According to the Denver Post,
DenverPost.com - Article Launched: 3/09/2006 01:00 AM
Partisan farewell
Colorado elections director William "Billy" Compton has been asked to leave his post early after he took a job as political director for the Democratic Party. Compton was scheduled to leave March 17, but left Wednesday instead.
Republican Secretary of State Gigi Dennis said through a spokesman that she wanted to avoid any appearance of a conflict.
"Mr. Compton is on paid administrative leave. His last official day was today," Dennis' spokeswoman Dana Williams said. "The reason for that is because of the nature of his new position with a partisan organization."
Friday, March 10, 2006
Thursday, March 09, 2006
Colorado political party hires Colorado's Elections Director
Colorado’s Director of Elections, Bill Compton is leaving to become Political Director for the Colorado Democratic Party
Is it proper for a high ranking Colorado election official to move to a high ranking position with a Colorado political party? It does not matter which party -- it does raise serious questions.
Can Colorado's 2006 elections be trusted? Compton is not the only employee to leave, and Secretary of State Gigi Dennis is new to the office. Who will be running the 2006 elections, certifying equipment and elections, and resolving election disputes?
Knowledge and contacts learned while serving as top election official could be used to tip election results. The Secretary of State must take specific actions to protect the people of Colorado from this threat.
• Not all election information has been released to the public. For example, detailed databases have not been released to the public, and they can give an edge to a campaign.
• Confidential knowledge of voting equipment is not public and can be used to secretly manipulate elections.
• Weaknesses in Colorado’s election system are known to Compton and can be exploited without much risk of detection.
Compton leaves behind an election system that is not secure, not accurate, not verifiable, not transparent, and not private. The system is open to error, fraud and abuse.
There is no reason to believe that Compton would abuse his knowledge, but the state has an obligation to take steps to protect the people.
The Secretary of State should get a written agreement from Compton attesting that he retains no access to or copies of files/records that are unavailable to the general public. This is typical for private sector key employees. It is vital that Compton be explicitly instructed and bound to protect this valuable information.
• Is Compton prohibited from keeping copies of files/documents for his own use?
• Is Compton prohibited from sharing insider information?
• Is there a clear identification of confidential information?
• Are high level employees bound by non-disclosure agreements?
• Who is responsible for protecting insider information?
All political campaigns (candidate as well as issue) should immediately take steps to protect themselves. Contact the Secretary of State and confirm that Colorado’s valuable election information will be protected from the revolving door of election officials.
Is it proper for a high ranking Colorado election official to move to a high ranking position with a Colorado political party? It does not matter which party -- it does raise serious questions.
Can Colorado's 2006 elections be trusted? Compton is not the only employee to leave, and Secretary of State Gigi Dennis is new to the office. Who will be running the 2006 elections, certifying equipment and elections, and resolving election disputes?
Knowledge and contacts learned while serving as top election official could be used to tip election results. The Secretary of State must take specific actions to protect the people of Colorado from this threat.
• Not all election information has been released to the public. For example, detailed databases have not been released to the public, and they can give an edge to a campaign.
• Confidential knowledge of voting equipment is not public and can be used to secretly manipulate elections.
• Weaknesses in Colorado’s election system are known to Compton and can be exploited without much risk of detection.
Compton leaves behind an election system that is not secure, not accurate, not verifiable, not transparent, and not private. The system is open to error, fraud and abuse.
There is no reason to believe that Compton would abuse his knowledge, but the state has an obligation to take steps to protect the people.
The Secretary of State should get a written agreement from Compton attesting that he retains no access to or copies of files/records that are unavailable to the general public. This is typical for private sector key employees. It is vital that Compton be explicitly instructed and bound to protect this valuable information.
• Is Compton prohibited from keeping copies of files/documents for his own use?
• Is Compton prohibited from sharing insider information?
• Is there a clear identification of confidential information?
• Are high level employees bound by non-disclosure agreements?
• Who is responsible for protecting insider information?
All political campaigns (candidate as well as issue) should immediately take steps to protect themselves. Contact the Secretary of State and confirm that Colorado’s valuable election information will be protected from the revolving door of election officials.
Tuesday, March 07, 2006
David Dill is beginning to "get it".
David Dill’s March 7th article Making Democracy Transparent shows that Dill is beginning to “get it” but has not yet “got it”.
We have preached long and hard that trustworthy elections are required to be transparent, use anonymous ballots, and be verifiably secure and accurate. Dill appears to be catching on -- albeit slowly.
Dill wants us to believe that elections conducted using digital ballots can comply with these requirements, without offering any proof that they can do so. We have seen no evidence that this is true, and continue to distrust claims that they can.
Stopgap solutions, such as US HR 550, don't meet these requirements. These stopgap measures are harmful; they are used to deflect pressure for addressing the fundamental system problems and enable officials to purchase inadequate electronic voting equipment.
We welcome Dill's work in the field, and hope he will soon join us in our quest for election systems that are transparent, use anonymous ballots, and are verifiably secure and accurate.
We have preached long and hard that trustworthy elections are required to be transparent, use anonymous ballots, and be verifiably secure and accurate. Dill appears to be catching on -- albeit slowly.
Dill wants us to believe that elections conducted using digital ballots can comply with these requirements, without offering any proof that they can do so. We have seen no evidence that this is true, and continue to distrust claims that they can.
Stopgap solutions, such as US HR 550, don't meet these requirements. These stopgap measures are harmful; they are used to deflect pressure for addressing the fundamental system problems and enable officials to purchase inadequate electronic voting equipment.
We welcome Dill's work in the field, and hope he will soon join us in our quest for election systems that are transparent, use anonymous ballots, and are verifiably secure and accurate.
Sunday, March 05, 2006
Say "no" to email and fax voting
Colorado legislators act to weaken secure elections. Through Senate Bill SB-062, Colorado legislators and election officials intend to permit voting by email and by fax.
If "limited" email voting were available to anybody, I believe that the “equal protection” clause of the law would permit others to gain access to the voting method. Can anybody guarantee that this would not happen?.
In any event, there are many elected officials who have experienced an election win or loss due to a very small number of votes. The point being -- EVERY SINGLE VOTE IS IMPORTANT, AND WE CANNOT SACRIFICE ANY. These officials should understand this. Elections are getting closer and closer. Every ineligible vote counted is a way to disenfranchise an eligible voter – by cancelling the eligible voter’s choices.
Also, for those who would vote for this bill I ask, “how can it be verified that the person voting by email is the specific person who is authorized to vote the ballot? The bill does not address this major defect. Consequently, email voting credentials will instantly have significant value.
Email voting credentials will be sold by voters who don’t care about the election contests. They will be bought by those who are able to collect these credentials and sell them (in a block) to the highest bidder. It will be like selling your user-ID and password to your internet account. Nobody will know if it is you, or your friend, or some miscreant who is logged into your account. Think of the power an individual will have when he says to a candidate, “I can offer you voting credentials for 15,000 votes if you will give me …”
I can see the buyer’s sales pitches now -- Your voting credentials are your ticket to this gigantic “let’s not vote” party. Come one, come all. Leave your credentials at the door.
Or better yet – donate your voting credentials to “worthy cause”. Worthy cause has a deep pockets donor who will make a $20.00 donation for every set of valid credentials that we give to him.
FAX voting has its own set of concerns. As with absentee voting, voters can be intimidated and there is nobody to see it; return envelopes can be signed by the eligible voter and turned over with the un-voted ballot FOR A PRICE; and signatures can be transferred from other documents or simply forged without concern for detection – since the person forging the document is never seen. To my knowledge, there is no evidence that signature verification accurately authenticates that the person who signed a ballot is the eligible voter.
Does anybody believe that those outside of our country would not take advantage of this gigantic opportunity to influence American elections?
SB062 is a step toward election chaos. Those voting FOR the bill will show their lack of understanding of why verifiable security is mandatory, and should be kept far away from future election system matters.
If "limited" email voting were available to anybody, I believe that the “equal protection” clause of the law would permit others to gain access to the voting method. Can anybody guarantee that this would not happen?.
In any event, there are many elected officials who have experienced an election win or loss due to a very small number of votes. The point being -- EVERY SINGLE VOTE IS IMPORTANT, AND WE CANNOT SACRIFICE ANY. These officials should understand this. Elections are getting closer and closer. Every ineligible vote counted is a way to disenfranchise an eligible voter – by cancelling the eligible voter’s choices.
Also, for those who would vote for this bill I ask, “how can it be verified that the person voting by email is the specific person who is authorized to vote the ballot? The bill does not address this major defect. Consequently, email voting credentials will instantly have significant value.
Email voting credentials will be sold by voters who don’t care about the election contests. They will be bought by those who are able to collect these credentials and sell them (in a block) to the highest bidder. It will be like selling your user-ID and password to your internet account. Nobody will know if it is you, or your friend, or some miscreant who is logged into your account. Think of the power an individual will have when he says to a candidate, “I can offer you voting credentials for 15,000 votes if you will give me …”
I can see the buyer’s sales pitches now -- Your voting credentials are your ticket to this gigantic “let’s not vote” party. Come one, come all. Leave your credentials at the door.
Or better yet – donate your voting credentials to “worthy cause”. Worthy cause has a deep pockets donor who will make a $20.00 donation for every set of valid credentials that we give to him.
FAX voting has its own set of concerns. As with absentee voting, voters can be intimidated and there is nobody to see it; return envelopes can be signed by the eligible voter and turned over with the un-voted ballot FOR A PRICE; and signatures can be transferred from other documents or simply forged without concern for detection – since the person forging the document is never seen. To my knowledge, there is no evidence that signature verification accurately authenticates that the person who signed a ballot is the eligible voter.
Does anybody believe that those outside of our country would not take advantage of this gigantic opportunity to influence American elections?
SB062 is a step toward election chaos. Those voting FOR the bill will show their lack of understanding of why verifiable security is mandatory, and should be kept far away from future election system matters.
Saturday, March 04, 2006
Voters need to replace Colorado election officials
Trustworthy elections are an essential component of representative government.
Current election officials are failing to provide trustworthy elections.
Colorado Voter urges voters to elect new election officials who will adopt a balloting system that provides for transparent elections, anonymous ballots and verifiably secure and accurate results.
- Current officials refuse to provide a secret ballot.
- Current officials refuse to permit public oversight of elections.
- Current officials refuse to require verifiable election system systems and procedures.
- Current officials refuse to require secure voter authentication and balloting.
- Current officials refuse to require proof of accuracy for each election process.
Those currently serving as Colorado's election officials must be replaced. We need executives who are committed to providing transparent elections, anonymous ballots and verifiably secure and accurate results.
Current election officials are failing to provide trustworthy elections.
Colorado Voter urges voters to elect new election officials who will adopt a balloting system that provides for transparent elections, anonymous ballots and verifiably secure and accurate results.
- Current officials refuse to provide a secret ballot.
- Current officials refuse to permit public oversight of elections.
- Current officials refuse to require verifiable election system systems and procedures.
- Current officials refuse to require secure voter authentication and balloting.
- Current officials refuse to require proof of accuracy for each election process.
Those currently serving as Colorado's election officials must be replaced. We need executives who are committed to providing transparent elections, anonymous ballots and verifiably secure and accurate results.
Friday, March 03, 2006
Email voting is coming to Colorado and state election director who fostered it is quitting
Just one day after testifying to the Colorado House State, Veterans, and Military Affairs committee about how carefully email voting would be managed under SB06-062, state elections director Billy Compton resigned as noted in today's Denver Post story County voting officials boxed in - Voids in 2 state posts add to anxiety over August primaries. Proponents of voting integrity lost that vote after Billy testified twice, and the committee approved email voting 6-5 along party lines.
Despite acknowledging that there are grave problems with security using email voting, Mr. Compton testified his office would be able to safely use email voting. He also testified how one sailor on one ship had not been able to fax his ballot so he had brought forward the plan for email voting. However, it was clear that Mr. Compton had not sought input from military sources as to the need for or how email voting might be implemented or from technical or security experts. The committee also broadened the bill so that email voting can essentially be used by anyone overseas. Presumably they meant to limit it to citizens but Senator McElhany's bill to require proof of citizenship to register to vote was defeated so China, Mexico, and wherever, feel free, Colorado welcomes your votes.
For six years now, that I'm aware of, every time there has been a bad idea for voting, or the Colorado Sec. of State has been approached for information, or to enforce election law or constitutional protections such as a secret ballot, Billy Compton has been the culprit.
Compton and Drew Durham backed Accenture for the non-existent voter registration database that he couldn't get going after four years and, as the article notes, hasn't even gone out on bid yet for a new contractor.
Boulder County bought the Hart Intercivic voting system that Compton's office has now certified for disabled voters. The Hart system couldn't handle ballots fast enough for a polling place election and eliminated a secret ballot. So now Boulder is looking for a whole new voting system but Compton's office simply turned a blind eye to the problems.
So Billy Compton definitely won't be missed but the disasters of his heritage will live on.
Charles E. Corry, Ph.D., F.G.S.A.
Despite acknowledging that there are grave problems with security using email voting, Mr. Compton testified his office would be able to safely use email voting. He also testified how one sailor on one ship had not been able to fax his ballot so he had brought forward the plan for email voting. However, it was clear that Mr. Compton had not sought input from military sources as to the need for or how email voting might be implemented or from technical or security experts. The committee also broadened the bill so that email voting can essentially be used by anyone overseas. Presumably they meant to limit it to citizens but Senator McElhany's bill to require proof of citizenship to register to vote was defeated so China, Mexico, and wherever, feel free, Colorado welcomes your votes.
For six years now, that I'm aware of, every time there has been a bad idea for voting, or the Colorado Sec. of State has been approached for information, or to enforce election law or constitutional protections such as a secret ballot, Billy Compton has been the culprit.
Compton and Drew Durham backed Accenture for the non-existent voter registration database that he couldn't get going after four years and, as the article notes, hasn't even gone out on bid yet for a new contractor.
Boulder County bought the Hart Intercivic voting system that Compton's office has now certified for disabled voters. The Hart system couldn't handle ballots fast enough for a polling place election and eliminated a secret ballot. So now Boulder is looking for a whole new voting system but Compton's office simply turned a blind eye to the problems.
So Billy Compton definitely won't be missed but the disasters of his heritage will live on.
Charles E. Corry, Ph.D., F.G.S.A.
Wednesday, February 08, 2006
Voting equipment selection process will be closed to the public
In December, the Boulder County Clerk solicited public comments on a Draft RFP for voting equipment.
The draft provoked hundreds of citizen comments recommending against the use of electronic voting. Click to read the 5.7 MB (200 page) Draft RFP citizen comments.
Despite the enormous public backlash, the county clerk has decided to proceed with her plan to bring untrustworthy digital ballots to Boulder County. Click to read the Rental RFP.
CAMBER filed an Open Records Request (see February 2 posting). One of the items requested is:
What happened? Boulder County once had a tradition of supporting open government.
This is the time for the press and citizens to rally together and work to restore transparent government.
The draft provoked hundreds of citizen comments recommending against the use of electronic voting. Click to read the 5.7 MB (200 page) Draft RFP citizen comments.
Despite the enormous public backlash, the county clerk has decided to proceed with her plan to bring untrustworthy digital ballots to Boulder County. Click to read the Rental RFP.
CAMBER filed an Open Records Request (see February 2 posting). One of the items requested is:
“Planned checkpoints including dates that the public will have an opportunity to participate in the process.”The County Attorney responded (see February 3 posting) that:
"Generally, the RFP process is closed to the public, for a variety of sound business reasons."Election officials are telling us that the people have no say in how their elections will be conducted.
What happened? Boulder County once had a tradition of supporting open government.
This is the time for the press and citizens to rally together and work to restore transparent government.
Friday, February 03, 2006
County response to Feb 2nd Open Records Request
February 3, 2006
Al Kolwicz
CAMBER
2667 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
RE: Open Records Request Dated February 2, 2006
Dear Mr. Kolwicz:
This letter is a response to your Open Records Request dated February 2, 2006.
1. Equipment requirements are stated in the RFP, which can be accessed at http://www.co.boulder.co.us/clerk/elections/ . A copy of the RFP is also available for inspection in my office. Please call me if you would like to inspect the document.
2. Voting system requirements are stated in the RFP.
3. The County does not have custody of a record containing “rejected requirements submitted by citizens.”
4. As stated above, the requested RFP is available on the web or for inspection at my office. Drafts of the RFP remain work product and as such are not releasable under the Open Records Act. C.R.S. 24-72-202(6)(b).
5. The only identified dates for the RFP process are those set forth in the RFP itself. I also have in my office, for your inspection, a copy of the section of the County's Policy Manual regarding RFP's. Generally, the RFP process is closed to the public, for a variety of sound business reasons. However, the Policy does set forth when the public is given notice of certain information. Additionally, when the Clerk is ready to make a recommendation for award, this will occur at a business meeting. It will be within the discretion of the Board of County Commissioners whether or not to take public testimony at that time.
When reading the RFP Policy, it would be helpful to keep in mind that the requirements and procedures vary for "invitations to bid" (referred to in the policy as 'bids') and Requests for Proposals. The selection of voting equipment for lease will conform to the procedures for RFPs, not bids.
The following information was provided to me by our Purchasing Agent, Jenny Olberding, which might be helpful to you in understanding the difference between a bid and an RFP as set forth in the Policy Manual.
Bids
Competitive sealed bidding requires that bids be evaluated and awarded on information contained in the invitation at the time of the bid opening. No substantive changes would affect determination of an award. Some examples of a Bid would be for the purchase of something that does not include a service component, such as equipment, vehicles or supplies. As per County policy, bids are opened publicly. The name of the company and their offer are read aloud publicly.
RFP’s
RFP’s allow the County to negotiate the services and equipment submitted in a proposal to meet the organizations needs. RFP’s are evaluated not only on price, but can include ability to meet a set of minimum requirements, qualifications and previous experience. Price is not always the determining factor in the evaluation of an RFP. As per County policy, RFP’s can be opened publicly, but only the names of the firms who submitted are shared. This process has been established to maintain the integrity of the RFP process and to provide a fair and competitive negotiation process to the best of our ability.
6. There are no documents containing the “[n]ames of people who contributed to the requirements and RFP.”
7. A list of potential vendors is available for your inspection at my office. This list documents the known vendors that the RFP was sent to directly; however, the RFP is open to any Vendor, and the County will accept any responses that meet the RFP and RFP Policy requirements.
8. There are no written procedures for how the public will participate in the specification of requirements and the RFP. As I stated above, the RFP process and work done by the evaluation committee will be closed to the public, per long-standing County policy. There may be some opportunity for public input during this process, but that will be determined by the evaluation committee. As you know, the RFP was originally released to the public for input prior to its release to vendors. Although the RFP changed during that time from an RFP for Purchase to an RFP for Lease, the substantive equipment requirements remained the same. Therefore, the County was able to use and incorporate many of the public comments in the final version of the RFP for Lease. At this point, the public has had input in the RFP process. Any further input will be at the discretion of the evaluation committee and the Board of County Commissioners.
9. There are no documents that include "[p]rocedures for how the public comments that were collected by the clerk will be evaluated and integrated in the rental RFP." Public comments were received and incorporated as appropriate. Both the comments received by the public and the final RFP are available on the web for public inspection. A review of both will reveal what public comments were incorporated into the final RFP.
If you have any questions, please feel free to call me at 441-3855.
Sincerely,
Shelley Stratton Bailey
Assistant County Attorney
aj
Available for inspection:
List of Vendors
Boulder County Policy Manual—Section II: Finance/Budget/Purchasing
RFP # 4730-06
Al Kolwicz
CAMBER
2667 Tincup Circle
Boulder, CO 80305
RE: Open Records Request Dated February 2, 2006
Dear Mr. Kolwicz:
This letter is a response to your Open Records Request dated February 2, 2006.
1. Equipment requirements are stated in the RFP, which can be accessed at http://www.co.boulder.co.us/clerk/elections/ . A copy of the RFP is also available for inspection in my office. Please call me if you would like to inspect the document.
2. Voting system requirements are stated in the RFP.
3. The County does not have custody of a record containing “rejected requirements submitted by citizens.”
4. As stated above, the requested RFP is available on the web or for inspection at my office. Drafts of the RFP remain work product and as such are not releasable under the Open Records Act. C.R.S. 24-72-202(6)(b).
5. The only identified dates for the RFP process are those set forth in the RFP itself. I also have in my office, for your inspection, a copy of the section of the County's Policy Manual regarding RFP's. Generally, the RFP process is closed to the public, for a variety of sound business reasons. However, the Policy does set forth when the public is given notice of certain information. Additionally, when the Clerk is ready to make a recommendation for award, this will occur at a business meeting. It will be within the discretion of the Board of County Commissioners whether or not to take public testimony at that time.
When reading the RFP Policy, it would be helpful to keep in mind that the requirements and procedures vary for "invitations to bid" (referred to in the policy as 'bids') and Requests for Proposals. The selection of voting equipment for lease will conform to the procedures for RFPs, not bids.
The following information was provided to me by our Purchasing Agent, Jenny Olberding, which might be helpful to you in understanding the difference between a bid and an RFP as set forth in the Policy Manual.
Bids
Competitive sealed bidding requires that bids be evaluated and awarded on information contained in the invitation at the time of the bid opening. No substantive changes would affect determination of an award. Some examples of a Bid would be for the purchase of something that does not include a service component, such as equipment, vehicles or supplies. As per County policy, bids are opened publicly. The name of the company and their offer are read aloud publicly.
RFP’s
RFP’s allow the County to negotiate the services and equipment submitted in a proposal to meet the organizations needs. RFP’s are evaluated not only on price, but can include ability to meet a set of minimum requirements, qualifications and previous experience. Price is not always the determining factor in the evaluation of an RFP. As per County policy, RFP’s can be opened publicly, but only the names of the firms who submitted are shared. This process has been established to maintain the integrity of the RFP process and to provide a fair and competitive negotiation process to the best of our ability.
6. There are no documents containing the “[n]ames of people who contributed to the requirements and RFP.”
7. A list of potential vendors is available for your inspection at my office. This list documents the known vendors that the RFP was sent to directly; however, the RFP is open to any Vendor, and the County will accept any responses that meet the RFP and RFP Policy requirements.
8. There are no written procedures for how the public will participate in the specification of requirements and the RFP. As I stated above, the RFP process and work done by the evaluation committee will be closed to the public, per long-standing County policy. There may be some opportunity for public input during this process, but that will be determined by the evaluation committee. As you know, the RFP was originally released to the public for input prior to its release to vendors. Although the RFP changed during that time from an RFP for Purchase to an RFP for Lease, the substantive equipment requirements remained the same. Therefore, the County was able to use and incorporate many of the public comments in the final version of the RFP for Lease. At this point, the public has had input in the RFP process. Any further input will be at the discretion of the evaluation committee and the Board of County Commissioners.
9. There are no documents that include "[p]rocedures for how the public comments that were collected by the clerk will be evaluated and integrated in the rental RFP." Public comments were received and incorporated as appropriate. Both the comments received by the public and the final RFP are available on the web for public inspection. A review of both will reveal what public comments were incorporated into the final RFP.
If you have any questions, please feel free to call me at 441-3855.
Sincerely,
Shelley Stratton Bailey
Assistant County Attorney
aj
Available for inspection:
List of Vendors
Boulder County Policy Manual—Section II: Finance/Budget/Purchasing
RFP # 4730-06
Thursday, February 02, 2006
Boulder County secretly developed and today released RFP
Boulder County secretly developed and today released to suppliers a RFP for rental voting equipment.
Many citizens are concerned that the RFP does not explicitly require: (1) a secret ballot, (2) a paper ballot, and (3) voting equipment that is verifiably secure, accurate and transparent. Any RFP that does not specify that these three elements are mandatory is unacceptable to these citizens.
CAMBER has been trying for weeks to gain access to information about the RFP and the process being used to develop it. The county has successfully kept secret the rental RFP and associated data from the public.
CAMBER immediately issued an Open Records Request in order to discover what Boulder County has planned for the 2006 Primary and General elections.
CAMBER hopes that the February 2nd Open Records Request will bring some sunshine to Boulder County.
Spokesman Al Kolwicz said, "We are terribly disappointed that Boulder County has seen fit to conduct the public’s business in secret. It is not the standard that the people expect from public officials."
Many citizens are concerned that the RFP does not explicitly require: (1) a secret ballot, (2) a paper ballot, and (3) voting equipment that is verifiably secure, accurate and transparent. Any RFP that does not specify that these three elements are mandatory is unacceptable to these citizens.
CAMBER has been trying for weeks to gain access to information about the RFP and the process being used to develop it. The county has successfully kept secret the rental RFP and associated data from the public.
CAMBER immediately issued an Open Records Request in order to discover what Boulder County has planned for the 2006 Primary and General elections.
CAMBER hopes that the February 2nd Open Records Request will bring some sunshine to Boulder County.
Spokesman Al Kolwicz said, "We are terribly disappointed that Boulder County has seen fit to conduct the public’s business in secret. It is not the standard that the people expect from public officials."
Open Records Request - February 2, 2006
Ms. Bailey,
Attached is an Open Records Request form.
We are terribly disappointed that Boulder County has seen fit to conduct the public’s business in secret. See below. It is not the standard that the people expect.
There ought to be a law protecting the public from public officials who abuse their office to silence dissent.
We hope that the county will provide an immediate response to our new request.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
Al
=========================
The following request is made under the Colorado Public Records law:
Date: ______________________2/2/2006
Name: Al Kolwicz
Organization represented (if any): CAMBER
Address/Phone No.: 2867 Tincup Circle, Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
Name of document(s) requested:
February 2, 2006
We have read in today’s PRESS RELEASE that Boulder County has released an RFP for rental voting equipment for the 2006 election. As you know, we are very interested in the purity of the 2006 elections.
We request copies of drafts and final documents related to the solicitation of bids for the rental voting equipment, including but not limited to:
Attached is an Open Records Request form.
We are terribly disappointed that Boulder County has seen fit to conduct the public’s business in secret. See below. It is not the standard that the people expect.
There ought to be a law protecting the public from public officials who abuse their office to silence dissent.
We hope that the county will provide an immediate response to our new request.
Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter.
Al
=========================
The following request is made under the Colorado Public Records law:
Date: ______________________2/2/2006
Name: Al Kolwicz
Organization represented (if any): CAMBER
Address/Phone No.: 2867 Tincup Circle, Boulder, CO 80305
303-494-1540
Name of document(s) requested:
February 2, 2006
We have read in today’s PRESS RELEASE that Boulder County has released an RFP for rental voting equipment for the 2006 election. As you know, we are very interested in the purity of the 2006 elections.
We request copies of drafts and final documents related to the solicitation of bids for the rental voting equipment, including but not limited to:
- Equipment Requirements
- Voting System Requirements
- Rejected requirements that were submitted by citizens
- Request for Proposals (RFP)
- Planned checkpoints including dates that the public will have an opportunity to participate in the process.
- Names of people who contributed to the requirements and RFP
- Identification of potential vendors
- Procedures for how the public will participate in the selection of the vendor proposals
- Procedures for how the public comments that were recently collected by the clerk were evaluated and integrated into the rental RFP
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