A loose federation of organizations and individuals working to protect voters from intimidation and elections from error and fraud.
Wednesday, August 25, 2004
Where are we, and where are we going?
CRS 1-10-101.5. Duties of the canvass board.
The canvass board shall reconcile the ballots cast in an election to confirm that the number of ballots counted in that election does not exceed the number of ballots cast in that election. The canvass board also shall certify the abstract of votes cast in any election.
Progress during day-3
Most of the temporary workers were excused after completing only a portion of the canvass.
After noon an incomplete set of absentee voting records were made available. Additional materials requested include a complete log of ballots printed and issued, a poll book containing the data required by CRS 1-8-108, and a electronic version of the poll book that can be sorted and summarized as needed for verification.
There is no precinct poll book identifying who voted and which ballot each voter was issued. This has made it impractical/impossible to verify that the correct ballot was issued to a voter. It appears that voters were issued the wrong ballot, and in some cases were issued sample ballots.
Plan for day-4
Confirming that ballots counted do not exceed ballots cast
To perform its duty, the Canvass Board must know and confirm the numbers of ballots counted and cast by party, race, method and precinct.
The number of ballots counted is reported on the abstract of votes, and might be verified by comparison with the scanned ballot reports.
The number of ballots cast can be verified using the physical materials. Each voting method has a unique method of determining and verifying the number of ballots cast, as summarized below.
Election results report totals for each political party, for each race, for each method of voting, and for each precinct. Each ballot is tracked to verify that it is not recorded for the wrong party, race, voting method, or precinct.
There are 3 political parties – Democratic, Republican, and Libertarian. There are 5 voting methods --- absentee, early, precinct, provisional, and emergency. Boulder County is divided into 229 precincts.
Absentee
To calculate the number of absentee ballots cast, something like the following formula might be used:
The number of absentee ballots printed
MINUS the number of absentee ballots unused
MINUS the number of absentee ballots replaced
MINUS the number of absentee ballots duplicated
MINUS the number of absentee ballot packets not returned by the voter
MINUS the number of absentee ballot packets returned by the Post Office as undeliverable
MINUS the number of return envelopes that arrived too late to count
MINUS the number of return envelopes disqualified
MINUS the number of ballots disqualified after opening the return envelope
PLUS the number of disqualified packets that were cured and accepted
Precinct
To calculate the number of precinct ballots cast, something like the following formula might be used:
The number of precinct ballots printed
MINUS the number of precinct ballots unused
MINUS the number of provisional ballots issued
MINUS the number of precinct ballots replaced
MINUS the number of precinct ballots duplicated
Early
To calculate the number of early ballots cast, something like the following formula might be used:
Number of early ballots printed
MINUS number of early ballots unused
MINUS number of early ballots replaced
MINUS number of early ballots duplicated
Provisional
To calculate the number of provisional ballots cast, something like the following formula might be used:
Number of provisional ballots issued
MINUS number of provisional ballots denied
MINUS number of provisional ballots replaced
MINUS number of provisional ballots duplicated
Emergency
To calculate the number of emergency ballots cast, something like the following formula might be used:
The number of emergency ballots printed
MINUS the number of emergency ballots unused
MINUS the number of emergency ballots replaced
MINUS the number of emergency ballots duplicated
Certifying the abstract of votes cast
To certify the abstract of votes cast requires that the canvass board verify that the votes on ballots are correctly interpreted and that the votes that are interpreted are correctly counted.
One method of achieving this is to compare the hand recorded votes on a sample of ballots to computer record of votes corresponding to each sample ballot, and to independently tabulate the computer records of votes.
This canvass board has not as yet received a copy of a report titled “abstract of votes” so we are unclear as to details.
Tuesday, August 24, 2004
We must move on to the rest of the canvass
Some important revelations came out of day-2, see below. One thing is clear, we must move on to the other areas of the canvass, or we will run out of time and be forced to take a non-support position on the canvass.
Who has the authority to approve the canvass?
With one exception, all of the people working in the room are temporary employees of the clerk and none have been legally appointed by their political party to serve as a canvass board member.
The GOP representative, Al Kolwicz, is the only party-appointed canvass board member. Does this mean that Kolwicz alone has the authority to approve/disapprove the canvass?
We have learned what we can from the precinct canvass
We have exhausted what is to be gleaned from the examination of the precinct materials. We can conclude the following:
- The temporary workers have not been instructed to follow a consistent auditing process. Consequently, their work-product is not uniform. This means that no scientific conclusions can be drawn from their effort. The method that my partner and I used for the first precinct on day-1 is very different from what we used for the last precinct on day-2. I am confident that what we would do on a fifth day would be even more different.
There is no cross-team communication, so there is no group learning going on. It is as though a canvass has never been done before.
- The procedures, training and forms used in the precinct are defective – they are error prone and do not produce a comparable result across precincts. These must be perfected before this system is ever used again.
- There is no list of (voter, ballot number) pairs – the poll book. The poll book is needed to verify the counts of voters and ballots. Just knowing that some person was assigned some ballot from some precinct is not good enough. Only eligible voters can be issued ballots, and the ballot that they are issued must be a ballot for the precinct where they are eligible to vote. The data available do not support this verification.
- The numbers of errors discovered during the precinct work casts doubt the accuracy of the count of voters and the ballots. The system is not suitable for use in an election where there is a small difference in vote count between the winner and the next highest vote earner. There is too much variation to support a high degree of confidence in the precinct results.
- The nomenclature used on the various documents is ambiguous and inconsistent. For example, on the Colorado Canvass Report, the term “Ballots Cast” is used instead of “Ballots Accepted by Scanner”. This likely means that different teams have interpreted these terms differently. This will cause great confusion when we attempt to conclude the canvass.
We must move on to the rest of the canvass
At least three times today I asked the supervisor to suspend working with the precinct data, and move on to the other areas. I asked when we will begin to verify the absentee, early, provisional, and emergency voters and ballots. I also asked when we would see a copy of the abstract of votes, and when we would begin to verify that all votes are correctly counted.
I was told by the supervisor that we’d start these after we complete the precinct work. I complained that we will run out of time needed to verify these areas.
I was told privately by team members that the team has never looked at these areas in the past.
It is vital that all voting methods be vigorously verified. After all, a very sizeable percentage of votes originate from non-precinct voting sources.
Sunday, August 22, 2004
Sun may never shine on new election system
Al Kolwicz, GOP member
It was very disheartening Friday to experience Boulder County’s heavy-handed methods in action. The sun may never shine on the work of this canvass board.
Colorado law requires that a canvass board be appointed to verify election results before they are made final. Republican and Democratic county parties appoint members to the board.
The board is required to verify that the number of ballots counted do not exceed the number of ballots cast and that all votes are counted correctly.
Friday’s first meeting of the canvass board was very disturbing. “The process is not open, it is being micro-managed by ill-prepared government personnel, it is being used to cover-up rather than identify defects, and it has gotten started on the wrong foot,” says Kolwicz.
Rather than starting with a system and task overview, members have been buried under a mountain of detail. It appears that there will be no attempt to professionally verify that the votes were correctly counted. This looks bad for November’s presidential election.
Process is not open - press muzzled like a dog
Investigative reporter, William Wagener, was barred from recording the canvass board meetings. Sheila Horton, an official candidate watcher, was barred from making an audio tape of the proceeding.
Jim Burrus, county press manager, told Wagener and Horton that they must not record the proceeding because it would violate Boulder County policy. When asked for a copy of the policy, Burrus said, “It is an unwritten policy”.
Obviously such a policy does not exist. On election night, Paul Aiken, a Boulder Camera photographer took photographs in the room where ballots were being processed. One of these photos was published on page 4A of the August 11th edition.
In addition, a HART InterCivic employee took many photographs in the room where ballots were being processed. The HART employee was not at all supervised.
Information kept secret - important and reasonable GOP request denied
The work of the canvass board is handicapped because the Clerk prohibits the board from resolving fundamental questions relating to the canvass.
Officials have prepared none of the documentation needed to facilitate the canvass. The Republican representative was denied his written request that agreement be reached on the following key items.
1. Rules that will govern the canvass.
2. Identification of all materials that will be available for the canvass.
3. Description of the methodology that will be used to complete the canvass.
As a consequence, a full day has passed and there are no rules, no list of materials, and no agreed-to methodology for completing the canvass. A valuable day has been lost.
Board being manipulated - time being squandered
The clerk has asserted itself to be in control of the board and has prohibited the canvass board from making independent judgments. Members are forced to look only at what the Clerk allows them to see. They work as two person teams, and not as a board. The board is not permitted to formulate their own, independent, canvassing and decision-making strategy.
The clerk has refused to provide the board with what it needs to perform its tasks. By forcing members to focus on tiny details, the board is blocked from gaining the perspective needed to perform its legal tasks.
By controlling the sequence in which election materials are reviewed, the clerk is keeping the board away from areas where uncertainty and error are most likely to exist.
Board members have not been provided with a complete inventory of materials. New material is identified by the clerk when and only if the clerk decides to disclose it.
Intimidation influencing canvass results
A uniformed sheriff’s deputy is present during the proceeding. Police have not been present in the past, and there is no explanation for police presence – but it is definitely intimidating.
Staff has seized control of the board, and use the subtle threat of the police to back them up. No statute or election rule has been presented to show that the clerk is operating within legal bounds.
In fact, since it is the clerk’s work that is being evaluated, it is highly inappropriate for the Clerk to control the board. To be accepted by the people as fair and open, the legally appointed representatives must be in charge of the canvass.
Some elections personnel are intimidating by being rude, abusive, and uncooperative. Simple requests are met with a “just sit down, shut up, and do what I tell you” response. The police presence and the absence of a video record add to the sense of threat.
There are no procedures for governing the canvass, so members do not know their rights. Staff says and does whatever they want to silence canvass board members and keep them pre-occupied.
Clerk’s personnel are not qualified
Verifying the results of a complex system is a highly sophisticated task requiring specialized knowledge and skills. It appears that none of the clerk’s personnel have been trained or have experience in these skills. They do not understand what is needed for the success of the canvass. Instead of working to identify defects, they instead are working to explain-away the defects.
The quality of the canvass is being severely compromised by the limited comprehension of the clerk’s personnel. This, coupled with the domineering posture they have assumed, will result in a violation of the charter of the board -- to verify that the number of ballots counted do not exceed the number of ballots cast and that all votes are counted correctly.
Recommendation
Insiders should relinquish control of the process to the legally appointed overseers.
And finally …
The conflict between the people and the Clerk is so simple. She wants to maintain control over a system that she does not fully understand. She wants to make her life easier by going through the motions of verification, but not perform the required tasks.
We, the canvass board and the watchdogs, understand the long history of why checks and balances have been built into the best practices of elections and the cost in public trust if these checks and balances are ignored.
The new systems that are being put into place all over this country have no history. The tests that are being run are ad hoc and really don’t test much at all. We are being asked to trust machines and procedures blindly.
Fair elections are too precious. We must not allow those who wish to hide the truth about our election system to silence the insightful.
Saturday, August 21, 2004
Boulder County GOP supports Al Kolwicz
Click to read the Boulder Camera story Boulder County GOP supports Al Kolwicz.
The Boulder County Republican Party legally appointed Al Kolwicz to serve as the Republican representative for the Logic and Accuracy Test, and also to serve as the Republican member of the Boulder County Canvass Board.
We the Boulder County Republican Party Executive Committee hereby affirm our support for Al Kolwicz and our desire that he and only he alone continue to serve as the Republican representative on the Canvass Board and the Logic and Accuracy Test.
Furthermore, we request that Boulder County Clerk, Linda Salas, send us a precise and detailed, written, legal explanation of why our appointed representative, Al Kolwicz, was told to leave the August 5th Logic and Accuracy Test and why he was denied his rights to represent our Party. We require this explanation before August 25, 2004.
If there is no legal basis for the exclusion of Al Kolwicz, we demand a public apology to Al Kolwicz and to Boulder County Republicans.
Resolved, August 19, 2004
Boulder County Republican Party Executive Committee
Wednesday, August 18, 2004
OK to participate in Canvass Board
- "Please advise me immediately if you know of any reason that I should not perform my service on this Canvass Board that will take place this Friday in the 33rd Street location."
- "The information I have is that you were asked to leave the building during a test and "lawful assembly"that you were believed to be disrupting. The deputy's instructions to you applied to that date and time, and that particular event. There is no permanent restriction on your participation or presence at the Clerk's Office that I am aware of, and no legal authority of a deputy sheriff to order such.
If there were to be another incident of disruption, threats, etc., of course the County Clerk could ask you to leave again, and you could be arrested for failure to comply with that particular request.
If the County Clerk chooses to attempt to permanently ban you from her County facility, she would be advised to seek a civil retraining order from the courts ordering such. You would be formally served with a copy and would know that it existed.
Finally, if you were to be arrested for a criminal violation, a Judge may order a "no contact" provision to any bond, which could/would restrict you from that facility or the Clerk's staff."
Tuesday, August 17, 2004
Detective interviews Kolwicz
Kolwicz initially thought that the visit was in response to a request sent to the Sheriff a few hours earlier. Kolwicz had asked the Sheriff to advise whether Kolwicz will be permitted to enter the county clerk's building in order to fulfill his duty on the Canvass Board.
The detective said that the interview was not related to this earlier request.
The detective said that the interview was related to charges filed by the Boulder County Attorney.
Canvass Board scheduled -- sheriff contacted
The sheriff has been contacted for a release that will permit the legally appointed Republican canvass board member, Al Kolwicz, to attend. Without this release, Kolwicz is barred from entering the public building where the board will meet.
The primary election was held on August 10th, and the canvass is to be completed by August 25th.
Monday, August 16, 2004
Canvass board meeting is still not scheduled
Boulder County has not set a time and place for canvassing work to begin. Proposed procedures and election materials have not been made available to the canvass board members. Repeated written requests for these facts have gone unanswered by the clerk.
If defects are discovered during the canvass, this late start could turn into a serious compliance problem. The canvass board is required to complete its duties by Wednesday, August 25th.
Any failure to meet the August 25th deadline will be caused by the clerk starting too late, not the board taking too long.
Sunday, August 15, 2004
Caldara: Want to know how I voted? Look it up
Please read Jon’s column.
Caldara: Want to know how I voted? Look it up
http://www.thedailycamera.com/bdc/insight/article/0,1713,BDC_2494_3109638,00.html
Then take two minutes to demand secret, accurate and verifiable elections.
Donetta Davidson
Secretary of State's Office
1560 Broadway, Suite 200
Denver, CO 80202
303 894 2200
FAX (303) 869-4861
SOS.Admin1@state.co.us
http://www.sos.state.co.us
We must STOP Boulder County from using their horrible voting system for the 2004 Presidential election.
We must not let officials force us to swallow another uncertain election like Florida 2000.
Thursday, August 12, 2004
What's a Canvass Board?
The following six snippets provide a sense of the duties and responsibilities of the canvass board.
- certify 1. to declare (a thing) true accurate, certain, etc. by formal statement, often in writing; verify; attest 2. to declare officially insane and committable to a mental institution 3. to guarantee the quality or worth of (a check, document, etc.); vouch for 4. to issue a certificate or license to 5. (Archaic) to assure; make certain – vi. to testify (to) – SYN approve). Webster’s New World Dictionary 2nd edition 1984
- "Abstract of votes cast" means a certified record of the results in each election for candidates for any office, ballot issue, or ballot question that the county clerk and recorder certified for the ballot. CRS 1-1-104(1).
- Duties of the canvass board. CRS 1-10-101.5.
The canvass board shall reconcile the ballots cast in an election to confirm that the number of ballots counted in that election does not exceed the number of ballots cast in that election.
The canvass board also shall certify the abstract of votes cast in any election.
- Imperfect returns - corrections. CRS 1-10-104.
(1) If, in the course of their duties, the canvass board or the secretary of state finds that the method of making or certifying returns from any precinct, county, or district does not conform to the requirements of law, the returns shall nevertheless be canvassed if they are sufficiently explicit in showing how many votes were cast for each candidate, ballot question, or ballot issue.
(2) If the canvass board or the secretary of state finds a clerical error or omission in the returns, the county clerk and recorder, after consultation with the election judges, shall make any correction required by the facts of the case. The election judges shall sign and submit to the canvass board any documentation required for any explanation or verification of the additions or corrections. The canvass board may adjourn from day to day for the purpose of obtaining the additions or corrections.
- Canvass board to conduct recount. CRS 1-10.5-107.
(1) Any county clerk and recorder or governing body required to conduct a recount shall arrange to have the recount made by the canvass board who officiated in certifying the official abstract of votes cast. If any member of the canvass board cannot participate in the recount, another person shall be appointed in the manner provided by law for appointment of the members of the original board.
(2) Any canvass board making a recount under the provisions of this section may employ assistants and clerks as necessary for the conduct of the recount.
(3) The canvass board may require the production of any documentary evidence regarding any vote cast or counted and may correct the abstract of votes cast in accordance with its findings based on the evidence presented.
(4) At the conclusion of the recount, the canvass board shall make the returns of all partisan, nonpartisan, ballot issue, and ballot question elections to the designated election official and provide a copy to the persons or groups requesting the recount or notified of the recount pursuant to sections 1-10.5-105 and 1-10.5-106. The canvass board shall meet and issue an amended abstract of votes cast for the office, ballot issue, or ballot question that is the subject of the recount and deliver it to the designated election official.
(5) The designated election official shall notify the governing body of the results of the recount.
- Accurate counting requires compliance with applicable law.
HAVA says on page 41 of http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/hava/pl252_107.pdf
TITLE III-UNIFORM AND NONDISCRIMINATORY ELECTION TECHNOLOGY AND ADMINISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
(6) UNIFORM DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A VOTE.-
Each State shall adopt uniform and nondiscriminatory standards that define what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote for each category of voting system used in the State.