inept. Only a portion, less than half, of the vote counting system can be tested by this process. The sample guarantees testing will be limited to a maximum of three vote scanning machines, a maximum of three ballot resolution teams, a maximum of three ballot qualification teams, etc. All of the remaining components of the system are ignored. Individual ballots should be sampled, starting at the point that they are received in the mail (hand delivery collection box). This will distribute the selected ballots over all processes and equipment.
3. The counting method is biased. The law requires the determination of voter intent to interpret the votes on each ballot. The hand count plan, instead, requires that the hand counters must interpret the votes in the same way as the computer interpreted the votes. (If the computer did tit wrong, the hand counter must do it wrong.) This is designed to bias the hand count results so that they match the computer results.
4. The hand count plan does not specify a "blind count". People performing the count can know the prior results -- both the total number of votes and the interpretation of individual votes. The same team should not conduct the original and repeat hand count.
5. The comparison of results is insufficient and inexact. The results of each sampled ballot should be compared to the actual results. In the case of a ballot whose votes were counted, the hand counted results of each vote on that ballot should be compared to the computer generated result for that particular ballot. The hand count plan does not keep track of results by ballot, and does not keep track of over and under votes. Sloppy averaging of votes within batches is not an adequate verification.
6. The hand count plan is not independent; the Clerk selects the people who check the Clerk's work-product. The process must be conducted by people who are not subservient to the Clerk.
7. There needs to be a provision in the hand count plan for disqualifying the original election results. If the hand count proves that the system failed to accurately count every vote cast by an eligible elector, the original counts should be discarded and the entire set of ballots reprocessed -- by hand.
The plan is a farce, designed to deceive the public into believing that the City is verifying election results.
1. The plan fails to verify (through sampling) that every vote cast by an eligible voter is accurately counted. Entire segments of the voting process are excluded from the hand count plan. Consequently, eligible votes that are not counted will not be detected by the process. Ineligible votes that get counted will not be detected by the process. The ballots sampled should include all ballots received. The plan ignores eligible ballots that are improperly rejected, and ineligible ballots that are improperly counted. It ignores duplicated ballots that are incorrectly duplicated, and potentially misplaced batches of ballots. It ignores eligible votes that are incorrecly interpreted.
2. The sampling procedure described in the plan is inept. Only a portion, less than half, of the vote counting system can be tested by this process. The sample guarantees testing will be limited to a maximum of three vote scanning machines, a maximum of three ballot resolution teams, a maximum of three ballot qualification teams, etc. All of the remaining components of the system are ignored. Individual ballots should be sampled, starting at the point that they are received in the mail (hand delivery collection box). This will distribute the selected ballots over all processes and equipment.
3. The counting method is biased. The law requires the determination of voter intent to interpret the votes on each ballot. The hand count plan, instead, requires that the hand counters must interpret the votes in the same way as the computer interpreted the votes. (If the computer did tit wrong, the hand counter must do it wrong.) This is designed to bias the hand count results so that they match the computer results.
4. The hand count plan does not specify a "blind count". People performing the count can know the prior results -- both the total number of votes and the interpretation of individual votes. The same team should not conduct the original and repeat hand count.
5. The comparison of results is insufficient and inexact. The results of each sampled ballot should be compared to the actual results. In the case of a ballot whose votes were counted, the hand counted results of each vote on that ballot should be compared to the computer generated result for that particular ballot. The hand count plan does not keep track of results by ballot, and does not keep track of over and under votes. Sloppy averaging of votes within batches is not an adequate verification.
6. The hand count plan is not independent; the Clerk selects the people who check the Clerk's work-product. The process must be conducted by people who are not subservient to the Clerk.
7. There needs to be a provision in the hand count plan for disqualifying the original election results. If the hand count proves that the system failed to accurately count every vote cast by an eligible elector, the original counts should be discarded and the entire set of ballots reprocessed -- by hand.
Monday, March 07, 2005
Say "no" to NIST's voter verification deception
The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) just released a draft of their input on VVPATs and DRE audits as requested by the Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC) of the Election Assistance Commission.
Preliminary Report: NIST Approach to VVPAT Requirements for the VSS
2002 Addendum (John Wack)
http://vote.nist.gov/TGDC/VVPAT%20Addendum%20-%20jpw%20-%203-2-051.pdf
The NIST draft is a step backward.
1. It does not require that the votes on the voter verified ballot be the official votes that get counted. Consequently, it is little more than a mechanism to deceive voters into thinking that voters are verifying their votes.
2. It requires that the voter be able to compare the votes on the paper to the votes in the computer -- which as far as I can tell is not possible. "To permit the voter, at the time of voting, to verify that the DRE-VVPAT is recording the electronic ballot choices correctly and to resolve problems should they occur,"
3. Several members of the IEEE committee on Voting Systems objected to this solution and provided many arguments against it.
As far as I can tell, this draft is another attempt to protect DRE vendors and election officials who have purchased DRE equipment, and is not an attempt to achieve the highest level of election security, accuracy and verifiability.
The draft should be rejected.
Preliminary Report: NIST Approach to VVPAT Requirements for the VSS
2002 Addendum (John Wack)
http://vote.nist.gov/TGDC/VVPAT%20Addendum%20-%20jpw%20-%203-2-051.pdf
The NIST draft is a step backward.
1. It does not require that the votes on the voter verified ballot be the official votes that get counted. Consequently, it is little more than a mechanism to deceive voters into thinking that voters are verifying their votes.
2. It requires that the voter be able to compare the votes on the paper to the votes in the computer -- which as far as I can tell is not possible. "To permit the voter, at the time of voting, to verify that the DRE-VVPAT is recording the electronic ballot choices correctly and to resolve problems should they occur,"
3. Several members of the IEEE committee on Voting Systems objected to this solution and provided many arguments against it.
As far as I can tell, this draft is another attempt to protect DRE vendors and election officials who have purchased DRE equipment, and is not an attempt to achieve the highest level of election security, accuracy and verifiability.
The draft should be rejected.
Monday, January 24, 2005
Colorado considers verifying vote counts.
January 24, 2005
Representative Alice Madden
Senator Shawn Mitchell
RE: SB05-079_01 http://www.leg.state.co.us/
We are forever grateful to you both for taking the first step to address major flaws in Colorado’s voting system. We hope that you will accept the following recommendations as constructive.
1. Only verified votes count. The draft bill contemplates the possibility of two ballots being cast by each elector -- a “permanent paper record” and an “electronic record of vote”. The notion of two ballots per elector should be eliminated. There should be only one ballot, and it should be the permanent paper record that was verified and cast by the eligible elector. Counting votes on an unverified ballot is not meaningful.
2. Adequate verification of count. The draft bill contemplates a random verification of the vote counting processes. This is highly desirable, but the method proposed in the bill is inadequate.
a. The random sample of twenty precincts is not sufficient. Since each county uses a unique counting process (procedure, personnel and equipment), the sample should include precincts from each county.
b. In the draft bill, it is not clear which ballots in each selected precinct are to be included in the sample. The votes for every contest on all of the ballots cast in a selected precinct should be included in the sample including Election Day ballots cast in the precinct, absentee, mail-ballot, early, provisional, emergency, and any other eligible ballots.
c. The draft bill should require that the number of ballots counted be verified against poll books and batch control sheets for each voting method to ensure that ballots have not been lost or added during the original count.
d. In the draft bill, it is not clear what will be reported following the verification. The original and the verification count for each contest should publicly report: the number of eligible voters, the under votes, over votes, the number of ballots cast for each method of voting, and the votes for each contestant for each method of voting - Election Day ballots cast in the precinct, absentee, mail-ballot, early, provisional, emergency, and any others.
e. To achieve a high quality count, the people counting the votes for the Secretary of State must not know the earlier vote tally results for the precinct(s). They must report their written findings before learning earlier results.
f. Suggestion. Ballots that were rejected during the original process should be subject to reconsideration during the verification count.
3. Transparent verification. In the draft bill, the Secretary of State is not required to conduct the verification in a public and transparent manner. The draft bill should explicitly require that every step in the verification count, including the random selection of precincts, must be open to authorized poll watchers who must be able to actually see, read, and hear everything that is happening as it is happening.
The bill should establish a process for the public to challenge the verification process and results.
Before counting the votes on the sampled paper ballots, the Secretary of State should make available to poll watchers a file for each selected precinct containing a scanned image of each ballot surface. Poll watchers should be permitted to independently count the votes to increase confidence in the process. They should be permitted to load the file into one or more computers. A means should be established to uniquely identify each ballot surface so that people can refer to each specific surface.
4. Defective count consequences. The draft bill should specify what is to occur when any count total differs from the original count.
The bill should state that each difference between the original and verification count is significant, and that differences will not be “averaged out”. For example, a different number of early votes (say +27) and an equally different number of absentee votes (say – 27) for the same candidate must be considered 54 errors, since the number of votes is linked to the poll book for each voting method.
Under what circumstances is the counting system (procedure, personnel and equipment) considered to be unreliable? Under what circumstances will all of the votes in all of the precincts in a county need to be manually recounted? Under what circumstances will all of the votes counted in Colorado using a particular vendor’s vote counting equipment need to be manually recounted?
5. Timing. The draft bill should establish time limits and time relationships for completing the verification of the random sample, resolving public input, completing any candidate requested recount, and declaring official results.
6. When is remote access to machines permitted? We do not understand PG 3, LN 22 – 27. It suggests that a voting machine is permitted to be remotely accessed under some circumstances. The circumstances should be specified.
7. Public access to electronic election data and source codes. PG 4, LN 1 – 11 should provide for public access to the source codes including BIOS. It must also include a requirement that the version and level of all software must be tamper proof and verifiable. Also, the section should provide for public access to copies of any electronic election data created during the course of an election. Sample files should be made available at least three weeks before the election. The production data files should be made available before verification counting begins.
We hope that you will incorporate changes to the draft bill to accommodate these suggested improvements. We are available to assist in any way that we can.
Sincerely,
Al Kolwicz
Executive Director
CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.ColoradoVoter.blogspot.com
Representative Alice Madden
Senator Shawn Mitchell
RE: SB05-079_01 http://www.leg.state.co.us/
We are forever grateful to you both for taking the first step to address major flaws in Colorado’s voting system. We hope that you will accept the following recommendations as constructive.
1. Only verified votes count. The draft bill contemplates the possibility of two ballots being cast by each elector -- a “permanent paper record” and an “electronic record of vote”. The notion of two ballots per elector should be eliminated. There should be only one ballot, and it should be the permanent paper record that was verified and cast by the eligible elector. Counting votes on an unverified ballot is not meaningful.
2. Adequate verification of count. The draft bill contemplates a random verification of the vote counting processes. This is highly desirable, but the method proposed in the bill is inadequate.
a. The random sample of twenty precincts is not sufficient. Since each county uses a unique counting process (procedure, personnel and equipment), the sample should include precincts from each county.
b. In the draft bill, it is not clear which ballots in each selected precinct are to be included in the sample. The votes for every contest on all of the ballots cast in a selected precinct should be included in the sample including Election Day ballots cast in the precinct, absentee, mail-ballot, early, provisional, emergency, and any other eligible ballots.
c. The draft bill should require that the number of ballots counted be verified against poll books and batch control sheets for each voting method to ensure that ballots have not been lost or added during the original count.
d. In the draft bill, it is not clear what will be reported following the verification. The original and the verification count for each contest should publicly report: the number of eligible voters, the under votes, over votes, the number of ballots cast for each method of voting, and the votes for each contestant for each method of voting - Election Day ballots cast in the precinct, absentee, mail-ballot, early, provisional, emergency, and any others.
e. To achieve a high quality count, the people counting the votes for the Secretary of State must not know the earlier vote tally results for the precinct(s). They must report their written findings before learning earlier results.
f. Suggestion. Ballots that were rejected during the original process should be subject to reconsideration during the verification count.
3. Transparent verification. In the draft bill, the Secretary of State is not required to conduct the verification in a public and transparent manner. The draft bill should explicitly require that every step in the verification count, including the random selection of precincts, must be open to authorized poll watchers who must be able to actually see, read, and hear everything that is happening as it is happening.
The bill should establish a process for the public to challenge the verification process and results.
Before counting the votes on the sampled paper ballots, the Secretary of State should make available to poll watchers a file for each selected precinct containing a scanned image of each ballot surface. Poll watchers should be permitted to independently count the votes to increase confidence in the process. They should be permitted to load the file into one or more computers. A means should be established to uniquely identify each ballot surface so that people can refer to each specific surface.
4. Defective count consequences. The draft bill should specify what is to occur when any count total differs from the original count.
The bill should state that each difference between the original and verification count is significant, and that differences will not be “averaged out”. For example, a different number of early votes (say +27) and an equally different number of absentee votes (say – 27) for the same candidate must be considered 54 errors, since the number of votes is linked to the poll book for each voting method.
Under what circumstances is the counting system (procedure, personnel and equipment) considered to be unreliable? Under what circumstances will all of the votes in all of the precincts in a county need to be manually recounted? Under what circumstances will all of the votes counted in Colorado using a particular vendor’s vote counting equipment need to be manually recounted?
5. Timing. The draft bill should establish time limits and time relationships for completing the verification of the random sample, resolving public input, completing any candidate requested recount, and declaring official results.
6. When is remote access to machines permitted? We do not understand PG 3, LN 22 – 27. It suggests that a voting machine is permitted to be remotely accessed under some circumstances. The circumstances should be specified.
7. Public access to electronic election data and source codes. PG 4, LN 1 – 11 should provide for public access to the source codes including BIOS. It must also include a requirement that the version and level of all software must be tamper proof and verifiable. Also, the section should provide for public access to copies of any electronic election data created during the course of an election. Sample files should be made available at least three weeks before the election. The production data files should be made available before verification counting begins.
We hope that you will incorporate changes to the draft bill to accommodate these suggested improvements. We are available to assist in any way that we can.
Sincerely,
Al Kolwicz
Executive Director
CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
303-494-1540
AlKolwicz@qwest.net
www.ColoradoVoter.blogspot.com
Tuesday, January 11, 2005
Boulder County vote counting system is not reliable
DATE: January 11, 2005
TO: Boulder City Council
FROM: Bill Eckert, Al Kolwicz
SUBJECT: Analysis of Boulder County Vote Counting System – Revision to January 4th report.
The City of Boulder intends to use Boulder County’s vote counting system for the March 2005 City Election. Because of the problems encountered by the County during the November 2004 election, it is risky to use the system for the City election.
One way to estimate the reliability of a vote counting system is to count the votes twice. If the results are identical, the system is considered to be reliable. (A reliable system is not necessarily accurate since both results could be incorrect.)
Fortunately, a recount was required for the St. Vrain School District contest. The difference between YES and NO in the original four-county election was less than ½ of one percent – 127 votes.
Recount results and the following analysis shows that the Boulder County vote counting system is not reliable.
REPORT SUMMARY
January 5, 2005
January 4th, Boulder County released a copy of the original and recount reports for the St. Vrain School District contest. Each county report shows, for each precinct, the number of ballots cast for each voting method (absentee, early, and Election Day). See attached ORIGINAL and RECOUNT reports.
Also attached is a third report showing: (a) the differences in the number of ballots counted by voting method and precinct between the original count and the recount, (b) the differences in the number of votes counted by precinct in the original count and the recount, and (c) the differences between the individual precinct reports.. Notice the following:
The differences between the ballots counted in the original and recount were:
179 Absentee
207 Early
373 Election Day
759 Total
The differences between the votes counted in the original and recount were:
14 Yes
20 No
34 Total
The differences between precinct reports in the original and recount were:
A. Precincts with the same quantity of votes:
18 Same quantity of ballots and, same voting methods
41 Same quantity of ballots and different voting methods
59 Total
B. Precincts with a different quantity of votes
03 Same quantity of ballots and same voting methods
09 Same quantity of ballots and different voting methods
02 More ballots
06 Fewer ballots
20 Total
Only 18 (22.8 percent) of the precinct reports were identical. The remaining 77.2 percent were different.
No matter how the differences are explained, it is the case that the results counted by the Boulder County Vote Counting System are not reliable enough to be used by the City of Boulder for its upcoming March 2005 election.
TO: Boulder City Council
FROM: Bill Eckert, Al Kolwicz
SUBJECT: Analysis of Boulder County Vote Counting System – Revision to January 4th report.
The City of Boulder intends to use Boulder County’s vote counting system for the March 2005 City Election. Because of the problems encountered by the County during the November 2004 election, it is risky to use the system for the City election.
One way to estimate the reliability of a vote counting system is to count the votes twice. If the results are identical, the system is considered to be reliable. (A reliable system is not necessarily accurate since both results could be incorrect.)
Fortunately, a recount was required for the St. Vrain School District contest. The difference between YES and NO in the original four-county election was less than ½ of one percent – 127 votes.
Recount results and the following analysis shows that the Boulder County vote counting system is not reliable.
- Only 22.8 percent of the 79 precincts achieved identical results.
- There are 759 differences in “ballots counted” section of the reports.
- There are 34 differences in the “votes counted” section of the reports.
Clerical error might explain some, but not all of the differences. Counting equipment error might explain some of the differences. Intentional changes could explain some, but not all of the changes. For example, in precinct 4171107003 there are no differences in the number of ballots counted, yet there are 4 more YES and 1 more NO votes counted.
No matter how the differences are explained, it is the case that the results counted by the Boulder County Vote Counting System are not reliable enough to be used by the City of Boulder for its upcoming March 2005 election.
Potential consequences of using this unreliable system for the City’s March election are:
- The wrong candidate might get elected.
- A recount might be required (possibly counted using the unreliable system).
- The election can be challenged and a new election required.
The Boulder County vote counting system should not be used for the March City election.
====================
REPORT SUMMARY
January 5, 2005
January 4th, Boulder County released a copy of the original and recount reports for the St. Vrain School District contest. Each county report shows, for each precinct, the number of ballots cast for each voting method (absentee, early, and Election Day). See attached ORIGINAL and RECOUNT reports.
Also attached is a third report showing: (a) the differences in the number of ballots counted by voting method and precinct between the original count and the recount, (b) the differences in the number of votes counted by precinct in the original count and the recount, and (c) the differences between the individual precinct reports.. Notice the following:
The differences between the ballots counted in the original and recount were:
179 Absentee
207 Early
373 Election Day
759 Total
The differences between the votes counted in the original and recount were:
14 Yes
20 No
34 Total
The differences between precinct reports in the original and recount were:
A. Precincts with the same quantity of votes:
18 Same quantity of ballots and, same voting methods
41 Same quantity of ballots and different voting methods
59 Total
B. Precincts with a different quantity of votes
03 Same quantity of ballots and same voting methods
09 Same quantity of ballots and different voting methods
02 More ballots
06 Fewer ballots
20 Total
Only 18 (22.8 percent) of the precinct reports were identical. The remaining 77.2 percent were different.
No matter how the differences are explained, it is the case that the results counted by the Boulder County Vote Counting System are not reliable enough to be used by the City of Boulder for its upcoming March 2005 election.
Sunday, December 26, 2004
Voting Standard should be rejected
December 26, 2004
Memo To: Election Assistance Commission (EAC),
EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC),
Chairs IEEE SCC 38 and P1583
From: Al Kolwicz, IEEE P1583 committee member, Executive Director CAMBER- Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results.
Re: IEEE standards project P1583 Standards for Voting Equipment
Occasionally committees produce a great work product. More often they do not. The work product of the IEEE P1583 project is not suitable for adoption as a national standard consequently, it should be rejected.
Implementation of this draft standard would not move our nation toward secure, accurate and verifiable elections. In fact it would do the opposite.
Methodology - A voting system consists of numerous components. Each of these components must work correctly in order to achieve a trustworthy election. One way to do this is to perfect individual components and then try to glue them together. A more successful way is to first perfect a framework and then develop components.
Requirements - Before considering the P1583 component a precise and comprehensive statement of requirements for the entire voting system must be developed and adopted by the public – not just some insiders. From the legislative process used to create election laws and rules, to the canvass procedures used to verify results of each election, the system needs wholesale reform.
System Architecture – Given the requirements, the nation should adopt an abstract architecture of a voting system, a tight set of requirements for each element of the system, a specification of the primitive functions, a set of metrics, and a set of acceptable methods to prove compliance. The architecture and primitives should be used to construct two or three reference implementations (at the high level) and include complete tests that verify each implementation.
Resources - This is a task that takes motivation, time, talent and money. It cannot be accomplished by amateurs – no matter how motivated and good intentioned. It cannot be accomplished by lawyers or typical legislators. It cannot be accomplished by the sitting Secretary of State and/or staff. And it cannot be accomplished by the county clerks and their people. It should not be accomplished by voting system vendors.
Recommendation - The P1583 draft should be rejected. A project should be authorized to develop the requirements and architecture of our voting system.
Memo To: Election Assistance Commission (EAC),
EAC Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC),
Chairs IEEE SCC 38 and P1583
From: Al Kolwicz, IEEE P1583 committee member, Executive Director CAMBER- Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results.
Re: IEEE standards project P1583 Standards for Voting Equipment
Occasionally committees produce a great work product. More often they do not. The work product of the IEEE P1583 project is not suitable for adoption as a national standard consequently, it should be rejected.
Implementation of this draft standard would not move our nation toward secure, accurate and verifiable elections. In fact it would do the opposite.
Methodology - A voting system consists of numerous components. Each of these components must work correctly in order to achieve a trustworthy election. One way to do this is to perfect individual components and then try to glue them together. A more successful way is to first perfect a framework and then develop components.
Requirements - Before considering the P1583 component a precise and comprehensive statement of requirements for the entire voting system must be developed and adopted by the public – not just some insiders. From the legislative process used to create election laws and rules, to the canvass procedures used to verify results of each election, the system needs wholesale reform.
System Architecture – Given the requirements, the nation should adopt an abstract architecture of a voting system, a tight set of requirements for each element of the system, a specification of the primitive functions, a set of metrics, and a set of acceptable methods to prove compliance. The architecture and primitives should be used to construct two or three reference implementations (at the high level) and include complete tests that verify each implementation.
Resources - This is a task that takes motivation, time, talent and money. It cannot be accomplished by amateurs – no matter how motivated and good intentioned. It cannot be accomplished by lawyers or typical legislators. It cannot be accomplished by the sitting Secretary of State and/or staff. And it cannot be accomplished by the county clerks and their people. It should not be accomplished by voting system vendors.
Recommendation - The P1583 draft should be rejected. A project should be authorized to develop the requirements and architecture of our voting system.
Tuesday, November 23, 2004
St. Vrain has not yet called for a recount.
From: Wurl, Nancy Jo [mailto:nwurl@co.boulder.co.us]
Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2004 4:37 PM
To: AlKolwicz@qwest.net
Cc: David Leeds (E-mail); Hillary Hall (E-mail); scott@scottgessler.com
Subject: RE: Will there be a recount? If so, under what rules?
Mr. Kolwicz:
Apparently there is going to be a recount of the St. Vrain Valley School District issue. The combined results from the counties involved fall within the one half of one percent that mandates a recount of St. Vrain Valley School District Ballot Issue 3A.
We have not communicated with you regarding this issue because the School District has not (as yet) called for the recount. The ball is in their capable hands and they will notify the counties (Boulder, Broomfield, Larimer, and Weld) in the required time frame. As noted, St. Vrain Valley extends into four counties so this recount has and will continue to require coordination between the District and the involved County Clerks. The District, not the Secretary of State nor the County Clerks, must call for the recount.
As prescribed in 1-10.5-107 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, when the recount is called by St. Vrain, we will notify the representative Canvass Boarad members and the hands-on workers. Because of Boulder County's paper ballot system, it will be necessary for the participating Canvass members to work full 8-hour shifts to accomplish the recount of the St. Vrain issue. All absentee, early voting, provisional, and duplicated ballots will need to be counted as well as the issue on all precincts containing the District's ballots.
The recount will be conducted per instructions from the Secretary of State, the statutes, and the Rules related to our voting system. The recount shall be completed on or before the December 10th statutory deadline. Only the St. Vrain issue will be counted.
Nancy Wurl
Sent: Tuesday, November 23, 2004 4:37 PM
To: AlKolwicz@qwest.net
Cc: David Leeds (E-mail); Hillary Hall (E-mail); scott@scottgessler.com
Subject: RE: Will there be a recount? If so, under what rules?
Mr. Kolwicz:
Apparently there is going to be a recount of the St. Vrain Valley School District issue. The combined results from the counties involved fall within the one half of one percent that mandates a recount of St. Vrain Valley School District Ballot Issue 3A.
We have not communicated with you regarding this issue because the School District has not (as yet) called for the recount. The ball is in their capable hands and they will notify the counties (Boulder, Broomfield, Larimer, and Weld) in the required time frame. As noted, St. Vrain Valley extends into four counties so this recount has and will continue to require coordination between the District and the involved County Clerks. The District, not the Secretary of State nor the County Clerks, must call for the recount.
As prescribed in 1-10.5-107 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, when the recount is called by St. Vrain, we will notify the representative Canvass Boarad members and the hands-on workers. Because of Boulder County's paper ballot system, it will be necessary for the participating Canvass members to work full 8-hour shifts to accomplish the recount of the St. Vrain issue. All absentee, early voting, provisional, and duplicated ballots will need to be counted as well as the issue on all precincts containing the District's ballots.
The recount will be conducted per instructions from the Secretary of State, the statutes, and the Rules related to our voting system. The recount shall be completed on or before the December 10th statutory deadline. Only the St. Vrain issue will be counted.
Nancy Wurl
Friday, November 19, 2004
It's not over in Boulder County
Boulder County’s Canvass Board arrived at a split decision regarding approval of the canvass of election results. The board’s report is attached.
Now, according to the Colorado Daily, Boulder County will conduct a recount in the St. Vrain School District contest.
The official Republican canvass board member submitted a letter to County Clerk Linda Salas asking her to verify that there will be a recount, and under what rules the recount will be conducted.
The news story suggests that the clerk is proceeding with a secret recount conducted by the administration and the vendor. This does not follow Colorado law which says that the recount will be “made by the canvass board who officiated in certifying the official abstract of votes cast.”
Also, specific provisions are written into the election rules for the equipment used by Boulder County. The news story suggests that there will be an attempt to violate these rules. For example, 14.8.3 (b) says, “Scan and resolve all recount ballots following original election procedures, including the examination of ballots (Rule 14.3; C.R.S. 1-10.5-108). Use the Audit Trail Report and original Scan Batch Reports with notes to ensure resolution action follows original resolution.” Whereas the news story quotes Jim Burrus as saying, “People from Hart will be here to set up that process so we can auto-resolve any damaged ballots that slowed us down before." While we disagree with the rule, we disagree even more with a violation of the written rules.
This recount is very important. It opens an opportunity to determine how precisely the ballots are being counted by Boulder County’s vote counting system. About ½ of one percent of all of the ballots voted in precinct were not correctly accounted for. Where did these ballots go, or come from? What happens in a recount when it is discovered that the equipment or the resolution board incorrectly interpreted the voter’s intent?
The rules are contradictory. On the one hand they say, “review the ballots to assure they were counted properly.” On the other they say, “ensure resolution action follows original resolution.” You cannot have it both ways.
We are awaiting a response to the Friday morning inquiry.
Al Kolwicz
Executive Director
CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
===================
Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 11:19 AM
Subject: Will there be a recount? If so, under what rules?
Ms. Salas,
I have read that there may be a required recount of St. Vrain.
Is this true?
If true, will the recount be conducted according to the following statute and rules?
C.R.S. 1-10.5-107. Canvass board to conduct recount.
Election Rules: 14.8 Counting of Ballots using the “Ballot Now” Voting System
Al Kolwicz
Canvass Board Member
Boulder County Republican Party
=====================
Nov 19, 2004
County readies for recount
By RICHARD VALENTY Colorado Daily Staff Writer
The Boulder County elections team completed one long, arduous election process Thursday when they sent certified results from about 160,000 ballots to the Colorado Secretary of State.
But it's back to work again Friday and next week to begin conducting Boulder County's part of a multi-county recount.
As of Wednesday, the St. Vrain School District Ballot Issue 3A tax increase proposal was trailing by 127 votes out of more than 60,000 ballots cast. Recounts can be requested if ballot issue results are closer than a 0.5 percent difference, and St. Vrain has requested a recount.
The St. Vrain district lies within parts of Boulder, Broomfield, Weld and Larimer counties, and Boulder County counted roughly 47,000 ballots with the St. Vrain issue included.
Jim Burrus, county media information officer, said the county will begin the process by locating the boxes containing paper ballots from precincts in the St. Vrain district.
"They haven't gone through and segregated the boxes yet, but they'll probably start on that tomorrow (Friday) or Monday," said Burrus.
The recount must be completed by Dec. 10, and Burrus said representatives from election system vendor Hart InterCivic will work with Boulder County to make sure the recount is done well before deadline.
County officials said the Nov. 2 general election results were released several days later than most other Colorado counties in part because some of the paper ballots were improperly printed. County high-speed scanners could not read the ballots properly, and county officials needed to individually resolve the improper ballots, slowing the process down dramatically.
Burrus said the county will be using the same ballots and the same scanners used for the general election during the recount, but will only be evaluating one question instead of the entire general election list of candidates and referenda.
"People from Hart will be here to set up that process so we can auto-resolve any damaged ballots that slowed us down before," said Burrus. "The only thing we'll need to look at is the St. Vrain question."
Meanwhile, county officials and Hart are working together to complete additional data from the general election. Burrus said Elections Manager Tom Halicki was working Thursday on compiling payroll information for some 150 people who worked on processing election results, not including precinct election judges.
Also, Burrus said Hart employees will be working on a report detailing the status of damaged ballots or ballots containing overvotes and undervotes. He said the report would contain information on how the questionable ballots were resolved, and said results could be available in "a week or two."
=========================
C.R.S. 1-10.5-107. Canvass board to conduct recount.
(1) Any county clerk and recorder or governing body required to conduct a recount shall arrange to have the recount made by the canvass board who officiated in certifying the official abstract of votes cast. If any member of the canvass board cannot participate in the recount, another person shall be appointed in the manner provided by law for appointment of the members of the original board.
(2) Any canvass board making a recount under the provisions of this section may employ assistants and clerks as necessary for the conduct of the recount.
(3) The canvass board may require the production of any documentary evidence regarding any vote cast or counted and may correct the abstract of votes cast in accordance with its findings based on the evidence presented.
(4) At the conclusion of the recount, the canvass board shall make the returns of all partisan, nonpartisan, ballot issue, and ballot question elections to the designated election official and provide a copy to the persons or groups requesting the recount or notified of the recount pursuant to sections 1-10.5-105 and 1-10.5-106. The canvass board shall meet and issue an amended abstract of votes cast for the office, ballot issue, or ballot question that is the subject of the recount and deliver it to the designated election official.
(5) The designated election official shall notify the governing body of the results of the recount.
========================
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/rule_making/electionrules.pdf PAGE 30
RULE
14.8 Counting of Ballots using the “Ballot Now” Voting System
14.8.1 In the case of a recount, the designated election official shall identify all precincts with the contest(s) designated for a recount using the following procedures:
a. Using the Ballot Now Scanned Ballots by Precinct report from the original election database, locate the batches containing any ballot type (Election, Absentee, and Provisional) for the recount.
b. Remove ballots from each batch and label them as “Recount”.
14.8.2 Required scanner testing shall be performed using a test deck from a randomly chosen precinct with at least 50 ballots as prescribed by statute, following testing procedures outlined in the State of Colorado Procedures for the use of the Ballot Now Voting System. A Recount Test spreadsheet shall be created based on the chosen precinct in the same fashion as the ballot options test spreadsheet.
14.8.3 Ballots for the recount shall be processed following the State of Colorado Procedures for the use of the Ballot Now Voting System in conjunction with the following procedures:
a. Open Ballot Now with an unused MBB (Mobile Ballot Box) from the election and create a Ballot Now recount database;
b. Scan and resolve all recount ballots following original election procedures, including the examination of ballots (Rule 14.3; C.R.S. 1-10.5-108). Use the Audit Trail Report and original Scan Batch Reports with notes to ensure resolution action follows original resolution.
c. Save all recount CVRs (Cast Vote Records) to the MBB (Mobile Ballot Box) after verifying that the number of ballots processed matches the number of ballots cast in the recount contest(s).
d. Open a new recount election in “Tally” and process the recount MBB following the tabulation procedures above.
e. Compare recount results to original results and document any differences.
f. Backup the test database and the official recount database following the “Archive” procedures.
===================
RULE
14.3 The purpose of a recount is to review the ballots to assure they were counted properly. Unless directed otherwise by the Secretary of State, all procedures of election night shall be followed as closely as possible during the recount, including an examination of the ballots.
===================
C.R.S. 1-10.5-108. Method of recount.
(1) The recount shall be of the ballots cast, and the votes shall be recorded on sheets other than those used at the election.
(2) Unless otherwise directed by the secretary of state, the ballots cast shall be recounted utilizing the same procedures, methods, and processes that were utilized for the original count of the ballots cast.
====================
Now, according to the Colorado Daily, Boulder County will conduct a recount in the St. Vrain School District contest.
The official Republican canvass board member submitted a letter to County Clerk Linda Salas asking her to verify that there will be a recount, and under what rules the recount will be conducted.
The news story suggests that the clerk is proceeding with a secret recount conducted by the administration and the vendor. This does not follow Colorado law which says that the recount will be “made by the canvass board who officiated in certifying the official abstract of votes cast.”
Also, specific provisions are written into the election rules for the equipment used by Boulder County. The news story suggests that there will be an attempt to violate these rules. For example, 14.8.3 (b) says, “Scan and resolve all recount ballots following original election procedures, including the examination of ballots (Rule 14.3; C.R.S. 1-10.5-108). Use the Audit Trail Report and original Scan Batch Reports with notes to ensure resolution action follows original resolution.” Whereas the news story quotes Jim Burrus as saying, “People from Hart will be here to set up that process so we can auto-resolve any damaged ballots that slowed us down before." While we disagree with the rule, we disagree even more with a violation of the written rules.
This recount is very important. It opens an opportunity to determine how precisely the ballots are being counted by Boulder County’s vote counting system. About ½ of one percent of all of the ballots voted in precinct were not correctly accounted for. Where did these ballots go, or come from? What happens in a recount when it is discovered that the equipment or the resolution board incorrectly interpreted the voter’s intent?
The rules are contradictory. On the one hand they say, “review the ballots to assure they were counted properly.” On the other they say, “ensure resolution action follows original resolution.” You cannot have it both ways.
We are awaiting a response to the Friday morning inquiry.
Al Kolwicz
Executive Director
CAMBER
Citizens for Accurate Mail Ballot Election Results
===================
Sent: Friday, November 19, 2004 11:19 AM
Subject: Will there be a recount? If so, under what rules?
Ms. Salas,
I have read that there may be a required recount of St. Vrain.
Is this true?
If true, will the recount be conducted according to the following statute and rules?
C.R.S. 1-10.5-107. Canvass board to conduct recount.
Election Rules: 14.8 Counting of Ballots using the “Ballot Now” Voting System
Al Kolwicz
Canvass Board Member
Boulder County Republican Party
=====================
Nov 19, 2004
County readies for recount
By RICHARD VALENTY Colorado Daily Staff Writer
The Boulder County elections team completed one long, arduous election process Thursday when they sent certified results from about 160,000 ballots to the Colorado Secretary of State.
But it's back to work again Friday and next week to begin conducting Boulder County's part of a multi-county recount.
As of Wednesday, the St. Vrain School District Ballot Issue 3A tax increase proposal was trailing by 127 votes out of more than 60,000 ballots cast. Recounts can be requested if ballot issue results are closer than a 0.5 percent difference, and St. Vrain has requested a recount.
The St. Vrain district lies within parts of Boulder, Broomfield, Weld and Larimer counties, and Boulder County counted roughly 47,000 ballots with the St. Vrain issue included.
Jim Burrus, county media information officer, said the county will begin the process by locating the boxes containing paper ballots from precincts in the St. Vrain district.
"They haven't gone through and segregated the boxes yet, but they'll probably start on that tomorrow (Friday) or Monday," said Burrus.
The recount must be completed by Dec. 10, and Burrus said representatives from election system vendor Hart InterCivic will work with Boulder County to make sure the recount is done well before deadline.
County officials said the Nov. 2 general election results were released several days later than most other Colorado counties in part because some of the paper ballots were improperly printed. County high-speed scanners could not read the ballots properly, and county officials needed to individually resolve the improper ballots, slowing the process down dramatically.
Burrus said the county will be using the same ballots and the same scanners used for the general election during the recount, but will only be evaluating one question instead of the entire general election list of candidates and referenda.
"People from Hart will be here to set up that process so we can auto-resolve any damaged ballots that slowed us down before," said Burrus. "The only thing we'll need to look at is the St. Vrain question."
Meanwhile, county officials and Hart are working together to complete additional data from the general election. Burrus said Elections Manager Tom Halicki was working Thursday on compiling payroll information for some 150 people who worked on processing election results, not including precinct election judges.
Also, Burrus said Hart employees will be working on a report detailing the status of damaged ballots or ballots containing overvotes and undervotes. He said the report would contain information on how the questionable ballots were resolved, and said results could be available in "a week or two."
=========================
C.R.S. 1-10.5-107. Canvass board to conduct recount.
(1) Any county clerk and recorder or governing body required to conduct a recount shall arrange to have the recount made by the canvass board who officiated in certifying the official abstract of votes cast. If any member of the canvass board cannot participate in the recount, another person shall be appointed in the manner provided by law for appointment of the members of the original board.
(2) Any canvass board making a recount under the provisions of this section may employ assistants and clerks as necessary for the conduct of the recount.
(3) The canvass board may require the production of any documentary evidence regarding any vote cast or counted and may correct the abstract of votes cast in accordance with its findings based on the evidence presented.
(4) At the conclusion of the recount, the canvass board shall make the returns of all partisan, nonpartisan, ballot issue, and ballot question elections to the designated election official and provide a copy to the persons or groups requesting the recount or notified of the recount pursuant to sections 1-10.5-105 and 1-10.5-106. The canvass board shall meet and issue an amended abstract of votes cast for the office, ballot issue, or ballot question that is the subject of the recount and deliver it to the designated election official.
(5) The designated election official shall notify the governing body of the results of the recount.
========================
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/rule_making/electionrules.pdf PAGE 30
RULE
14.8 Counting of Ballots using the “Ballot Now” Voting System
14.8.1 In the case of a recount, the designated election official shall identify all precincts with the contest(s) designated for a recount using the following procedures:
a. Using the Ballot Now Scanned Ballots by Precinct report from the original election database, locate the batches containing any ballot type (Election, Absentee, and Provisional) for the recount.
b. Remove ballots from each batch and label them as “Recount”.
14.8.2 Required scanner testing shall be performed using a test deck from a randomly chosen precinct with at least 50 ballots as prescribed by statute, following testing procedures outlined in the State of Colorado Procedures for the use of the Ballot Now Voting System. A Recount Test spreadsheet shall be created based on the chosen precinct in the same fashion as the ballot options test spreadsheet.
14.8.3 Ballots for the recount shall be processed following the State of Colorado Procedures for the use of the Ballot Now Voting System in conjunction with the following procedures:
a. Open Ballot Now with an unused MBB (Mobile Ballot Box) from the election and create a Ballot Now recount database;
b. Scan and resolve all recount ballots following original election procedures, including the examination of ballots (Rule 14.3; C.R.S. 1-10.5-108). Use the Audit Trail Report and original Scan Batch Reports with notes to ensure resolution action follows original resolution.
c. Save all recount CVRs (Cast Vote Records) to the MBB (Mobile Ballot Box) after verifying that the number of ballots processed matches the number of ballots cast in the recount contest(s).
d. Open a new recount election in “Tally” and process the recount MBB following the tabulation procedures above.
e. Compare recount results to original results and document any differences.
f. Backup the test database and the official recount database following the “Archive” procedures.
===================
RULE
14.3 The purpose of a recount is to review the ballots to assure they were counted properly. Unless directed otherwise by the Secretary of State, all procedures of election night shall be followed as closely as possible during the recount, including an examination of the ballots.
===================
C.R.S. 1-10.5-108. Method of recount.
(1) The recount shall be of the ballots cast, and the votes shall be recorded on sheets other than those used at the election.
(2) Unless otherwise directed by the secretary of state, the ballots cast shall be recounted utilizing the same procedures, methods, and processes that were utilized for the original count of the ballots cast.
====================
Sunday, October 31, 2004
Is Boulder County violating election laws?
Boulder County’s new vote counting system consists of 8 systems used to scan ballots, interpret the voter’s intent, and export the votes to portable media. One additional system is used to import the votes from the portable media and calculate the election results.
Each of the 9 systems can be easily modified by keyboard input or by loading data into the computer. Data include computer programs, files that define the election to the system, and files for storing scanned images of each ballot and the votes that were interpreted from each ballot. The smallest change in any of these elements can result in undesirable side effects.
By law, before and after a system is used for processing live ballots, the system must be tested. Colorado statute C.R.S. 1-7-506 says, “The designated election official shall have the electronic vote-counting equipment tested at each counting center in the manner prescribed in this section to ascertain that it will accurately count the votes cast for all offices and ballot issues. The electronic equipment shall be tested at least three times, once on the day before the election, again just prior to the start of the count on election day, and finally at the conclusion of the counting.”
Also, whenever maintenance is performed on a system, the system must be tested. Colorado statute C.R.S. 1-7-506.5 says, “The tests shall be sufficient to determine that the system is properly programmed, the election is correctly defined on the system, and all of the input, output, and communication devices are working properly.”
Boulder County is violating both of these laws. They have not performed the tests required by C.R.S. 1-7-506, and they have not performed the tests required by C.R.S. 1-7-506.5.
A set of test ballots was prepared by the political parties. The vote counting system failed to correctly count the test votes.
After days of secret discussions, Boulder County Clerk Linda Salas made an unbelievable decision. She decided to make changes to the systems and, without testing the modified systems, she began processing early and absentee ballots. After processing thousands of ballots, she decided to perform maintenance on the systems and, again without testing, resumed processing the real ballots. Not one of the required tests was performed.
Salas turned down requests by the Republicans to test the systems being used to process the real ballots. Republicans are not satisfied running tests on systems other than the ones actually doing the processing of the real ballots.
Republican Party representative Al Kolwicz is horrified saying, “Ms. Salas is being irresponsibly reckless with our votes. She is breaking the law. Anybody with a tiny bit of common sense would test these systems before using them to process real ballots.”
An election complaint has been filed with the Secretary of State.
Each of the 9 systems can be easily modified by keyboard input or by loading data into the computer. Data include computer programs, files that define the election to the system, and files for storing scanned images of each ballot and the votes that were interpreted from each ballot. The smallest change in any of these elements can result in undesirable side effects.
By law, before and after a system is used for processing live ballots, the system must be tested. Colorado statute C.R.S. 1-7-506 says, “The designated election official shall have the electronic vote-counting equipment tested at each counting center in the manner prescribed in this section to ascertain that it will accurately count the votes cast for all offices and ballot issues. The electronic equipment shall be tested at least three times, once on the day before the election, again just prior to the start of the count on election day, and finally at the conclusion of the counting.”
Also, whenever maintenance is performed on a system, the system must be tested. Colorado statute C.R.S. 1-7-506.5 says, “The tests shall be sufficient to determine that the system is properly programmed, the election is correctly defined on the system, and all of the input, output, and communication devices are working properly.”
Boulder County is violating both of these laws. They have not performed the tests required by C.R.S. 1-7-506, and they have not performed the tests required by C.R.S. 1-7-506.5.
A set of test ballots was prepared by the political parties. The vote counting system failed to correctly count the test votes.
After days of secret discussions, Boulder County Clerk Linda Salas made an unbelievable decision. She decided to make changes to the systems and, without testing the modified systems, she began processing early and absentee ballots. After processing thousands of ballots, she decided to perform maintenance on the systems and, again without testing, resumed processing the real ballots. Not one of the required tests was performed.
Salas turned down requests by the Republicans to test the systems being used to process the real ballots. Republicans are not satisfied running tests on systems other than the ones actually doing the processing of the real ballots.
Republican Party representative Al Kolwicz is horrified saying, “Ms. Salas is being irresponsibly reckless with our votes. She is breaking the law. Anybody with a tiny bit of common sense would test these systems before using them to process real ballots.”
An election complaint has been filed with the Secretary of State.
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