Sunday, October 31, 2004
Each of the 9 systems can be easily modified by keyboard input or by loading data into the computer. Data include computer programs, files that define the election to the system, and files for storing scanned images of each ballot and the votes that were interpreted from each ballot. The smallest change in any of these elements can result in undesirable side effects.
By law, before and after a system is used for processing live ballots, the system must be tested. Colorado statute C.R.S. 1-7-506 says, “The designated election official shall have the electronic vote-counting equipment tested at each counting center in the manner prescribed in this section to ascertain that it will accurately count the votes cast for all offices and ballot issues. The electronic equipment shall be tested at least three times, once on the day before the election, again just prior to the start of the count on election day, and finally at the conclusion of the counting.”
Also, whenever maintenance is performed on a system, the system must be tested. Colorado statute C.R.S. 1-7-506.5 says, “The tests shall be sufficient to determine that the system is properly programmed, the election is correctly defined on the system, and all of the input, output, and communication devices are working properly.”
Boulder County is violating both of these laws. They have not performed the tests required by C.R.S. 1-7-506, and they have not performed the tests required by C.R.S. 1-7-506.5.
A set of test ballots was prepared by the political parties. The vote counting system failed to correctly count the test votes.
After days of secret discussions, Boulder County Clerk Linda Salas made an unbelievable decision. She decided to make changes to the systems and, without testing the modified systems, she began processing early and absentee ballots. After processing thousands of ballots, she decided to perform maintenance on the systems and, again without testing, resumed processing the real ballots. Not one of the required tests was performed.
Salas turned down requests by the Republicans to test the systems being used to process the real ballots. Republicans are not satisfied running tests on systems other than the ones actually doing the processing of the real ballots.
Republican Party representative Al Kolwicz is horrified saying, “Ms. Salas is being irresponsibly reckless with our votes. She is breaking the law. Anybody with a tiny bit of common sense would test these systems before using them to process real ballots.”
An election complaint has been filed with the Secretary of State.
Friday, October 29, 2004
- The Secretary of State’s office is operating as a shield that protects election officials and hardware suppliers.
- The Legislature is totally ignored – as if it never existed.
- The Courts are refusing to find election officials guilty of violations – no matter how flagrant.
- The Political Parties have been neutered, and are no longer providing independent oversight of elections.
- There is no accountability, no security, no verifiability, and no rule of law.
Read the email below if you are can stand it. Basically, Boulder County has started the vote counting process using equipment with many known defects. Officials are abusing their positions to cover up their bad decision to purchase HART InterCivic vote counting equipment – despite intense citizen pressure against doing so.
For refusing to perform their duties to protect our election, shame on Boulder County’s Commissioners, the Boulder County Clerk, and the Secretary of State – shame, shame, shame.
Sent BY FAX: 303-869-4861
Dear Secretary Davidson,
Boulder County is violating C.R.S. 1-7-506. Electronic vote-counting – test, and Colorado Election Rules 11.4.5(b and c), and 27.3.3(b).
After terminating an unsuccessful part 1 of the Logic and Accuracy Test, Boulder County:
- has not corrected the cause of discrepancies,
- has performed maintenance on the equipment,
- has augmented the test deck without political party oversight, and
- has violated the county’s own plan for testing the electronic vote counting equipment.
Problems discovered during part 1 have been documented and filed with the Boulder County Clerk Salas.
When I discussed this with Clerk Linda Salas, this afternoon, she told me that they were going to run the second part of the LAT on Election Day. If in fact the logic and accuracy test is testing the actual vote counting system, and not a fake vote counting system, then it will be impossible to run part 2 of the LAT.
What shall we do to ensure that the vote counting system is correctly counting votes?
Boulder County Republican Party
Friday, October 22, 2004
A non-partisan group of public-spirited voters has filed suit to protect the secret ballot.
Despite months of objections by voters, Boulder County has refused to comply with the Colorado Constitution. The Constitution strictly provides that “no ballots shall be marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it.”
Contrary to the law, every Boulder County ballot contains a unique serial number. The number can be recorded by the voter or somebody can compile a list of who voted which ballot.
A scanned image of every ballot is recorded in computer files including offsite backup files. Someone with access to the physical ballots, or the computer files, can see the votes and the serial number.
Valuable computer files have been “stolen” from "almost secure" places like Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Given a list of who voted which ballot and access to a computer file of ballot images, it is an easy task to know how a particular voter voted.
There is a market for this information. Knowledge of how a voter voted can facilitate vote selling and voter intimidation. Knowledge of how lots of voters voted can facilitate highly valuable demographic information linked to voter choices. Additionally, courts might demand access to a voter’s ballot.
The suit asks the court to issue an order requiring Boulder County to comply with the secret ballot provisions of the law. The co-plaintiffs believe that the Colorado Constitution strictly provides that “no ballots shall be marked in any way whereby the ballot can be identified as the ballot of the person casting it.”
A hearing is scheduled in Boulder for Monday, October 25th at 1:30 PM, and will be presided over by Honorable Morris W. Sandstead Jr.
Students registered without ID will be permitted to vote using honor system
Colo. limits number of poll watchers
Thursday, October 21, 2004
Boulder County Republican Party
Designated Election Representative
2867 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
October 20, 2004
Ms. Donetta Davidson BY FAX: 303-869-4861
Secretary of State
1560 Broadway, Suite 200
Denver, CO 80202
REF: Boulder County - Instructions to political parties – October 9, 2004
Boulder County - Logic & Accuracy Test instructions – October 9, 2004
Boulder County - Canvass instructions –October 9, 2004
Boulder County Republicans - Response to Salas – October 10, 2004
Boulder County Republicans - Test objectives – October 20, 2004
Logic & Accuracy Test - part1 – October 20, 2004
Dear Secretary Davidson:
This is a formal complaint regarding the conduct of today’s Logic & Accuracy Test – part1.
Because the next stage of this Logic and Accuracy Test is scheduled for Friday, October 22nd, we request immediate and independent investigation of this complaint. For your information, there were two non-Republican poll watcher witnesses to today’s activities.
The Boulder County Republican Party and the Boulder County Clerk & Recorder fundamentally disagree on the meaning of:
CRS 1-7-506. Electronic vote-counting – test.
(1) (a) The designated election official shall have the electronic vote-counting equipment tested at each counting center in the manner prescribed in this section to ascertain that it will accurately count the votes cast for all offices and ballot issues. (Emphasis added).
This disagreement has made it impossible for the Boulder County Republican Party to comply with its duty under that same section:
(2) The designated election official shall give to the county chairpersons of the major political parties or their official representatives and to the county chairperson or official representative of any minor political party who notifies the designated election official no less than sixty days before the election of the party's desire to participate in the testing, at least twenty-five official ballots that are clearly marked as test ballots. The county chairpersons or their official representatives shall secretly vote the test ballots and retain a record of the test votes. (Emphasis added).
For several months, the Boulder County Republican Party has attempted, in good faith, to engage the Boulder County Clerk and Recorder, Linda Salas, in a meaningful negotiation of Logic & Accuracy testing procedures. The clerk has not responded to our many, many attempts to develop mutually agreeable testing procedures. The Republican’s most recent attempts to communicate with the clerk are summarized in the October 10th and October 20th items referenced above.
Instead of discussing the issues with us, the clerk has unilaterally dictated unreasonable restrictions on the political parties and has turned the Logic & Accuracy Test into a pending hoax. The consequence of this hoax will be total loss of public trust in the general election results. The clerk’s directives are documented in the three October 9th items referenced above.
Proceeding under the clerk’s directive will serve no purpose, other than provide the clerk a document which could be used to communicate the false public assurance that the vote counting system has been verified by the political parties and is trustworthy.
Nothing is further from the truth. Under the procedures mandated by the clerk, this test procedure will not verify the ability of the vote counting system to correctly count votes. Furthermore, the procedure will create documentation which can be used to perpetrate a massive public deception, and humiliate the Boulder County Republican Party.
For example, of 228 precincts, the Republicans were permitted to test only 15. Of 57 ballot styles, Republicans were permitted to test only 15. At least one ballot style includes five ballot-faces, and Republicans were not permitted to test any ballot with five ballot faces. [These facts are relevant because Boulder County printed and distributed sample ballots that contained the wrong candidates for the U. S. 4th Congressional race, demonstrating that errors in fact do happen with this system.]
By working within the clerk’s mandated procedures, instead of our test development tools (which we were prohibited from using), we made several errors in creating our test. We did not document the number of over and under votes by contest by precinct by voting method. We did not distinguish between “voter intent” and “vote counting experiment expected outcome”. We did not summarize votes by contestant by precinct by voting method, as are reflected in the results of the election. While not explicitly required by the law, these data are required to verify the accurate count of votes. The clerk denied our request for photocopies of the voted test ballots.
We have documented evidence that the Boulder County vote counting system tested by the primary election Logic & Accuracy Test was not the same as the vote counting system used to count the live votes. Votes are interpreted differently by the real system and this fact is hidden from test personnel by the clerk’s procedure.
The vote counting system does not comply with Rule 27 - Rules Concerning Uniform Ballot Counting Standards.
We can find no legal basis, and no professional basis, for the procedures dictated by the clerk. In fact, we believe the procedures do not comply with the law and know that the procedures violate professional testing standards. We believe that the procedures will guarantee creation and execution of phony tests that are totally inadequate to ascertain that [the voting system] will accurately count the votes cast for all offices and ballot issues. [CRS 1-7-506]
If the Republican Party does not comply with the clerk’s unilateral dictates, the Republican Party will not be permitted to perform its legally mandated public oversight responsibility. [CRS 1-7-506] Furthermore, the clerk has demonstrated a propensity to demagogue such a refusal by the Party, and to intimidate the Party and their representatives by calling upon the County Sheriff and the District Attorney. The only way for the Republican Party to participate in the test is for the Republican Party to agree to engage in this repugnant public deception.
The clerk is abusing her position of public trust by refusing to permit effective oversight of the vote counting system, and as a consequence the clerk is interfering with the conduct of this election.
The clerk is forcing the Republican Party to choose between (1) aiding the clerk to perpetuate a hoax upon the public, and (2) withdrawing from performing the Party’s legally mandated election oversight responsibility.
In addition to the above, the clerk authorized a Libertarian Party candidate to mark test ballots. Since candidates may not serve as watchers, we question the suitability of a candidate to mark test ballots. Also, Green Party representatives were denied their request to mark test ballots. [The Republican Party permitted the Green Party representatives to suggest a few tests which the Republican Representative marked onto some Republican test ballots.] Test participants were required to choose between (1) refusing to sign, (2) waiting around with nothing to do for an additional two hours, or (3) committing possible perjury by falsely signing a seal log.
Investigators should be advised that this complaint is associated with four unresolved election complaints:
- July 28, 2004 – Multiple items including: non-secret ballot, no poll book, negligence in providing timely data, denial of access to independent oversight
- August 27, 2004 – Falsification of canvass report.
- September 8, 2004 – Colorado Open Records Request
- September 13, 2004 – Decertification of HART InterCivic vote counting equipment.
We depend on your urgent attention to this complaint.
Boulder County Republican Party
Official Election Representative
Linda Salas, Boulder County Clerk & Recorder
David Leeds, Chair, Boulder County Republican Party
Ted Halaby, Chair, Colorado Republican Party
Scott Russell, Political Director, Colorado Republican Party
Senate President, John Andrews, Colorado Senate
Robert J. Corry, Jr., Esq., Law firm of Corry and Fellows, LLP
Wednesday, October 20, 2004
Principal functions of an election system
- VOTER REGISTRATION
- ELECTION PREPARATION
- LOGIC & ACCURACY TEST
- VOTE INTERPRETATION
- VOTE COUNTING
- VOTE RECOUNTING
- CANVASS OF RESULTS
- GLOBAL FUNCTIONS
- VERIFICATION AND AUDIT
- DEFECT AND COMPLAINT ADMINISTRATION
- POLL WATCHER TRANSPARANCY
- RECRUIT AND TRAIN JUDGES
- RECRUIT AND TRAIN TEMPORARY WORKERS
- POLITICAL PARTY LAISON
THE FUNCTIONS VARY FOR EACH METHOD OF VOTING – EARLY, ABSENTEE, PRECINCT, PROVISIONAL, EMERGENCY, AND MANDATORY MAIL BALLOT.
Refer to October 16, 2004 - Voting System Standard needs work.
Tuesday, October 19, 2004
Release: October 17, 2004
Contact: Al Kolwicz, Election Representative 303-494-1540
Clerk interferes with election
Just before the August primary, Boulder County Republicans (BCR) were prevented from using real-life test ballots to test the county’s new vote counting system. Since then, BCR has tried to work out a plan with Clerk & Recorder, Linda Salas, so that similar problems will not interfere with the November election.
It appears that there will be no such agreement. On October 9th, Salas issued a directive to the political parties which, according to the Republicans, violates and oversteps the law, and prohibits a meaningful test of the counting system. On October 10th, the BCR challenged the directive.
According to Al Kolwicz, the official Republican representative for 2004 elections, “Salas has not provided the data needed to conduct the logic & accuracy test, and has not responded to BCR’s October 10th challenges of her directive.”
Logic & accuracy tests are supposed to prove that votes are counted according to the law. Salas has refused to provide a specification of what constitutes a vote that will be counted. Federal and State laws attempt to make sure that the voter’s intent is honored when votes are interpreted, and that votes are interpreted consistently. Without a written guideline, or specification, a vote might be counted on Monday, but rejected on Tuesday – counted in the original count, but rejected in a recount.
Salas has refused to permit BCR to verify that the votes on a particular ballot are interpreted and counted correctly. “One might call this”, says Kolwicz, “a things will average out philosophy.” This is not what the law requires. Each and every vote must be interpreted and counted correctly.
The clerk has decreed that the political parties must provide two persons to work on the logic and accuracy test. The law does not require this, and the clerk has not answered BCR’s question as to why two persons are required. Could it be that the Salas is trying to neutralize Kolwicz?
Salas has decreed that the ballots must be developed and marked at the clerk’s office, without the use of any computer assistance. BCR testers use computer software to design and check out their test cases.
The clerk has decreed that there will be only 25 test ballots per political party. Considering that there are 228 precincts, ____ ballot styles, and five ways to vote, the 25 ballot limitation makes a hoax out of the logic & accuracy test.
“More to the point,” says Kolwicz, “the clerk’s decrees are not legal. She is interfering with the legal rights of the political parties to verify that the vote counting system correctly interprets and counts every vote.
The two representatives from the parties, and the jurisdiction representatives, will meet in the Election’s office on October 20th at 10:00 a.m. Each party and jurisdiction will be presented with 25 ballots, which they will be required to vote on-site.
Members of the general public will not be allowed into the room where the test decks are being scanned. Only properly designated members of the political parties and the local jurisdictions will be allowed to attend.
Strict reading of the clerk’s directive suggests that poll watchers, the press, and video recorders will be prohibited from observing the test preparation.
* * * END * * *
Sunday, October 17, 2004
Contact: Al Kolwicz, Executive Director 303-494-1540
More problems than voter registration
The public has learned that Colorado’s voter registration process and its voter registration files have been spoiled due to lax voter registration standards and negligent compliance with Colorado laws. See October 13 list of questions. While major, these are not the only problems.
Besides registration, other complaints have been filed with County Clerks and Secretary of State, Donetta Davidson, and have not been resolved. For example, in Boulder County:
- In violation of the Colorado Constitution, voters are forced to use a non-secret ballot.
- New vote counting equipment does not count votes correctly.
- In cooperation with the Secretary, the county has silenced legally appointed political party representatives who attempted to document and disclose problems.
Election complaints have been buried in a morass of bureaucratic stalling, mumbo-jumbo, and non-response. The Boulder County examples listed above are very serious, and have gone unresolved for more than two months. No public hearing has been held.
Poll watchers are being denied access to the data needed to challenge ineligible voters, to monitor ballot security, and to verify that every vote is correctly counted. Colorado Open Records Act requests have been stalled and denied, and clerks and the Secretary are covering up problems and refusing to produce the data needed to detect them.
Also, no independent entity has the responsibility to protect the people’s right to a trustworthy election. Complaints that are filed against the clerk or the Secretary are reviewed and decided by the clerk or the Secretary. They serve as defendant, judge and jury and operate above the law.
Attorney General Ken Salazar does not protect the people’s rights. He says that his job is to protect the Secretary of State. County Attorneys say it their job to protect the county clerks. The Secretary of State covers up for county clerks and the clerks protect the Secretary of State.
The courts do not help. Judges do not like to interfere with elected officials in an independent arm of government. People detecting the problems do not have the resources to bring charges, and campaigns do not wish to appear to be cry-babies.
To salvage this election requires that officials acknowledge the problems and take immediate and aggressive action. CAMBER suggests twelve things that can be done.
EMERGENCY ELECTION SALVAGE
To salvage the November election, several things can be done:
- Authorize a $100.00 bounty for each ineligible elector and each violation.
- Issue an order reminding election officials they’ll be held accountable for errors and fraud, and violations of the law – including violations committed by officials.
- Governor, Senate President, and House Speaker appoint a competent independent oversight body with authority to receive and log, publish and resolve all election complaints. Encourage submission of problems.
- Secretary of State issue an order prohibiting absentee ballot “duly authorized agents” from collecting absentee ballots.
- Do not open any provisional ballot until (a) all provisional ballot envelopes in the State have been qualified and (b) the ID of all qualified provisional voters have been entered into a statewide database, and (c) the complete list of provisional ballot voters has been searched and duplicate provisional ballot voters have been identified.
- Do not open any absentee ballots until after all provisional and in-person ballots have been counted. An in-person or provisional ballot must cancel an absentee ballot.
- Do not use any DRE voting equipment. These machines are not verifiable, cannot be recounted or challenged, and do not have the trust of those who understand the risks of voting using these machines. Print additional paper ballots to be used instead of DRE voting equipment.
- Do not use any vote-counting equipment that does not produce a verifiable record of votes. To verify a record of votes from a ballot requires the ability to compare each record of votes from a ballot with the original ballot. Instead, hand count votes using a standard process and form.
- Open all election processes to poll watchers. Encourage as much transparency as possible, short of interfering with election judges and workers. Provide up-to-date copies of computer files and access to poll books, ballot stubs, ballot controls, batch controls, absentee and provisional ballot qualification processes, and vote counting.
- Document and enforce strict canvassing procedures.
- Document and enforce strict and meaningful logic and accuracy testing procedures.
- Fund and authorize a full scale, independent, statewide post-election study of Colorado’s election process using the November 2004 election data, procedures, systems, and complaints.
Saturday, October 16, 2004
In my professional opinion, it will take much more time and effort to try to live with this poor specification than it will to fix it before it is released.
What the document needs is an abstract architecture of a voting system, a tight set of requirements for every element, a specification of primitive functions, a set of metrics, and a set of acceptable methods to prove compliance.
The document should not be wedded to any implementation. Technology evolves too quickly. The doc is currently wedded to DRE voting equipment that will by my guess be outmoded within the five to seven years it will take to repair this document once it becomes approved by the EAC, incorporated into state statutes, learned and implemented by vendors and independent testing authorities, embodied in test scripts, and so on and so on … The document is totally inadequate when it comes to paper ballots, and does not address classes of existing, new technology such as that of Vogue Election Systems. The document addresses device-level concepts rather than system level concepts. To be useful, all of the elements of the election system must interoperate and be tested as a system to prove secure, accurate and verifiable functionality.
This document, to be useful, must speak to high level rather than implementation level ideas. The architecture and primitives should be used to construct two or three reference implementations (at the high level) and include complete tests that verify each implementation.
Short of this, I believe that we will have failed.
Wednesday, October 13, 2004
A. It has been said by Mr. Kolwicz, Executive Director of CAMBER, that your office has created a massive opportunity for fraud, error and disenfranchisement. How do you respond to this charge?
- People have been registered without identification.
- What have you done to ensure that every registration accepted by an independent agent is delivered to the clerk? (For example, is every form serialized so that they can be tracked?)
- Records, needed by poll watchers to verify voter eligibility, are being withheld – such as did the voter supply ID?, where did the registration originate? (in clerk’s office, in driver’s license, by mail, by independent voter drive, etc.)
- Absentee ballots are being picked up by independent agents. What are you doing to ensure that every ballot picked up actually makes it into the ballot box?
- Since every ineligible vote cancels the vote of an eligible voter, what are you doing to protect eligible voters from being silently disenfranchised?
- Boulder County is using a non-secret ballot. How do you explain this clear violation of the Colorado Constitution? (Every ballot contains a unique, non-removable serial number, and every cast ballot is scanned into a ballot image file that could be looked at or stolen by insiders or hackers.)
B. What have you done to ensure that only U.S. citizens are registered to vote? How many non-citizens does your office estimate are registered to vote in Colorado? If you do not know, who is supposed to know this?
C. In addition to the voter registration problems, what other problems have been brought to your attention, and what are you doing about them?
- Boulder County threatened criminal charges against a legally appointed representative of a political party because he refused to falsify test data. The District Attorney found no basis for these charges.
- Why did you approve Boulder County’s falsification of the Primary election Canvass board results. The County created a document which did not represent the opinion of the Republican Party and you accepted it. Why?
E. You recently signed a multi-million dollar contract with Accenture to develop a statewide voter registration system. Are the registration system problems we are discussing here today solved by the new system, and how can people verify that these problems are resolved?
- Why was Accenture selected, considering that they are in multi-million dollar disputes with other governments for non-performance? Considering that they were associated with the ENRON scandal?
- Why was the contract developed and negotiated in secret?
- Why have responses to Open Records Requests for information about the contract been delayed?
- How much money will this system cost? Does Colorado own the results of the work? Will all of the data contained in the new voter registration system public, and will poll watchers and researchers be able to gain access to ALL of the data? Currently, Counties have refused these requests claiming that the data is proprietary information belonging to the Vendor.
Tuesday, October 12, 2004
We would like to observe the emergency meeting you described in the Denver Post article of October 10.
6,000 felons on voter lists http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36~23827~2457832,00.html?search=filter
Move to purge felons from voter rolls http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36~64~2460975,00.html?search=filter
More weaknesses in state's voting system http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36~73~2461251,00.html#
Felons will get to cast special ballot http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36~64~2461551,00.html#
In addition to felons, we hope that you will also discuss how clerks are planning to implement the laws regarding citizenship, and any other voter eligibility requirements.
We believe that clerks have inappropriately accepted recent registrations with no voter Identification. Consequently, verifying the eligibility of voters when they are issued a ballot is vital. Therefore, at the emergency meeting, we ask that you also discuss how watchers will be provided with the information that they need to challenge ineligible voters. Boulder County has told us that watchers may not see if a person requesting a ballot had provided Identification when they registered, and where the person’s registration came from (e.g. drivers license, elections office, authorized voter drive by source, etc.).
Please notify us when and where this emergency meeting will take place so that we can observe.
Thank you for your prompt reply.
Sunday, October 10, 2004
This is yet another illustration that election officials are not protecting our votes. Registration office rumors say that officials are registering people who have provided no identification. It’s also reported that nobody is checking to ensure that registrants are citizens.
Every ineligible elector that votes cancels the vote of an eligible elector.
We cannot trust officials. We must protect our own votes. Voters must volunteer to serve as poll watchers during the absentee, early, provisional and vote counting processes. Political parties must appoint knowledgeable people to conduct the Logic & Accuracy testing, and serve on the Canvass Board.
We can trust election results ONLY after we verify them.
To read the article online, click: http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36~64~2457832,00.html#
Wednesday, October 06, 2004
The Colorado Open Records Act requires that public records be made available to the public. This protects the public from officials who would hide public information in order to cover up errors or wrongdoing.
Republicans want to access the August Primary computer files needed to verify that votes were correctly interpreted and counted.
Independently, a local computer consultant and member of Citizens for Verifiable Voting, Paul Walmsley has made repeated offers to the County Commissioners and the County Clerk, to check the new equipment using statistical sampling. The commissioners and the clerk have repeatedly refused his offer.
The Republicans made their request on September 8th and the law requires that the county comply within three days.
“The clerk has offered a series of bogus arguments to avoid compliance with our request,” said Al Kolwicz who is representing the Boulder County Republicans on election matters.
The clerk has claimed that the files are company confidential information belonging to HART InterCivic. The clerk made a similar claim in 2001 when it tried to block public access to the files stored in Diebold equipment. Diebold corporate attorneys finally agreed that the records were not Diebold proprietary information.
The clerk claims that exporting a flat file of vote records would disclose the HART table structures. The GOP says that this is not true. It is common practice to export flat files in order to protect confidential data structures.
The clerk and the Secretary of State argue that a court order is required to access “voted ballots.” But in fact the law is explicit and uses the term “voted ballots” to refer to the paper ballots marked by the voter.
Republicans do not want access to the paper ballots. They want access to the file of scanned ballot images, and the file of interpreted votes from each ballot image – to ensure that each vote is correctly interpreted.
The party today sent the clerk another (the fourth) appeal that the clerk follow the law and provide the records.