Election coordinator, Josh Liss, today revealed that the Hart vote counting equipment does not perform according to its specifications - see Colorado Daily, June 23. This is the reason that the Clerk wants to use non-secret ballots. Liss asked CAMBER to help the county to go forward with non-secret ballots.
CAMBER rejects the county's solution, and offers to help solve Hart's problem in a way that protects the secret ballot.
One must ask, why has this this clerk been working so hard to protect the equipment supplier rather than working to protect the people?
Friday, June 23, 2006
Colorado Daily reports that Salas intends to choose non-secret ballot option.
Boulder County Clerk, Linda Salas, and Hart InterCivic are working to crush people's right to vote by secret ballot.
The Boulder County Republicans and Dean Schooler are among those leading the fight to protect this basic right.
Boulder County election officials are out of control.
CAMBER believes that there is still time to act, today. Get the Democratic Party to join the effort, and plead with the Secretary of State to protect secret ballots.
The Boulder County Republicans and Dean Schooler are among those leading the fight to protect this basic right.
Boulder County election officials are out of control.
• They are abusing the power of their office to sacrifice basic voter rights.Clerk Salas is a candidate in the upcoming primary election. If ballots include a unique identifier, Salas can see how YOU voted. This potential for intimidation must be stopped.
• They are fixated on doing what is most convenient for themselves rather than what is necessary for a trustworthy election.
• They are working to cover up design and implementation deficiencies with the county's election procedures and the Hart vote counting equipment.
CAMBER believes that there is still time to act, today. Get the Democratic Party to join the effort, and plead with the Secretary of State to protect secret ballots.
Tuesday, June 20, 2006
Boulder County clerk is deciding between secret and non-secret voting.
Hart InterCivic has submitted a proposal to print ballots for the 2006 primary and general elections. Serial numbers and bar codes that uniquely identify the ballot would be printed on a perforated, removable stub, as required by Article 5 of the election code.
To keep votes secret, the stub will be removed just before the voter casts their ballot.
Clerk Linda Salas is thinking about not allowing the perforated ballots. Instead, she prefers the non-anonymous ballots that were dragged into court last year. She says that this would reduce the cost of the ballots by $3,500.00.
We say keep the secret ballot. Why take chances with voter privacy, voter intimidation, and fraud?
Let the clerk and the secretary of state know that people want secret ballots.
Keep secret ballots.
Linda Salas
Boulder County Clerk & Recorder
1750 33rd St.
Boulder, CO 80301
(303) 413-7700
lsalas@co.boulder.co.us
Gigi Dennis
Colorado Secretary of State
1700 Broadway, Suite 250
Denver, Colorado 80290
(303) 860-6900
gigi.dennis@sos.state.co.us
To keep votes secret, the stub will be removed just before the voter casts their ballot.
Clerk Linda Salas is thinking about not allowing the perforated ballots. Instead, she prefers the non-anonymous ballots that were dragged into court last year. She says that this would reduce the cost of the ballots by $3,500.00.
We say keep the secret ballot. Why take chances with voter privacy, voter intimidation, and fraud?
Let the clerk and the secretary of state know that people want secret ballots.
Keep secret ballots.
Linda Salas
Boulder County Clerk & Recorder
1750 33rd St.
Boulder, CO 80301
(303) 413-7700
lsalas@co.boulder.co.us
Gigi Dennis
Colorado Secretary of State
1700 Broadway, Suite 250
Denver, Colorado 80290
(303) 860-6900
gigi.dennis@sos.state.co.us
Monday, June 19, 2006
Records refused. Meeting oversight refused. 8-point alternative to eSlate offered.
The Secretary of State wrote a June 16th denial of our June 13th request for records and has refused to permit us to observe the meetings that will determine the outcome of our HAVA complaint. We believe that these are violations of the Colorado Open Records Act and the Sunshine laws.
To not decertify the eSlate would be a mockery of the law.
Anticipating a whitewash, after observing the foot-dragging in the Secretary of State’s office, this morning we submitted our 8-point alternative to the widespread use of non-compliant DRE voting equipment for the 2006 primary election.
Given the no-win position that government officials have placed us in, we believe that the 8-point alternative best meets the needs of the people and the spirit of federal and state election laws.
Please ask Secretary of State Dennis to adopt our workable 8-point alternative.
Gigi Dennis
E-mail gigi.dennis@sos.state.co.us
Voice (303) 860-6900
Fax (303) 869-4860
To not decertify the eSlate would be a mockery of the law.
Anticipating a whitewash, after observing the foot-dragging in the Secretary of State’s office, this morning we submitted our 8-point alternative to the widespread use of non-compliant DRE voting equipment for the 2006 primary election.
Given the no-win position that government officials have placed us in, we believe that the 8-point alternative best meets the needs of the people and the spirit of federal and state election laws.
Please ask Secretary of State Dennis to adopt our workable 8-point alternative.
Gigi Dennis
E-mail gigi.dennis@sos.state.co.us
Voice (303) 860-6900
Fax (303) 869-4860
Tuesday, June 13, 2006
CAMBER uses Colorado Open Records Act to pierce secret and unaccountable election practices
The Colorado Secretary of State and County Clerks appear to be collaborating to block public access to legitimate public information. The information might be embarrassing to election officials. Months of delays appear to be coordinated efforts to block the public from challenging official decisions.
1. CAMBER is trying to find out if Boulder County will use anonymous voting for the 2006 Primary Election. In recent elections, they did not permit anonymous voting. Click to read our Colorao Open Records Act request for ballot plans.
2. CAMBER is trying to preempt the Colorado Secretary of State from making a secret back room decision that could cover up dereliction of election duties at the expense of the public. Click to read our Colorao Open Records Act request for status of the HAVA complaint against HART eSlate voting equipment.
According to Al Kolwicz, CAMBER Executive Director, "It is no longer acceptable for election officials to operate in secret and be unaccountable to the public. We have trusted them in the past and look where it has gotten us. Trusting officials was a serious mistake."
1. CAMBER is trying to find out if Boulder County will use anonymous voting for the 2006 Primary Election. In recent elections, they did not permit anonymous voting. Click to read our Colorao Open Records Act request for ballot plans.
2. CAMBER is trying to preempt the Colorado Secretary of State from making a secret back room decision that could cover up dereliction of election duties at the expense of the public. Click to read our Colorao Open Records Act request for status of the HAVA complaint against HART eSlate voting equipment.
According to Al Kolwicz, CAMBER Executive Director, "It is no longer acceptable for election officials to operate in secret and be unaccountable to the public. We have trusted them in the past and look where it has gotten us. Trusting officials was a serious mistake."
Thursday, June 01, 2006
Holly Lowder - new Colorado Elections Director.
June 1 -- Holly Lowder is Colorado's new Elections Director. She just resigned from her job as Alamosa County Clerk and Recorder where she was appointed in 1981.
Alamosa County has fewer than 7,000 active voters. As of January 13, 2006, Colorado had 2,327,239 active voters.
We are very concerned that Ms Lowder's background does not appear to include technical experience.
Click to read our welcome letter.
Alamosa County has fewer than 7,000 active voters. As of January 13, 2006, Colorado had 2,327,239 active voters.
We are very concerned that Ms Lowder's background does not appear to include technical experience.
Click to read our welcome letter.
Thursday, May 25, 2006
UPDATE: Public hearing on HART eSlate decertification
The May 24th public hearing on the HAVA complaint for wrongful certification of the HART eSlate was well run, well attended (50 citizens), and well worth the effort.
The hearing record will remain open until June 1st. I hope that you will submit letters and materials before then.
A decision will be announced by the Secretary of State on or before July 10th.
Click the CAMBER website to:
1. Read our brief.
2. Hear the audio-recording of the hearing.
3. Read a critique of the hearing and suggestions for future improvement.
Thanks to everyone who is helping to protect anonymous and verifiable voting.
Al
The hearing record will remain open until June 1st. I hope that you will submit letters and materials before then.
A decision will be announced by the Secretary of State on or before July 10th.
Click the CAMBER website to:
1. Read our brief.
2. Hear the audio-recording of the hearing.
3. Read a critique of the hearing and suggestions for future improvement.
Thanks to everyone who is helping to protect anonymous and verifiable voting.
Al
Wednesday, May 17, 2006
SOS response is deemed insufficient
A HAVA complaint has been filed against the Colorado Secretary of State which alleges that the Secretary of State wrongfully certified HART InterCivic DRE voting equipment.
A public hearing has been scheduled for May 24th.
The Secretary of State has insufficiently responded to a Colorado Open Records Act request.
Today the Secretary of State was sent an expanded CORA request, and asked to quickly provide the requested data.
“If the SOS stalls long enough, we won’t get the data we need, and we won’t be able to submit complete testimony at the May 24th public hearing,” said Al Kolwicz, Executive Director of CAMBER, a voter rights group.
Click to read May 17 -- Discussion regarding insufficiency of records response
The public hearing on the HAVA complaint is set for 1:30 p.m. May 24th at the Blue Spruce Conference Room of the Secretary of State’s Office, 1700 Broadway, 2nd Floor, Denver, Colorado.
A public hearing has been scheduled for May 24th.
The Secretary of State has insufficiently responded to a Colorado Open Records Act request.
Today the Secretary of State was sent an expanded CORA request, and asked to quickly provide the requested data.
“If the SOS stalls long enough, we won’t get the data we need, and we won’t be able to submit complete testimony at the May 24th public hearing,” said Al Kolwicz, Executive Director of CAMBER, a voter rights group.
Click to read May 17 -- Discussion regarding insufficiency of records response
The public hearing on the HAVA complaint is set for 1:30 p.m. May 24th at the Blue Spruce Conference Room of the Secretary of State’s Office, 1700 Broadway, 2nd Floor, Denver, Colorado.
Monday, May 08, 2006
Colorado accepts HAVA complaint against HART eSlate.
The Colorado Secretary of State has accepted a formal HAVA complaint filed against the certification of the HART eSlate voting equipment.
The complaint charges that the eSlate fails to provide anonymous voting as required by the Colorado Constitution and fails to provide private unassisted voting for blind voters as required by Federal HAVA requirements.
A public hearing has been scheduled for May 24, 2006, at the Colorado Secretary of State's office in Denver.
Today, a request was submitted to the Secretary of State asking for relevant documents including the test cases and results that were used for Federal and State certification.
This is a critical public hearing. It has been reported that 40 Colorado counties plan to use HART equipment. Some are in the midst of contract negotiations.
It appears that the Secretary of State is attempting to get HART contracts signed before the hearing.
If this is true, then this would be a major disservice to the public.
The complaint charges that the eSlate fails to provide anonymous voting as required by the Colorado Constitution and fails to provide private unassisted voting for blind voters as required by Federal HAVA requirements.
A public hearing has been scheduled for May 24, 2006, at the Colorado Secretary of State's office in Denver.
Today, a request was submitted to the Secretary of State asking for relevant documents including the test cases and results that were used for Federal and State certification.
This is a critical public hearing. It has been reported that 40 Colorado counties plan to use HART equipment. Some are in the midst of contract negotiations.
It appears that the Secretary of State is attempting to get HART contracts signed before the hearing.
If this is true, then this would be a major disservice to the public.
Sunday, April 09, 2006
HR 550 - More harm than good.
HR 550 does not solve the digital ballot problem. It creates the false illusion that it does, and moves us in the wrong direction.
A second and third ballot -- the paper audit trail and bar code -- will result in increased legal disputes, uncertainty, and loss of voter confidence.
Digital ballots must be outlawed -- until it can be proven that they can be made transparent, anonymous, and verifiably secure and accurate. At present they are not.
For an election to be trustworthy, the recording, interpretation, and counting of each eligible elector's intent must be verified and performed in a fully transparent and anonymous manner. The public must believe that results reflect the intent of the voters.
The problem with direct record electronic (DRE) voting equipment is that it records votes electronically. Digital ballots have been permitted to evolve because of two major flaws:
1. Wrong requirements -- Voting equipment vendors and election officials are recklessly attempting to reduce cost and increase convenience. They are ignoring the non-negotiable requirements. Reduce cost and increase convenience only when an election system is: (a) transparent, (b) anonymous, and (c) verifiably secure and accurate. To sacrifice any of these higher requirements will result in an untrustworthy election.
2. Wrong architecture -- Some people incorrectly assume that private voting for disabled voters requires digital ballots. A user interface for disabled-voters does not require that votes be stored on digital ballots. Votes must be stored on a medium that can be (a) transparent, (b) anonymous, and (c) verifiably secure and accurate. Paper meets these requirements.
Elections are intended to be deterministic (you get the same results no matter how many times you re-calculate). Surveys are understood to be stochastic (they are subject to probabilistic behavior). Checking samples of audit trails is not adequate verification.
What do we recommend?
1. Prohibit digital ballots and bar codes.
2. Require that user interfaces support paper ballots.
3. Require the same ballot for absentee, polling place and provisional voting.
A second and third ballot -- the paper audit trail and bar code -- will result in increased legal disputes, uncertainty, and loss of voter confidence.
Digital ballots must be outlawed -- until it can be proven that they can be made transparent, anonymous, and verifiably secure and accurate. At present they are not.
For an election to be trustworthy, the recording, interpretation, and counting of each eligible elector's intent must be verified and performed in a fully transparent and anonymous manner. The public must believe that results reflect the intent of the voters.
The problem with direct record electronic (DRE) voting equipment is that it records votes electronically. Digital ballots have been permitted to evolve because of two major flaws:
1. Wrong requirements -- Voting equipment vendors and election officials are recklessly attempting to reduce cost and increase convenience. They are ignoring the non-negotiable requirements. Reduce cost and increase convenience only when an election system is: (a) transparent, (b) anonymous, and (c) verifiably secure and accurate. To sacrifice any of these higher requirements will result in an untrustworthy election.
2. Wrong architecture -- Some people incorrectly assume that private voting for disabled voters requires digital ballots. A user interface for disabled-voters does not require that votes be stored on digital ballots. Votes must be stored on a medium that can be (a) transparent, (b) anonymous, and (c) verifiably secure and accurate. Paper meets these requirements.
Elections are intended to be deterministic (you get the same results no matter how many times you re-calculate). Surveys are understood to be stochastic (they are subject to probabilistic behavior). Checking samples of audit trails is not adequate verification.
What do we recommend?
1. Prohibit digital ballots and bar codes.
2. Require that user interfaces support paper ballots.
3. Require the same ballot for absentee, polling place and provisional voting.
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